Rebecca Heath, University of Cambridge
Department of Sociology (42-43 Park End Street) or MS Teams
Please join either in person or online. For in-person attendees, the talk will be preceded by a light lunch at 12.15pm.
Please email comms@sociology.ox.ac.uk with any questions.
Abstract
This study proposes the manipulation of markets as an alternative to the conventional policing of cybercrime that is focussed on taking down marketplaces and arresting key individuals. We present two web-based experiments examining the effect of a partial disruption to delivery on market functioning. Study 1 shows that in a single-platform environment, a partial disruption to delivery can decrease market efficiency. This decrease is borne by sellers who sell fewer goods and have lower earnings.
Study 2 introduces a multi-platform environment to examine displacement. We show that a partial disruption to delivery can reduce activity on the targeted platform, mitigating the direct effects of the disruption on market efficiency. However, we also find that a partial disruption to delivery can trigger negative selection: deceptive sellers are significantly more likely than honest sellers to switch platforms in the short run. Thus, the disruption may generate secondary inefficiencies that warrant further study. This research paves the way for evidence-based, causally driven investigations to inform policies aimed at disrupting cybercrime and other illicit markets.
