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Class and Status: The Conceptual Distinction
and its Empirical Relevance

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Abstract

In this paper, we defend Max Weber's distinction between class and status as related but different forms of social stratification. We argue that this distinction is not only conceptually cogent, but that class and status do have differing explanatory power in different areas of social life. Consistently with Weber's argument, we show that economic security and prospects are stratified more by class than by status, while the opposite is true for outcomes in the domain of lifestyle and cultural consumption. As for politics, we show that it is class rather than status which predicts the choice between voting Conservative or Labour in British general elections. Class also predicts 'Left-Right' political attitudes, but it is status rather than class which predicts 'Libertarian-Authoritarian' attitudes.

1 Introduction

Max Weber's distinction between 'class' and 'status' (Weber, 1968, pp.252–272 esp.) is a commonplace of introductory courses and texts in social stratification. Yet in contemporary research in this field very little use of the distinction is in fact made.

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In the US, much of the conceptual refinement of Weber's approach would appear already to have been lost by the 1950s and 1960s as leading authors in effect reinterpreted class in terms of status. Thus, one finds definitions of social classes on such lines as 'strata of society composed of individuals who accept each other as status equals' (Lipset and Bendix, 1959, p.275) or 'aggregate[s] of persons, within a society, possessing approximately the same status' (Shils, 1975, p.249). Subsequently, the essentially one-dimensional view of stratification implicit in such definitions was confirmed through the widespread acceptance of the notion of 'socioeconomic' status, which, while little explicated, allowed stratification to be treated—in a way highly convenient to quantitative researchers—in terms of a single continuous measure such as the Duncan Socio-Economic Index (Duncan, 1961).¹

In Europe, and especially perhaps in Britain, the idea of class and status as two qualitatively different forms of social stratification retained currency through to the 1970s, following its effective deployment in Lockwood's influential *The Blackcoated Worker* (1958) and also in various community studies. However, interest in status then rather rapidly declined. In part, this can be seen as a response to actual social change—that is, to the rather evident decay over the post-war decades of many features of the 'traditional' status order. But also important was the revival of academic Marxism and a consequent preoccupation, on the part of Marxist and non-Marxist sociologists alike, with issues of class. More recently, the theoretical efforts of Bourdieu (see esp. 1984) have attracted much attention and, in particular, his attempt to 'rethink' and indeed overcome Weber's 'opposition' between class and status (1984, p.xii): that is, by treating status as the symbolic aspect of class structure which is itself deemed to be not reducible to 'economic' relations alone. At about the same time, a group of British researchers, in seeking to determine what they subsequently refer to as 'generalised advantage/disadvantage' or 'stratification arrangements', quite explicitly rejected the Weberian distinction as being 'neither useful nor necessary' (Stewart *et al.*, 1980, p.28).²

¹That authors such as Bendix and Shils, who were notable Weber scholars, should be involved in the abandonment of a Weberian approach is puzzling. One possibility is that they were seeking in some way to implement the idea of 'social classes' that Weber introduces in a quite separate section of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* from that in which the distinction between class and status is most fully elaborated. However, the former section is in little more than note form, the idea of 'social classes' remains undeveloped, and the text as it stands could provide no warrant for any attempt at reducing class to status. As regards the Duncan index, it seems often forgotten that this originated in an ingenious attempt to use available income and educational data in order to derive *prestige* scores for all occupational categories recognised in the US Census.

²In practice, what Stewart *et al.* (1980) did was to estimate the 'social distance' between

In a previous paper (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2004), we have sought to re-assert the conceptual value of the distinction between class and status; and also to argue, on empirical grounds, that, in present-day British society at least, a status order is still discernible, and one that, even if less sharply demarcated, retains clear continuities with that described for the later nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries in historical and pioneering sociological research.³ In the present paper, we have two further, complementary aims. On the one hand, we seek to show, again on empirical grounds, how, in different areas of social life, the stratification of outcomes, whether seen as life-chances or life-choices, may predominantly occur on the basis of *either* class *or* status. On the other hand, we hope thus to clarify and reinforce the case for treating class and status as qualitatively different forms of stratification that exert their effects through quite different social processes, and that alike need recognition if a full understanding of the structuring of social inequality in contemporary societies is to be obtained.

2 Class and status

Taking a broadly Weberian position, we regard a class structure as one formed by the social relations of economic life or, more specifically, by relations in labour markets and production units. Thus, a primary level of differentiation of class positions is that which separates those of employers, self-employed workers and employees. However, in modern societies, further differentiation must be recognised among employees in terms of their relations with employers as these are regulated by the (implicit as well as explicit) terms of their employment contracts. In recent years, a fairly wide consensus would in fact appear to have emerged, at least among sociologists engaging in comparative empirical research, in treating class operationally on these lines.⁴

occupations, using techniques that were pioneered by Laumann (1966, 1973). We adopt essentially the same approach in our own work but with the aim specifically of identifying a status order (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2004). In Britain over the last twenty years or so the most notable attempts to apply a Weberian approach have been made in historical sociology (Runciman, 1983, 1989, 1997) and social history (Cannadine, 1990).

³Preliminary results from a comparative research project on the social stratification of cultural consumption, in which we are engaged with colleagues from six other countries, suggest that, following a methodology similar to our own (see further below), a status order can be identified in these countries also; and further that some significant cross-national commonality exists in the occupationally-based status hierarchies that emerge.

⁴That is, on the basis of the EGP or CASMIN class schema (see further Erikson *et al.*, 1979; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992, ch.2). A research programme is currently in progress aimed at investigating the suitability of a development of this schema to serve as a common EU social classification (see www.iser.essex.ac.uk/esec).

Again following Weber, we regard a status order as a structure of relations expressing perceived, and in some degree accepted, social superiority, equality and inferiority among individuals that is of a quite diffuse kind and that reflects not their personal qualities but rather certain of their positional or perhaps purely ascribed attributes (e.g. ‘birth’ or ethnicity). In status orders in their more developed forms—such as were found, say, in early modern Europe—differences in patterns of association and lifestyles were marked and had a strong institutional underpinning. Members of different status groups enjoyed various exclusive rights and privileges, sanctioned by law or custom: for example, those of bearing arms, of holding certain political offices or franchises or forms of property, or of engaging in particular occupations or kinds of consumption.⁵ However, in modern societies, the development of ideas of citizenship, implying a fundamental equality of legal, political and social rights (cf. Marshall, 1950; Lockwood, 1992, pp.173-8 esp.), means that the status order becomes of an increasingly ‘conventional’ character. That is to say, patterns of differential association and distinctiveness in lifestyles are for the most part maintained only informally. Moreover, the egalitarian ideology associated with citizenship, as epitomised in the belief that ‘one person is as good as another’ (cf. Shils, 1975), results in a greater reluctance on the part of those treated as social inferiors to respond with deference, and in claims to superiority becoming in any event less often made, at least in an explicit and public form (for Britain, see further Runciman, 1997; McKibbin, 1998). Thus, the hierarchy of status relations becomes less sharply defined, the expression of status more covert, and the criteria of status more uncertain and contestable.

None the less, while there are good grounds for supposing that in modern societies the stratifying force of status has weakened, it would be rash to suppose further that status can now be simply disregarded. Most obviously, issues of status would seem still to be widely recognised among the population at large. When in everyday conversation or in the media the topic of ‘class’ is raised, or indeed when members of the public are asked about this topic in interviews with sociologists, it is in fact *status* rather than class, following the distinction made above, that is chiefly—and quite readily—discussed. For example, phrases such as ‘class distinctions’, ‘class barriers’ or ‘class consciousness’ are commonly used in ways that make it apparent that they in

⁵We leave aside the issue of whether caste systems can be regarded as the most fully developed forms of status stratification, as Weber would at various points imply, or whether such systems—or at least that of India—are better seen as culturally quite specific social formations not amenable to analysis in terms of more general stratification concepts (cf. Dumont, 1970).

fact refer to distinctions of status and to status exclusiveness and sensitivity.⁶

Furthermore, as we have already noted, our previous research (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2004) provides, for Britain, more systematic evidence of the persistence of a status order. Taking occupation as being one of the most salient characteristics to which status now attaches and taking close friendship as a good indicator of a relationship of basic equality between individuals (cf. Laumann, 1966, 1973), we are able to show, through multidimensional scaling techniques, that the occupational structure of close friendship has a leading dimension that is most plausibly interpreted as one of status. That is to say, starting from a structure of social equality, a structure of inequality can be directly inferred. The hierarchy of occupations that is thus revealed has clear similarities with that suggested by research for earlier periods, and chiefly in that the degree of ‘manuality’ of the work involved can be taken as a major influence on status. Or, somewhat more specifically, one might say that occupations that require working with symbols and/or people tend to confer higher status than do those that require working directly with material things, while those that require working with both people and things—such as many occupations in the now expanding services sector—have typically an intermediate ranking.

In addition, we are able to demonstrate two other points that have direct relevance for our present purposes. First, while status, as measured by the occupationally-based scale that we derive from our analyses of close friendship, is correlated with income and education, the correlation—and especially with income—is quite modest; and it is further evident that our scale is clearly tapping something other than ‘socioeconomic’ status in so far as this is taken to be determined by a combination of income and education.⁷

⁶Indeed, ethnographic work, even if of a rather unsystematic kind, has indicated that, in the ‘right’ context, individuals may still be quite ready to speak in ways that obviously imply status superiority and derogation. Deverson and Lindsay (1975) contains examples such as the following. A woman living on a private estate talking about residents of a neighbouring council estate: ‘We use them and they use us, I suppose. They can come and clean our houses but, quite frankly, if someone built a high wall down the middle and separated their estate from ours, no one would mind. There’s no real relationship between us’ (1975, p.41). A young ‘middle class’ housewife: ‘I can’t understand people who feel guilty about the working classes. People always will be different, even if everyone has the same houses and the same money. We’d always be richer in our minds than the working classes, just by reading books’ (1975, p.191). A doctor in private practice: ‘I think a lot of lives are nothing to write home about, but often it’s because they are limited people. Sometimes they’re unlucky, though, they may have been born in the wrong cradle. It still matters very much where you were born and where you went to school’ (1975, p.192). See also Mount (2004).

⁷When our status scale is regressed on income and education, the coefficient for income turns out to be insignificant (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2004, Table 3).

Secondly, while a status gradient can be seen as running across classes (as represented for Britain by the Goldthorpe schema) from the professional and managerial salariat down to the working class, there is still a good deal of variation in status homogeneity *within* classes: that is to say, some classes show far more internal stratification by status than do others.

One methodological implication of the foregoing is, then, that we should have no major difficulties of multicollinearity when we try to separate out the effects of class and status, and also those of income and education, on life-chances and life-choices of different kinds. However, there is one further methodological point that should in this regard be noted. As well as seeking to distinguish the effects in question, we shall also wish to make some assessment of their ‘relative importance’, and this is a notoriously difficult matter (King, 1986; Kruskal and Majors, 1989) at least where the variables involved have no common metric. Apparent differences in importance may reflect nothing more than that one variable is being measured better than another. The general strategy that we believe it best to adopt in the face of this problem is not to attach undue weight to the results of any particular analysis but rather to be guided by the general pattern of results that emerges from a series of analyses dealing with different substantive issues—of the kind that we shall in fact present.

3 Class and economic life-chances

Given our understanding of class in terms of employment relations, we would expect individuals’ class positions rather than their status to be the major influence in determining their economic life-chances. It is fairly evident how differences in such life-chances would follow from differences in employment relations; but there is no very obvious mechanism that would link them to status. Empirical results showing strong connections between class, on the one hand, and the risks of unemployment, variability in earnings, and long-term earnings prospects, on the other, have in fact already been presented for Britain (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2006). Here, we aim to test our expectations more strictly, at least in regard to unemployment and earnings prospects, by bringing status into the analysis.⁸

As regards the risks of unemployment, we use the same data-set as Goldthorpe and McKnight—i.e. that of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We take individuals aged 21 to 54 in 1991 who were interviewed in

⁸We cannot include analyses of variability in earnings since no data-set is available that contains information on this matter and also occupational data of a kind that would allow us to implement our status scale.

all years between 1991 and 2002 ($N = 2,860$). Over this twelve-year period, 826 respondents (28.9%) reported at least one spell of unemployment and 299 (10.5%) reported a cumulative unemployment duration of twelve months or more. We here concentrate on those individuals who had experienced long-term (or recurrent) unemployment as defined in this way.

In Table 1 we report results from binomial logistic regression analyses in which experience (or not) of long-term unemployment is the dependent variable.⁹ In model 1 class is included as an explanatory variable along with a number of sociodemographic variables that for present purposes we treat as controls. It can be seen that class effects (using a nine-class version of the Goldthorpe schema) show up quite consistently and on much the same pattern as found by Goldthorpe and McKnight (2006, Fig. 2). The most striking feature is the much greater risk of long-term unemployment run by members of Class IVb, self-employed workers, and of Classes VI and VII, the working class, than by members of Class I and Class II, the salariat. At the extreme, an unskilled worker in Class VII was four times ($e^{1.398}$) more likely to have been long-term unemployed than a higher-level professional or manager in Class I.¹⁰ As noted by Goldthorpe and McKnight (2006), the ‘service relationship’ enjoyed by members of the salariat is more likely than the basic labour contract to imply an expectation of continuity of employment or at least of employability; and, should job loss occur, typically involves a much longer period of notice, during which alternative employment can be sought (see also Gallie *et al.*, 1998, pp.139-41).

In model 2 we then repeat the analysis with status, as measured by the scale we have earlier proposed (see Appendix A), being also included. Two points of main importance emerge. First, while class effects are in most cases lowered, and so that with Class VI and also Class IIIb they become marginally insignificant at the 5% level, their overall pattern is little changed. In particular, the far more serious risk of long-term unemployment for unskilled workers remains—being still almost three times greater ($e^{1.062}$) than for those in Class I. Secondly, although introducing status reduces class effects somewhat, the effect of status itself is far from being significant. In

⁹Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 7 in Appendix C. Note that some independent variables are parameterised in different ways in different sets of analysis. For example, age is grouped into three discrete bands in the analysis reported in Table 1, while it is entered as a continuous variable in Tables 3, 4 and 5. This is so because we seek to replicate previous analyses the various domains, and these analyses do sometimes differ in the parameterisation of independent variables.

¹⁰Although Goldthorpe and McKnight (2006) use the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) rather than the Goldthorpe class schema, and their data cover a different time period (1991–1999), the differences they report are very similar.

Table 1: Determinants of long-term unemployment (logistic regression, $N = 2,860$).

	model 1		model 2	
	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>
age 34–43 ^a	0.145	(0.150)	0.152	(0.150)
age 44–51	0.154	(0.175)	0.155	(0.176)
female ^b	-0.710**	(0.145)	-0.674**	(0.148)
cohabit ^c	0.636**	(0.221)	0.633**	(0.221)
single	0.668**	(0.215)	0.670**	(0.215)
wid/div/sep	1.097**	(0.193)	1.092**	(0.193)
children ^d	0.102	(0.150)	0.095	(0.150)
Class II ^e	0.339	(0.265)	0.267	(0.273)
Class IIIa	0.763**	(0.279)	0.645*	(0.298)
Class IIIb	0.859*	(0.335)	0.664	(0.375)
Class IVac	-0.073	(0.557)	-0.311	(0.595)
Class IVb	1.193**	(0.303)	0.897*	(0.398)
Class V	0.622*	(0.309)	0.317	(0.407)
Class VI	1.145**	(0.291)	0.800	(0.416)
Class VII	1.398**	(0.242)	1.062**	(0.379)
status			-0.413	(0.359)
constant	-2.986**	(0.265)	-2.836**	(0.295)
pseudo R^2	0.065		0.066	
log-likelihood	-895.38		-894.72	

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$; ^a age 21–33 as ref.cat.; ^b male as ref.cat.; ^c married as ref.cat.; ^d childless as ref.cat.; ^e Class I as ref.cat.

accounting for this, we may note, from more detailed analyses that we have undertaken, that there is a particularly weak association between status and the risk of long-term unemployment across the higher ranges of our status scale, where the risk is in general below average.¹¹

Turning now to economic prospects, we here focus, as do Goldthorpe and McKnight, on age-earnings curves. However, we cannot follow them in using the data-set of the New Earnings Survey because of difficulties in applying our status scale. We therefore continue with the BHPS data-set, despite problems that arise with relatively small numbers.

Goldthorpe and McKnight show (2006, Figs. 4 and 6 esp.) that marked differences exist in the economic prospects of members of different classes as indexed by age-earnings curves. Most notably, while for those in the salariat earnings tend to rise with age up to around age fifty, reflecting, it may be supposed, the operation of incremental salary scales and promotion ladders, for those in the working class earnings tend more or less to level out in their thirties.¹²

In Figure 1, panel A, we present age-earnings curves, based on BHPS data, for men and women who were in full-time employment in 2002 and who were found Class I, Class II, and a combined ‘blue-collar’ Class V+VI+VII.¹³ As is apparent, these curves bring out essentially the same class differences as those observed by Goldthorpe and McKnight. In the other panels of Figure 1 we then present curves for broad status bands within these three classes, using the four major divisions that we have proposed within our status scale (see Appendix A). It can be seen (panels B and C) that within both Class I and Class II, the higher and lower salariat, the curves for status band 1 lie somewhat above those for status band 2 but are still very similar in shape (allowing for some fluctuation in that for band 2 due, we would suppose, to

¹¹A graph plotting the risk of long-term unemployment by status group is available from the authors on request. In another model, not reported here, we have added educational qualifications in the regression. This again leads to marginal reductions in class effects but the effects of different levels of qualification are not themselves statistically significant.

¹²It should be noted that neither Goldthorpe and McKnight’s analyses nor our own claim to trace the actual life-course earnings of individuals but, rather, to show how age-specific earnings differ by class. Some distortion is possible due both to cohort effects and to selection effects (see further Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2006) but not, we believe, of a kind sufficient to disturb the main results of the analyses.

¹³We combine Classes V, VI and VII, and pool men and women together, since, as will be seen, we wish to consider earnings within combinations of age, class and broad status band, and, for such analyses, the sample size of even the BHPS is relatively small. We do not consider age-earnings curves for Class III, that of routine nonmanual workers, because it could in this case be misleading to treat men and women together. As Goldthorpe and McKnight (2006) show, age-earnings curves here show marked differences by gender, and this problem could only be addressed by making the further IIIa/IIIb division.

small numbers); and further (panel D), that within Class V+VI+VII both status bands 3 and 4 show the same, much flatter curves, with that for status band 4 actually lying above that for status group 3—this reflecting the fact that the manual occupations that predominate in band 4 yield generally higher earnings than the personal service or ‘people processing’ occupations that predominate in band 3.




Figure 1: Median annual earnings by age for men and women in full-time employment by class (Panel A), and by broad status band within class (Panels B to D).

In sum, thinking in terms of status as well as of class does not appear to add a great deal to our understanding of differences in age-earnings curves. To check on this impression more formally, we show in Table 2 results from

analyses, based on the same data as used in Figure 1, in which we regress earnings on age and age-squared.

Table 2: Parameter estimate and standard error of age and age-squared in OLS regression models predicting the logarithm of annual earnings (men and women combined).

	age		age-squared		<i>N</i>
	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>	
Class I	0.116	(0.011)	-0.127	(0.013)	954
Class II	0.111	(0.011)	-0.124	(0.013)	1255
Class V+VI+VII	0.055	(0.007)	-0.063	(0.009)	1600
status band 1	0.145	(0.010)	-0.163	(0.013)	1317
status band 2	0.056	(0.009)	-0.058	(0.011)	1540
status band 3	0.088	(0.011)	-0.101	(0.014)	786
status band 4	0.051	(0.009)	-0.057	(0.011)	1155
Class I & status band 1	0.137	(0.012)	-0.152	(0.015)	735
Class I & status band 2	0.054	(0.023)	-0.053	(0.026)	218
Class II & status band 1	0.147	(0.017)	-0.168	(0.022)	577
Class II & status band 2	0.070	(0.013)	-0.074	(0.017)	585
Class II & status band 3	0.251	(0.058)	-0.299	(0.076)	76
Class V+VI+VII & status band 3	0.063	(0.013)	-0.073	(0.015)	497
Class V+VI+VII & status band 4	0.045	(0.009)	-0.052	(0.011)	1090

Note: The regression models also control for the logarithm of hours worked and gender.

It is evident from the first panel of Table 2 that, as would be expected, the coefficients for both age terms are significantly larger for Classes I and II than for Class V+VI+VII. But, from the second panel, it can be seen that, while the coefficients for status band 1 are larger than those for status bands 2, 3 and 4, there is far less differentiation among the latter.¹⁴ And, similarly, it emerges from the remaining panels of the table that, although within both Class I and Class II age effects on earnings are clearly stronger for those in status band 1 than for those in lower status bands, in Class II the coefficients for status bands 2 and 3 go in the ‘wrong’ direction—a major factor here being the inclusion in 3 of protective service personnel—and in Class V+VI+VII the coefficients for status bands 3 and 4 are not significantly different.

¹⁴For example, the 95% confidence interval of the linear age term for status band 2 is: 0.038–0.074 (i.e. $0.056 \pm 1.96 \times 0.009$), which overlaps with that for status band 3, 0.066–0.110.

In so far, then, as risk of long-term unemployment and age-earnings curves serve well as indicators of economic life-chances, as regards security and prospects respectively, we can say that our expectation that class rather than status will mainly differentiate such life-chances is in general confirmed.

We turn next to a quite different topic: that of cultural consumption considered as an aspect of lifestyle. In this case—and following from our earlier discussion—our expectation is the exact reverse of the above: i.e. we would expect that stratification will here be on the basis of status rather than class.

4 Status and cultural consumption

For Weber, distinctiveness in lifestyle is the most typical way in which members of different status groups, even within the purely conventional and relatively loose status orders of modern societies, seek to define their boundaries—that is, to establish cues or markers of inclusion and exclusion. Furthermore, a number of more recent authors have emphasised cultural taste and consumption as an aspect of lifestyle that is of particular importance as a means of the symbolic communication of ‘distinction’ and thus of expressing a form of hierarchy that is set apart from that of ‘mere’ economic advantage (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984; DiMaggio, 1987; Peterson, 1997).

In a series of earlier papers (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2005a,b,c), we have examined the social stratification of cultural consumption in three different domains—those of music, theatre, dance and cinema, and the visual arts—using data from the Arts in England Survey of 2001 (Skelton *et al.*, 2002).¹⁵ For each of these domains we have first applied latent class analysis to raw data on the frequency of different kinds of consumption, for men and women aged 20–64, in order to establish *patterns of consumption* and, in turn, *types of consumer*. And we have then used multinomial logistic regression analyses in order to examine the determinants of individuals’ approximation to one type or another.

An initial finding from these analyses is that cultural consumption in England is not stratified on ‘elite-to-mass’ lines: in particular, we cannot identify an elite that is distinctive in consuming ‘high’ cultural forms while at the same time rejecting ‘lower’, or more popular, forms. Or, in other words, there is no evidence of a close ‘homology’ between cultural and social stratification. However, we do find support, albeit with some qualifications, for the alternative hypothesis (Peterson and Simkus, 1992; Peterson and Kern, 1996)

¹⁵A further relevant paper is Chan and Goldthorpe (2006) which examines the social stratification of newspaper readership.

that the main axis of cultural stratification, in modern societies at least, is one that separates cultural ‘omnivores’ from cultural ‘univores’. The former have relatively high levels of consumption of *all* genres within a particular domain but the latter are restricted in their consumption to popular genres only.¹⁶ For our present purposes, therefore, the question of chief importance is that of the basis on which ‘omnivore–univore’ stratification occurs.

In Table 3 we show selected results from our papers previously referred to. Specifically, from our logistic regressions, in which the dependent variable is type of cultural consumer, we present those results that relate to the major contrast involved: i.e. that show the effects of covariates on the log odds of being an omnivore rather than either a univore or, as with the visual arts, a type that can in fact be only described as a non-consumer or ‘inactive’.¹⁷

From Table 3 it may be noted, to begin with, that the range of socio-demographic variables that we introduce chiefly as controls have significant effects in only rather patchy, albeit fairly plausible, ways. Turning then to the stratification variables, on which our interest centres, it can be seen that, across the three cultural domains, the effects of class on the chances of an individual being an omnivore rather than a univore or an inactive are very largely insignificant. In contrast, the effects of status are in each case significant and quite strong.¹⁸ It is true that we have here to treat class via the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) which is in effect a seven-class instantiation of the schema that we used in a nine-class version in analysing the risk of unemployment. However, while we thus measure class in a somewhat less detailed way than previously, we think it unlikely that this in itself could be the source of the clear predominance of status over class that we find.¹⁹

¹⁶For example, in the case of music, omnivores have similarly high levels of consumption of pop and rock as do univores but, unlike the latter, also consume classical music, opera and jazz. In the case of theatre, dance and cinema, omnivores have relatively high attendance at plays, musicals, pantomimes, ballet and other dance performances as well as going to the cinema, while univores are essentially restricted to the latter. However with the visual arts, as noted in the text below, the most extreme contrast is that between omnivores and non-consumers.

¹⁷In the case of the visual arts, we need also to modify the omnivore–univore distinction so as to allow for a type of consumer we label as a ‘paucivore’, who consumes across a modest range of genres; and in the case of music, so as to allow for a type of ‘omnivore–listener’ who consumes most genres via various media but not in live form.

¹⁸For example, in the case of theatre, dance and cinema, the probability of a hypothetical woman who is 40-year-old, childless, lives in London and earns £25,000 p.a., being an omnivore rather than a univore would be 23–26 percentage points higher (depending on her educational attainment) if she was at the top rather than at the bottom of status hierarchy. For details, see Chan and Goldthorpe (2005c, p.206)

¹⁹NS-SEC could in fact be regarded as instantiating the conceptual approach of the

Table 3: Determinants of latent class membership in the domains of music, theatre, dance and cinema, and the visual arts (multinomial logit model, $N = 3819$).

	music		theatre, dance and cinema		visual arts	
	O vs U		O vs U		O vs I	
	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>
female ^a	0.156	(0.137)	0.615**	(0.092)	0.223	(0.192)
married ^b	-0.321	(0.176)	0.148	(0.112)	-0.200	(0.239)
separated	-0.065	(0.214)	0.188	(0.139)	0.180	(0.295)
age	0.066**	(0.006)	0.005	(0.004)	0.026**	(0.009)
child (0-4) ^c	-0.391	(0.214)	-0.562**	(0.113)	-0.639*	(0.285)
child (5-10)	-0.340	(0.188)	0.070	(0.100)	0.260	(0.232)
child (11-15)	-0.397*	(0.191)	0.088	(0.105)	0.039	(0.252)
The North ^d	-0.470*	(0.193)	-0.231	(0.124)	-0.089	(0.253)
Midlands	-0.198	(0.184)	-0.207	(0.123)	-0.880**	(0.279)
South East	0.060	(0.198)	0.083	(0.135)	-0.150	(0.270)
South West	-0.224	(0.238)	-0.189	(0.153)	-0.174	(0.321)
income	0.012	(0.007)	0.026**	(0.005)	0.006	(0.009)
CSE/others ^e	1.006**	(0.276)	0.169	(0.152)	1.220*	(0.499)
O-levels	1.109**	(0.242)	0.668**	(0.128)	1.072*	(0.462)
A-levels	1.523**	(0.265)	1.130**	(0.145)	1.849**	(0.471)
sub-degree	1.851**	(0.266)	1.027**	(0.160)	2.219**	(0.469)
degree	2.367**	(0.256)	1.223**	(0.151)	3.260**	(0.450)
Class 2 ^f	-0.135	(0.172)	0.078	(0.126)	0.613*	(0.241)
Class 3	-0.329	(0.247)	-0.161	(0.160)	-0.396	(0.376)
Class 4	0.299	(0.291)	-0.205	(0.203)	0.699	(0.411)
Class 5	-0.253	(0.382)	-0.134	(0.218)	0.073	(0.554)
Class 6	-0.107	(0.317)	-0.199	(0.195)	-0.480	(0.514)
Class 7	-0.109	(0.387)	-0.507*	(0.230)	-0.325	(0.646)
status	1.047**	(0.287)	0.631**	(0.179)	1.229**	(0.402)
constant	-5.906**	(0.472)	-2.118**	(0.292)	-5.461**	(0.688)

Note: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$; ^a male as ref.cat.; ^b single as ref.cat.; ^c childless as ref.cat.;
^d London as ref.cat.; ^e No qualification as ref.cat.; ^f Class 1 as ref.cat.

In addition, it may be noted from Table 3 that while income has a significant effect in only one domain (theatre, dance and cinema), level of educational qualifications is generally significant in its effects, even if not always in an entirely monotonic way. But the question must then arise of how far, given that class, income and status are also included in our analyses, education is to be regarded as itself operating as a stratification variable. It would seem reasonable to suppose that level of qualifications is, to some extent at least, here picking up individual *psychological* attributes, such as, say, information processing capacity, that could exert a quite independent influence on the likelihood of being a cultural omnivore (cf. Moles, 1971; Berlyne, 1974, and also on this issue see Chan and Goldthorpe, 2006).

However, regardless of what view may be taken on this last issue, Table 3 still provides rather clear support for our expectation that differences in lifestyle will be associated with—and can indeed be taken as expressions of—stratification by status *rather* than by class. By way of illustration, we can turn to some of the descriptive detail of our results. For example, we can note that while members of Classes 1 and 2, the professional and managerial salariat, are more likely to be cultural omnivores than are members of other classes, the importance of status stratification *within* these classes is much in evidence. We have previously observed (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2004) that in the higher ranges of our status scale professionals generally rank above managers. And, correspondingly, we find that the groups that most regularly show the highest proportions of omnivores are Higher professionals, Teachers and other professionals in education, and Specialist managers (e.g. finance, IT and personnel managers, who often have professional qualifications and operate in professional roles).²⁰ Conversely, other types of manager, in manufacturing, transport, construction, services etc., whose status rankings are similar to, or even below, those of some groups of routine nonmanual workers in Class 3, have in turn only a similar, or if anything a lower, probability of being omnivores.

So far, then, we have sought to bring out the contrast between the stratification of economic life-chances and the stratification of cultural consumption—the former primarily reflecting individuals’ positions within the class struc-

Goldthorpe class schema in a more reliable way than previously. Moreover, as we note in the papers previously cited, even if we simplify our measure of status to the four broad status bands that we introduced above in our analyses of age-wage curves, this still does not remove the closer association of cultural consumption with status than with class, as treated by the seven NS-SEC classes.

²⁰As can be seen from Appendix A, these groups rank 1, 3 and 4 in the order of our status scale. The second-ranking group, Associate professionals in business, also tends to show relatively high proportions of omnivores.

ture, understood in terms of employment relations, the latter, their position within the status order. However, we would not wish to suggest that it is possible for all areas of social life to be simply divided into those in which either class or status is the dominant stratifying influence. Often the situation may be more complex. This point we now seek to illustrate in regard to individuals' political commitments and value orientations.

5 Class, status and politics

A relationship between class and political party support has long been recognised. Indeed, several authors have viewed the development of electoral politics in modern societies as 'the democratic translation' of the class struggle (Lipset, 1960; Korpi, 1983). Of late, though, it has been widely argued that class politics are in decline; and some authors have claimed a growing importance of what has been variously termed 'identity', 'lifestyle' or 'status' politics (e.g. Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1994; Hechter, 2004). In Britain, the association between class and vote did in fact weaken at the General Election of 1997 (Evans, 1999) and has since remained at a lower level than previously. But this is not of course to say that class is no longer a major influence on voting, nor that it has become overshadowed by other influences such as status.

To investigate this matter further, we turn to the data-set of the British Election Surveys and, in order to obtain an adequate basis for the kind of multivariate analysis that we wish to undertake, we pool the data for the 1997 and 2001 elections. In Table 4 we take party choice, as between the Conservatives, Labour and all other parties, as the dependent variable in a multinomial regression that includes similar explanatory and control variables as we have used in our previous analyses.

Under model 1, it is clear that at all events in the case of the major contrast—voting Conservative rather than Labour—class is the most important explanatory variable (using again the nine-class version of the Goldthorpe schema), and on a pattern that is familiar from all earlier research. It is the higher salariat of Class I, the small employers of Class IVac and the self-employed workers of Class IVb who are the most likely to vote Conservative rather than Labour, and unskilled workers in Class VII who are the least likely—in fact, almost three times less so ($e^{-1.013}$) than members of Class I. Further, the probability of supporting the Conservatives rather than Labour rises with income.

Level of educational qualifications also has significant effects on vote, and in the contrast between voting 'other' rather than Labour, education could be

Table 4: Determinants of party choice at the 1997 and 2001 British General Elections (multinomial logit model, $N = 3,407$).

	model 1				model 2			
	Con v Lab		Others v Lab		Con v Lab		Others v Lab	
	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>
2001 ^a	-0.220*	(0.101)	0.259**	(0.095)	-0.220*	(0.101)	0.258**	(0.095)
age	0.030**	(0.003)	0.009**	(0.003)	0.030**	(0.003)	0.009**	(0.003)
female ^b	0.250*	(0.101)	0.016	(0.098)	0.230*	(0.103)	0.008	(0.099)
CSE ^c	0.126	(0.152)	0.281	(0.151)	0.126	(0.152)	0.281	(0.151)
O-levels	0.468**	(0.151)	0.490**	(0.157)	0.465**	(0.151)	0.489**	(0.157)
A-levels	0.288	(0.179)	0.797**	(0.175)	0.280	(0.179)	0.794**	(0.175)
sub-degree	0.381*	(0.168)	1.154**	(0.166)	0.363*	(0.169)	1.146**	(0.167)
degree	-0.313	(0.179)	0.977**	(0.169)	-0.347	(0.183)	0.961**	(0.172)
income	0.032**	(0.004)	0.006	(0.004)	0.032**	(0.004)	0.006	(0.004)
Class II ^d	-0.159	(0.151)	-0.036	(0.152)	-0.129	(0.154)	-0.023	(0.155)
Class IIIa	-0.313	(0.182)	0.108	(0.183)	-0.259	(0.190)	0.132	(0.192)
Class IIIb	-0.600**	(0.216)	-0.001	(0.211)	-0.499*	(0.240)	0.045	(0.236)
Class IVac	0.655*	(0.265)	0.235	(0.310)	0.760**	(0.287)	0.283	(0.329)
Class IVb	0.248	(0.232)	0.079	(0.260)	0.395	(0.278)	0.147	(0.305)
Class V	-1.046**	(0.231)	-0.043	(0.206)	-0.879**	(0.289)	0.034	(0.272)
Class VI	-1.126**	(0.222)	-0.466*	(0.215)	-0.944**	(0.291)	-0.382	(0.289)
Class VII	-1.013**	(0.182)	-0.222	(0.178)	-0.838**	(0.257)	-0.141	(0.257)
status					0.243	(0.252)	0.111	(0.256)
constant	-2.651**	(0.289)	-1.828**	(0.281)	-2.709**	(0.296)	-1.857**	(0.289)
pseudo R^2			0.064				0.064	
log-likelihood			-3296.90				-3296.43	

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$; Con: Conservatives, Lab: Labour, Others: All other parties;

^a 1997 as ref.cat.; ^b male as ref.cat.; ^c No qualification as ref.cat.; ^d Class I as ref.cat.

regarded as being more influential than class. However, it should be noted that in neither contrast are the effects of education monotonic. Thus, in the case of the Conservative–Labour contrast, it is those with O-levels or sub-degree qualifications who are most likely to vote Conservative. For this reason, the role of education specifically as a stratification variable would here again seem somewhat problematic.

When, with model 2, we introduce status into the analysis, it can be seen that class effects are in most cases somewhat reduced (while the effects of income remain unchanged). However, while in the contrast between other parties and Labour, no class effect is now significant—only education effects, in much the same way as before—in the Conservative–Labour contrast class effects, as well as those of education, remain very much on their previous pattern. Unskilled workers in Class VII are still more than two times ($e^{-0.838}$) less likely to vote Conservative rather than Labour than are the higher salariat of Class I. Furthermore, the effect of status itself is clearly not significant in either contrast. On this evidence, then, we can say that class has certainly not disappeared as a basis of the stratification of political partisanship in Britain, and that at least so far as the central division within electoral politics is concerned, class remains of obvious importance even when the effects of status are also taken into account.

From the general theoretical position that we have adopted, the results reported in Table 4 can of course be in no way surprising. Individuals holding different class positions, as we would wish to understand them in terms of employment relations, can quite rationally see themselves as having different interests that are likely to be better represented and upheld, in the case of those in the salariat and the petty bourgeoisie, by the Conservatives, and, in the case of those in other classes, and in the working class especially, by Labour: for example, in regard to issues concerning economic inequality and the redistribution of income and wealth, levels of public spending on social welfare, and indeed relations between employers and employees.²¹

However, in addition to these more or less standard ‘left–right’ issues, it may well be supposed that various other issues also have resonance among the electorate, and perhaps to an increasing extent. One set of such issues that today attracts much attention relates to social order and to the limits of freedom and authority—issues concerning, say, tradition and respect, compliance with the law and its enforcement, and censorship. There are in fact now available Likert-type scales, with good reliability, for measuring individuals’ value positions on the ‘left–right’ dimension and also on what might be called the ‘libertarian–authoritarian’ dimension (Heath *et al.*, 1994;

²¹On the rationality of class voting see Evans (1993) and Weakliem and Heath (1994).

Evans *et al.*, 1996). In the present context, it is then of interest to see if in the placing of individuals on the left–right dimension class maintains its importance *vis-à-vis* status in the same way as it does with vote; and, if so, whether a similar or a different situation obtains in regard to the libertarian–authoritarian dimension.

To this end, we draw on the data-set of the British Social Attitudes Survey of 2002 that allows respondents to be given scores on both the left–right and libertarian–authoritarian scales (see Appendix B for the survey items used in the construction of these scales, and also Park and Surridge, 2003). In Table 5 we show the results of regressing individuals’ scores on these two scales on a similar range of explanatory and control variables as those we used in regard to vote.

In the case of the left–right scale, it can be seen that the results of Table 5 are indeed in most respects similar to those reported in regard to the chances of voting Conservative rather than Labour. Class effects are generally significant, often strong, and on essentially the same pattern as before—due allowance being made for the fact that we have here to revert to the seven NS-SEC classes; and class effects are, as it were, reinforced by income effects. The effects of education are also on the same pattern as in regard to vote: i.e. those with intermediate level qualifications tend to be more right-wing than either those with lower or higher qualifications. And again, too, the effect of status fails to reach significance—although, it should be said, now only marginally so, and with the sign of the coefficient indicating a tendency for higher status to be associated with more right-wing values.

However, in the case of the libertarian–authoritarian scale, an entirely different outcome is apparent. All class effects, and likewise those of income, are now far from significant while the effect of status is both significant and quite strong. The higher a person’s status, the more likely he or she is to express libertarian rather than authoritarian values. Specifically, other things being equal, an increase of one standard deviation in status is associated with a change of -0.51 (i.e. -1.381×0.366) on the libertarian–authoritarian scale. Education also shows some positive libertarian effects, although only for those having A-level qualifications or higher, and with by far the strongest effect occurring with graduates.²²

²²Park and Surridge in their analysis of the same data-set find stronger and more consistent effects of education in regard to libertarian-authoritarian values. This suggests that neglecting status, as they do, may lead to an overestimation of the importance of education. Park and Surridge also include a measure of religious adherence and find that this too has significant effects. We have repeated our own analysis with religion included and obtain similar results to Park and Surridge—but without the pattern of our other results being appreciably affected.

Table 5: Determinants of political attitudes on ‘left–right’ and ‘libertarian–authoritarian’ scales (OLS regression).

	left–right		lib–auth	
	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>	$\hat{\beta}$	<i>s.e.</i>
age	0.005	(0.005)	0.030**	(0.005)
female ^a	0.605**	(0.166)	0.136	(0.169)
10–23k ^b	0.257	(0.214)	0.297	(0.217)
23–44k	0.958**	(0.233)	0.209	(0.237)
>44k	2.153**	(0.277)	-0.111	(0.282)
CSE ^c	0.472	(0.276)	0.193	(0.281)
O-levels	1.039**	(0.261)	-0.261	(0.263)
A-levels	1.090**	(0.294)	-0.726*	(0.299)
sub-degree	1.089**	(0.289)	-0.822**	(0.292)
degree	0.153	(0.321)	-3.223**	(0.325)
Class 2 ^d	-0.873**	(0.282)	0.020	(0.288)
Class 3	-1.233**	(0.359)	-0.004	(0.367)
Class 4	0.021	(0.429)	-0.138	(0.438)
Class 5	-1.553**	(0.434)	0.082	(0.443)
Class 6	-1.551**	(0.406)	-0.340	(0.416)
Class 7	-1.732**	(0.453)	-0.130	(0.462)
status	0.684	(0.377)	-1.381**	(0.385)
constant	11.711**	(0.529)	21.363**	(0.537)
<i>N</i>	2421		2441	
<i>R</i> ²	0.13		0.17	


Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$; ^a Male as ref.cat.; ^b Income < 10k as ref.cat.; ^c No qualification as ref.cat.; ^d Class I as ref.cat.

A more detailed examination of our data reveals that the far more important effect of status on libertarian–authoritarian than on left–right value orientations is a phenomenon chiefly of the higher ranges of the status order. As is shown in Figure 2, at lower status levels—that is, in status bands 3 and 4 (marked in Figure 2 by ‘+’ and ‘△’ respectively) which comprise mainly routine service and manual occupational groups—left-wing and authoritarian values tend to go rather closely together. But while as status increases authoritarian values tend to give way to more libertarian ones, left–right differences at the same time become apparent. Thus, among groups in status band 2 (marked by ‘o’ in Figure 2), who tend to hold middling positions on the libertarian–authoritarian scale, one finds *both* groups that are quite right-wing, such as Plant, depot and site managers and Managers and proprietors in services, *and* those who are more centrist, such as Buyers and sales representatives and several lower administrative and clerical groups. And a similar division then occurs in status band 1 (marked by ‘×’ in Figure 2) among groups who are alike in having the most libertarian values. Thus, General managers and administrators, Specialist managers and Higher professionals are clearly more right-wing than are Teachers and other professionals in education, Scientists engineers and technologists, and the three groups of associate professionals.

What, then, is here indicated is the value of the distinction between class and status in allowing a new perspective on the social stratification of political partisanship and of value orientations. Class politics are clearly not dead. Class can still be regarded as the main basis of social cleavage so far as left–right issues are concerned: i.e. issues that turn on divergent interests arising out of inequalities in economic conditions and life-chances. But in regard to libertarian–authoritarian issues, it is status, not class, that appears as the major stratifying force. Adherence to libertarian values, we would suggest, tends to be a feature of a high status life-style and general *Weltanschauung*—in just the same way as is relatively high and omnivorous (rather than elitist) cultural consumption.²³ In sum, in so far as status politics exist, it would appear important to recognise that they do not replace class politics but rather co-exist with them in a complex interrelationship.

²³In this regard, we would agree with Hechter (2004, p.3) that status politics is likely to bring together ‘individuals who have a common interest in consuming culturally specific goods and who are attributed with a specific degree of social honour on this account.’ This line of argument could be subjected to more stringent empirical test if we had a data-set that included information on both individuals’ cultural consumption and their socio-political values. So far, we have not been able to discover a data-set containing such information.

Figure 2: Mean position of the 31 status groups on left–right and libertarian–authoritarian scales.



Note: Groups in status bands 1, 2, 3 and 4 are marked by the following symbols respectively: x, o, △, +. A key to the abbreviation is provided in Appendix A.

6 Discussion and conclusions

In this paper our aim has been to show that recent tendencies to disregard, or to seek to elide, the Weberian distinction between class and status are unfortunate in their consequences, and that, if the distinction is not recognised, and empirically implemented, then research into the stratification of British society—and, we would believe, of other modern societies—may well go astray. This point would seem especially relevant in regard to studies of the impact of social stratification on life-chances and life-choices across different areas of social life.

Thus, we have demonstrated that individuals' positions within the class structure, understood in terms of employment relations, are the prevailing influence on their economic life-chances in regard to the risk of long-term unemployment and earnings prospects over the life-course, while it is their positions within the status order that are preponderant in regard to at least one major aspect of life-style, level and pattern of cultural consumption. If, then, the analysis of these outcomes had been made on the basis of some uni-dimensional conception of stratification, a less clear understanding of their patterning would in all probability have resulted. In the case of politics, we have sought to show that both class and status are involved in the shaping of partisanship and value orientations—but in clearly differing ways. Class is dominant as regards left–right issues involving primarily material interests, while status is dominant as regards libertarian–authoritarian issues that involve, to use Weber's phrase, 'ideal interests'. We believe that there may well be many other situations of this kind, which, rather than calling for analysis primarily in terms of class *or* of status will require a careful separating out of their respective effects. One important example here could well be that of social inequalities in health. Of late, a rather fierce debate has broken out among social epidemiologists and medical sociologists between, on the one hand, those favouring 'material' or 'political economy' explanations of such inequalities and, on the other, those favouring 'psycho-social' or 'cultural-behavioural' explanations—to follow the terminology used in the valuable review of the debate provided by Bartley (2004). There are obvious parallels here between class-based and status-based explanations, and it would seem to us essential (cf. also Bartley, 2004, ch.2 esp) that, as a basis for advancing the debate, the stratification of different health outcomes should be analysed in terms of reliable measures of both class and status, rather than of just one or the other or of ad hoc measures that confuse the two.²⁴

²⁴We realise that our demonstration of the differing explanatory power of class and status in different domains of social life is of course specific to the measures of class and status that we use. It would thus be possible for a critic to argue that with a different

Extending the substantive range of analyses of the kind that we have undertaken in this paper should, moreover, help in addressing one more general question for further research that such analyses pose. Given that for different life-chances and life-choices either class or status may turn out to be the key stratifying influence, what are the causal processes or mechanisms that underlie the empirical regularities that can be demonstrated? There are some cases, such as that earlier referred to of class voting patterns, where progress in this regard has been made: that is to say, we have gained some idea of a causal pathway leading from individuals' class positions, to their perception of related economic interests, to their knowledge of parties' performance and programmes, and thence to their vote. However, in many other cases the sources of the empirical regularities remain opaque. And, on account of the neglect of status that we noted at the start, this is more generally true of regularities that are linked to status than of those linked to class. The primary task is thus to point to, and to seek to remedy, this neglect, and it is on this task that we have here concentrated. But the next step that needs to be taken in advancing our knowledge of how social stratification actually impacts on individual experience and action is to move from statistical to substantive explanation.

approach to conceptualising and measuring class, a different picture could be shown up. However, we would doubt if this could be achieved with any other extant class schema that recognises, and seeks to maintain, the conceptual distinction between class and status—such as, say, that proposed from a Marxist standpoint by Wright. For as Wright (1997, p.37) recognises, although his and the Goldthorpe schema have clearly differing theoretical origins, 'as a practical set of operational categories, the [Wright] class structure matrix . . . does not dramatically differ from the class typology used by Goldthorpe'. In the case of the 'micro-classes' approach currently being developed by Grusky and his associates (Grusky and Sørensen, 1998; Grusky and Weeden, 2001; Weeden and Grusky, 2005), it remains to be seen in exactly what ways the specific occupational groupings that are distinguished will be treated as capturing relative advantage and disadvantage or social hierarchy as opposed to merely 'vertical' differentiation (cf. Goldthorpe, 2006, vol.2, ch.15).

A The status scale

Table 6: The 31 status groups ranked in descending order of status score, and representative occupations within each category. The four broad status bands are indicated by dashed lines.

rank & title	code	representative occupations ^a
1 Higher professionals	HP	chartered accountants, clergy, medical practitioners, solicitors
2 Associate professionals in business	APB	journalists, investment analysts, insurance brokers, designers
3 Specialist managers	SM	company treasurers, financial managers, computer systems managers, personnel managers
4 Teachers and other professionals in education	TPE	college lecturers, education officers and inspectors, school teachers
5 General managers and administrators	GMA	bank and building society managers, general managers in industry, national and local government officers
6 Associate professionals in industry	API	computer analysts and programmers, quantity surveyors, vocational and industrial trainers
7 Scientists, engineers and technologists	SET	civil and structural engineers, clinical biochemists, industrial chemists, planning engineers, software engineers
8 Filing and record clerks	FRC	conveyancing clerks, computer clerks, library assistants
9 Managers and officials, nec	OMO	security managers, cleaning managers
10 Administrative officers and assistants	AOA	clerical officers in national and local government
11 Numerical clerks and cashiers	NCC	accounts assistants, bank clerks
12 Associate professionals in health and welfare	APH	community workers, nurses, occupational therapists, youth workers
13 Secretaries and receptionists	SEC	personal assistants, receptionists, secretaries, word processor operators

14	Other clerical workers	OCW	general assistants, commercial and clerical assistants
15	Buyers and sales representatives	BSR	buyers and purchasing officers, technical sales representatives, wholesale representatives
16	Childcare workers	CCW	educational assistants, nursery nurses
17	Managers and proprietors in services	MPS	catering managers, hoteliers, publicans, shopkeepers and managers
18	Plant, depot and site managers	PDM	clerks of works, farm managers, maintenance managers, transport managers, works managers
<hr/>			
19	Sales workers	SW	cash desk and check-out operators, sales and shop assistants, window dressers
20	Health workers	HW	ambulance staff, dental nurses, nursing auxiliaries
21	Personal service workers	PSW	caretakers and housekeepers, hairdressers and beauticians, travel attendants, undertakers
22	Protective service personnel	PSP	fire service and police officers, security guards
23	Routine workers in services	RWS	car park attendants, cleaners, counterhands, couriers and messengers, hotel porters, postal workers
24	Catering workers	CW	bar staff, chefs, cooks, waiters and waitresses
25	Store and despatch clerks	SDC	despatch and production control clerks, storekeepers
<hr/>			
26	Skilled and related manual workers n.e.c.	SMO	gardeners and groundsmen, printers, textile workers, woodworkers
27	Transport operatives	TO	bus and coach drivers, lorry and van drivers, taxi drivers
28	Skilled and related manual workers in construction and maintenance	SMC	bricklayers, electricians, painters and decorators, plasterers, roofers, telephone repairmen

29	Skilled and related manual workers in metal trades	SMM	fitters, setters, setter-operators, sheet metal workers, turners, welders
30	Plant and machine operatives	PMO	assemblers, canners, fillers and packers, food processors, moulders and extruders, routine inspectors and testers
31	General labourers	GL	agricultural workers, factory labourers, goods porters, refuse collectors

^a That is, occupations that account for relatively large numbers of individuals within each category and at the same time give some idea of its range.

B The ‘left–right’ and ‘libertarian–authoritarian’ scales

The two scales used in Section 5 are constructed additively from the following survey items. Each item has five response categories, ranging from 1 (‘agree strongly’) to 5 (‘disagree strongly’). Thus the values of the left–right scale range from 5 to 25, with higher values denoting more right-wing views, and the values of the libertarian–authoritarian scale range from 6 to 30, with higher values denoting more authoritarian views. Cronbach’s alpha for the two scales is quite high, at 0.82 and 0.74 respectively.

- Left–Right scale
 - Government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off.
 - Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers.
 - Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth.
 - There is one law for the rich and one for the poor.
 - Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance.

- Libertarian–Authoritarian scale
 - Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values.
 - People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.
 - For some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentences.
 - Schools should teach children to obey authority.
 - The law should always be obeyed, even if a particular law is wrong.
 - Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards.

C Descriptive statistics

Table 7: Distribution of respondents across categories of discrete independent variables (percentages), and mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of continuous independent variables.

For Table	1	3	4	5
data source	BHPS	AinE	BES	BSAS
<i>N</i>	2860	3819	3407	2391
male	44.3	44.7	46.4	45.6
female	55.7	55.3	53.6	54.5
married	72.5			
cohabit	8.4			
single	10.9	18.3		
wid/div/sep	8.1	16.9		
married/cohab.		64.8		
children	46.5			
no children	53.5	46.2		
children 0–4		17.1		
children 5–10		20.4		
children 11–15		16.3		
age 21–33	38.5			
age 34–43	35.1			
age 44–51	26.4			
London		12.9		
The North		29.9		
Midlands & E.A.		30.1		
South East		16.2		
South West		11.0		
1997			66.8	
2001			33.2	
income < 10k				24.0
income 10–23k				27.8
income 23–44k				30.3
income > 44k				17.9
no qual.		22.7	33.7	22.7
CSE		13.3	14.6	11.4
O-levels		23.3	14.1	18.7
A-levels		13.6	9.8	14.1
sub-degree		9.1	12.5	15.4
degree		18.1	15.3	17.8

Class I (higher level salariat)	14.4	14.7		
Class II (lower level salariat)	22.1	19.9		
Class IIIa (routine nonmanual, higher grade)	16.4	12.6		
Class IIIb (routine nonmanual, lower grade)	7.7	8.0		
Class IVa (small proprietors with employees)	2.7	3.1		
Class IVb (small proprietors without employees)	5.2	4.3		
Class V (lower-grade technicians)	7.3	7.4		
Class VI (skilled manual workers)	6.5	8.2		
Class VII (unskilled manual workers)	17.7	21.9		
Class 1 (higher manager & prof.)		12.8		11.1
Class 2 (lower manager & prof.)		26.8		28.1
Class 3 (intermediate occ.)		15.0		12.6
Class 4 (small employers & own account workers)		7.2		7.0
Class 5 (lower super. & technical occ.)		9.4		11.9
Class 6 (semi-routine occ.)		16.2		16.4
Class 7 (routine occ.)		12.6		12.9
mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)				
status	-0.013	-0.001	-0.051	-0.018
	(0.359)	(0.365)	(0.367)	(0.366)
age		42.1	50.6	47.7
		(11.8)	(17.1)	(16.8)
income		15573	18886	
		(10863)	(14201)	

Note: BHPS: British Household Panel Survey (as of 1991); AinE: Arts in England Survey; BES: British Election Studies, 1997 & 2001; BSAS: British Social Attitudes Survey 2002.

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