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Social identities and political cleavages:
The role of political context

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Summary. Using a novel method, this article investigates the impact of social group identities on attitudes and on vote in a variety of political contexts. Examining the major regions of Britain, Canada and the U.S., we find considerable national and regional diversity in the nature of social cleavages. For example, social class and race had widely different effects across societies, but within societies their impacts on attitudes and on vote were very similar. On the other hand, despite that age and religion had a similar effect on attitudes across societies, the effects on vote varied considerably. The significant within country differences underlines the importance of using region, rather than country, as the unit of analysis. More importantly, these results highlight the role of political context, especially competing cleavages and the structure of party competition, in the establishment of politically relevant social cleavages.

Keywords: Political sociology; Social cleavages; Voting behaviour; Social and political attitudes; Comparative methods

1. Introduction

The study of the relationship between social structure and political party support has a strong tradition in political sociology (see, Lazarsfeld *et al,* 1944; Berelson *et al,* 1954;

Alford, 1967; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Butler and Stokes, 1974; Hout *et al,* 1999). To varying degrees, social class, gender, age, race and religion have all been found to affect voting in Western democracies. The underlying mechanism for this relationship—i.e., that differences in social position are associated with different concerns, that in turn encourage support for parties that represent these concerns—is assumed to be mediated by social and political attitudes (e.g., Vanneman, 1980; Schwartz and Huismans, 1995; Brint, 1984; Kelley and Evans, 1995; Weakliem, 1991, 1993). In the event that a particular social group is not a relevant political cleavage characterized by unique voting patterns, it is often attributed to a lack of attitudinal differences between that group and other relevant social groups. This type of argument is also used to explain an apparent decline in cleavage voting and an increase in more individual voting based on 'post-materialist' values (Inglehart, 1987, 1990, 1997).

An alternative, although not necessarily opposing, view sees a lack of cleavage voting as reflecting inadequate political party representation. Growing empirical evidence suggests that there is indeed a reciprocal relationship between the nature of a polity and cleavage structures (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997). There is significant evidence, for example, that the type of electoral system helps determine the number of viable political parties in a given polity (Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; Riker, 1982; Lijphart, 1990; 1994). If there are an insufficient number of parties, all major cleavages may not be uniquely represented. This could be detrimental to particular social cleavage because it cannot become politically relevant unless there is a party explicitly drawing upon inter-group conflicts to mobilize support (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; see also Manza and Brooks, 1999). Moreover, as Kiltschelt and Hellemans (1990), page 20, argue, although parties emerge from social and political cleavages, they "are usually able to influence the extent to which certain cleavages are articulated

in the population and contribute to the mobilization or demobilization of group divisions". A whole array of factors associated with the political context of a society could affect whether political parties represent the interests of a social group—the size and social importance of the cleavage, the number of competing cleavages, and the type of electoral system, all could have an impact.

Few empirical studies have simultaneously assessed the impact of political context on the effects of social structure on attitudes and vote (an exception is Weakliem, 1993). This paper fills some of this void by exploring the effects of social identities on attitudes and vote across a variety of political contexts. Examining the major regions of Britain, Canada and the U.S., we make a number of distinctive moves. First, we focus on regional differences within countries, as well as on the usual national differences since political context often varies in important ways between regions. Secondly, we examine the impact of many social identities, exploring the effects of each individually but controlling for the others, rather than simply explore the effects of a single identity. Finally, we develop a novel method that facilitates the explicit comparison of the effects of social group identities on attitudes with their effects on vote, both within and across societies.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. Social and political attitudes in Western democracies

Social and political attitudes in Western democracies can generally be divided along two dimensions: left-right attitudes and liberal-conservative attitudes (see Berelson *et al,* 1954; Fleishman 1986; Feldman 1988; Evans *et al* ,1996; Baer *et al* 1995). Left-right issues pertain to the state's role in the economy, with those on the left being more favorable towards government intervention, social spending and redistribution

policies, and those on the right being more favorable towards a free market economy. Liberal-conservative issues are related to personal freedom of thought, association and lifestyles. Those who are liberal in attitude are tolerant of alternative lifestyles, while those on the conservative end are more likely to favour traditional lifestyles and values, and to dislike social change.

By no means is there a consensus that left-right issues and liberal-conservative issues remain of paramount importance. A leading proponent of the new issues argument is Inglehart (1987, 1990, 1997) who argues that post-materialist issues have began to replace the traditional ideological dimensions in recent decades. Economic security has allegedly decreased the importance of left-right issues, freeing voters to focus on other social and cultural issues. One could also interpret the rise in prominence of nationalist issues as indicative of post-industrial society. In fact, some argue that nationalist issues occupy a distinct ideological dimension of their own (Heath *et al,* 1999). For the most part, however, 'post-materialist' issues can be incorporated within the traditional two-dimension framework, especially within the liberal-conservative dimension (Weakliem (1991), page1330), and even national issues generally coexist with the main issue dimensions. The latter is evident in Quebec where the Bloc Quebecois campaigns for independence under a social democratic platform.

2.2. The Sociological Approach to Cleavages

Political sociology generally sees these fundamental ideological dimensions as reflections of social identities formed on the basis of social structure or social group memberships (see for example, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Alford 1967; Rose and Urwin 1970; Lijphart 1979). The left-right dimension is rooted in social

class, with the working class tending to favour interventionist and income redistribution policies. The liberal-conservative dimension is closely related to religiosity and education, with active members of religious groups exhibiting more conservative social values, and highly educated people being more liberal-minded.

The sociological approach originates with Lazarsfeld *et al* (1944; see also Berelson *et al,* 1954) who stated the conditions for persistent group voting as the following:

> (1) initial social differentiation such that the consequences of political policy are materially or symbolically different for different groups; (2) conditions of transmitability from generation to generation; and (3) conditions of physical and social proximity for continued in-group contact in succeeding generations (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954), page 75).

Other influential research by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that social cleavages are so important to a polity that they determine the structure of party competition. This explanation suggests, then, that social group identities induce group norms supporting a particular political party. Although it is not explicit from Lazarsfeld and his colleagues, this implies that these group processes will also generate an intra-group consensus on social and political attitudes. If this holds, societies with similar social group structures should display similar socio-political attitudes and party support.

Recent empirical research casts some doubt on this argument. For example, social class does *not* have the same impact on vote across societies (see the edited volume by Evans 1999). One possible explanation for this variability is that the groups themselves may be less developed in some countries compared to others, and that the second and third of Berelson's conditions described above may apply less strongly. This is the classic explanation for the absence of class voting in the U.S.: as

Sombart (1976/1906) argued, high rates of intergenerational social mobility implies that there will be little intergenerational transmission of values and relatively little social proximity or continued in-group contact in succeeding generations. It is rarely possible to test this explanation since cross-national data on within-group processes are hard to come by. A testable inference from this argument, however, is that social group identities will have rather similar impacts on attitudes and vote within a given country. Thus in North America one might expect that the absence of strong and enduring within-class social relationships has led both to a weak relationship between class and left-right attitudes and to a similarly weak relationship between class and party.

2.3. Considering Political Context

The simple sociological model may work well in a country such as Britain where, at least historically, a cohesive social group has a strong political presence — i.e., a viable political party represents the group's concerns. On the other hand, if a social group's concerns are not clearly represented by a viable political party, members of that group may vote on the basis of some other social group identity. Consider a polity without a strong working class party (e.g., the United States), where working class voters can choose only between parties that do not explicitly address class concerns. In such a polity, working class voters may be inclined to vote according to the concerns of another group identity and so may vote on religious rather than class lines.

Now contemplate a polity with a political party that is both secular and pro-working class. Assume that no other parties represent the working class but all other parties represent religious concerns. Those who are both religious and working class may decide against voting for the working-class party since it rejects their religious

interests. Likewise, those who are opposed to policies favouring religious interests may vote for the working class party regardless of their social class. If non-religious voters constitute a significant portion of the population, there may be no difference between classes in their propensity to vote left. Although we are suggesting here that the structure of party competition can influence the association between social group identities and party support, it does not follow that there will necessarily be a similar association between social group identities and socio-political attitudes. In other words, just because class voting is low, does not mean that the class polarization of attitudes will be any different than in a society characterized by a high level of class voting.

Broadly speaking, if political context is irrelevant, each social group identity should have a similar affect on vote as it does on attitudes within societies. If political context does matter, the effects of social group identities on attitudes and vote should vary independently, and should differ across societies. It is widely known that voting does not always reflect social structure in a similar manner across countries. Less is known about whether attitudes are affected in the same manner and under what conditions the two effects move in tandem or are independent. In order to shed light on these issues, we apply this theory to an analysis of Britain, Canada and the U.S. In many ways these countries are very similar: they are modern industrial societies with similar social class structures, have first-past-the-post electoral systems, have a large English-speaking majority, and have significant minority populations. They are also characterized by regional cleavages, enabling us to divide the countries accordingly. More importantly, the political context of these countries are known to differ in ways—e.g., specifically in terms of party structures–that may affect cleavage voting.

3. Data and methods

3.1. Data and Samples

Our analysis is restricted to the period between 1992 and 2000, and is based on seven high quality surveys employing nationally representative samples. Our desire to examine patterns at the regional rather than national level requires us to combine datasets for each country in order to increase the sample sizes and statistical power. In all cases, models were initially fit for each dataset separately to ensure compatibility.

For the U.S. analysis we use a combined dataset of the 1996 and 2000 American National Election Studies (ANES). The Canadian analysis is based on a data set combining the 1993 and 1997 Canadian Election Studies (CES). Finally, the British analyses are based on a combination of the 1992 and 1997 British Election Studies (BES), and the 1999 Welsh Assembly Election Study (WAES). These studies are ideally suitable because they contain extensive information about respondents' social background, attitudes and voting behaviour. We restrict our analysis to only those who reported voting in the most recent election. More details of the data, including response rates, can be seen in Appendix A.

We analyse four Canadian regions (sample sizes, after omitting missing cases, are in parentheses): the Western provinces (N=1939), Ontario (N=1308), Quebec (N=1206), and the Eastern provinces (N=594). The British data are divided into five regions: Scotland (N=1642), Wales (N=1169), northern England (N=1304); the midlands of England (N=1168) and the southern England (N=2006). The U.S. data are divided according to the U.S. Census's four major regions: the Northeast (N=503), Midwest (N=808), South (N=1131) and West (N=646). The criteria for distinguishing regions were a combination of theoretical rationales and practical considerations. Quebec, Scotland and Wales all have unique political contexts that might be expected

to induce different social identity effects—i.e., national cleavages and parties representing them—and were thus separated accordingly. Other regional divisions were based on geographical divisions and sample sizes.

3.2. Dependent Variables

Our four dependent variables are left-right attitudes, liberal-conservative attitudes, right vote and left vote. The attitude variables are operationalised using two separate scales. High scores on the liberal-conservative scale indicate socially conservative attitudes; high scores on the left-right scale indicate *laissez-faire* attitudes. Since there are few questions common to all the surveys employed, we could only construct scales that are functionally equivalent. Functional equivalence is sufficient, however, since our interest is in comparing societal differences in the relative impact of social variables on these attitudes rather than absolute societal differences. Details of the scales, including the specific items used for each country and the reliability coefficients, are in Appendix B.

Each of the regions has parties that can be placed into a left/liberal group and a right/conservative group. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to these groups as 'left vote' and 'right vote' respectively throughout the article. We contrast vote for these parties with vote for all other parties, including centre parties and nationalist parties, but excluding non-voters. For all Canadian regions the Progressive Conservative Party and the Reform Party are grouped together as the right parties, and the New Democratic Party (NDP) is coded as the left party. For the British analyses, the Labour Party is coded as the left party, and the Conservative Party is treated as the right party. We follow convention by treating the Democrats as the left party and the Republicans as the right party in the U.S. (see Hout, Manza and Brooks 1999).

3.3 Explanatory Variables

The models include seven social group explanatory variables: age, gender, religiosity, race, national identity, education, and social class. All of these concepts are coded as categorical variables, and except for race and national identity, are coded identically for each region.

Age is divided into three categories: 18 to 34 years old, 35-64 old, and 65 and over, and operationalised as two dummy regressors with the youngest category as the reference. Gender is treated as a dummy variable with women coded as the reference category, and education is coded as a dummy variable for those who have a university degree.

Religiosity is divided into four categories: practicing Protestants, practicing Catholics, those who regularly practice another religion, and those who are less religious (reference category). The U.S. and British data included a question on frequency of church attendance so that is employed here. Respondents who attended church at least once a month were classified as 'practicing'. The Canadian data did not contain a similar question on religious practices, but rather a question asking respondents how important religion was to them. Only those who claimed it was 'very important' were coded as 'practicing'.

Following from Hout, Manza and Brooks (1999) social class is divided into five categories: managers, professionals, clerical workers (routine non-manual labour), self-employed, and working class (or manual labour). Due to a significant portion of missing cases in most regions, we also include a sixth category for those whom their occupation was unknown. Social class is treated as a set of five dummy regressors with the working class as the reference category.

For all U.S. regions, race is divided into three categories: black, other visible minorities, and white (reference category). The numbers of non-whites were too small in Canada and Britain to allow dividing them into two categories, so race is operationalised simply as visible minorities versus white (the reference category).

National identity is measured only for Quebec, Scotland and Wales, where it is treated as a dummy variable for the minority nation versus others. Those for whom French was their first language and it was still spoken in the home, were classified as Quebecois national identity. For Scotland and Wales, national identity was measured simply by respondents' self-reports of Scottish or Welsh identity.

3.4. Modelling Procedure

Left-right and liberal-conservative attitudes were regressed separately on the social group variables using ordinary least squares regression (OLS). Separate probit models were used to regress left vote and right vote on the same social group variables. We adjusted the coefficients from the OLS models of attitudes—in effect standardizing the regression equations—so that they are comparable with the corresponding coefficients from the probit models of vote. Cross-regional similarities and differences in the relative effects of social group variables on attitudes and vote are then examined using graphs. More details of this method are described below.

We start by discussing the probit models of left and right vote. The general probit model assumes that a binary dependent variable, y (1,0), represents a continuous latent variable, *Z*. For each combination of predictors there is a different mean μ, which represents the cut-off point where $Z > 0$ (the point where the observed discrete response variable changes from 0 to 1). In our case, *Z* represents the "propensity" to vote left (or right) and y represents actual left vote (or right vote). This model assumes

that the errors are independent and normally distributed and that the residual variance equals one (Fox (1997), page 447). The basic vote model is as follows:

$$\pi_i = \Phi(\alpha + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + ... + \beta_k x_{ik}) \qquad (1)$$

Where π_i represents the probability that y =1 (in our case, vote for the party), Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function and $(\alpha + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + ...\beta_k x_{ik})$ represents the mean of *Z* given the social identity explanatory variables, and the βs represent the slopes of the social group identity variables. β_1 can be interpreted as the increase in *Z* for a one-unit increase in x_1, holding all other explanatory variables constant.

We now turn to the attitude models. One way of standardizing regression equations is to constrain the mean squared error (MSE) of the two models to be equal. Recall that the probit model assumes that the residual variance, and hence the MSE, of $Z \mid x_1, x_2 \ldots x_k$ is equal to 1. We can adjust the coefficients and standard errors from OLS regression models so that the MSE equals 1 using the following formulas:

$$\beta' = \frac{\beta}{\sqrt{\text{MSE}}} \qquad (2)$$

$$\text{SE}(\beta)' = \frac{SE(\beta)}{\sqrt{\text{MSE}}} \qquad (3)$$

While this adjustment is arbitrary from a substantive point of view, it is sensible considering that our dependent variables, left-right attitudes and liberal-conservative attitudes, have artificial metrics. Since we have different measures of attitudes in each of the data sets, we cannot determine *differences* in attitudes across

societies. However, this method allows us to sensibly compare the *relative* effects of social identities on attitudes and vote across societies. For example, our method cannot determine in which society women are most liberal, but it can show where the impact of gender on attitudes and vote is strongest. In other words, this method allows us to compare levels of group polarization in terms of attitudes and vote, and differences and similarities in these two types of polarization, across societies.

Rather than only examine the coefficients in tables, which is not conducive to determining patterns of association when there are many regions under analysis, we plot them on graphs. The horizontal axis on these graphs represents the adjusted coefficient from the attitudes models; the vertical axis represents the corresponding coefficient from the probit models of vote. Simply put, the horizontal axis tells us the level of polarization in terms of attitudes, while the vertical axis displays the polarization in terms of vote. Regions are depicted by the following codes:

United States:	*Canada:*	*Great Britain:*
USNE: Northeast	CAEA: East	GBSC: Scotland
USNC: North Central	CAWE: West	GBWA: Wales
USSO: South	CAON: Ontario	GBNE: North England
USWE: West	CAQU: Quebec	GBME: Midlands, England
		GBSE: South England

Each graph includes a loess nonparametric regression line of the cross-societal trend (see Fox, 2000).

4. Results

The unadjusted coefficients, and their standard errors, from the models of left-right attitudes and liberal-conservative attitudes are in Tables A1 and A2 of the Appendix. The residual standard error for each model is also reported so that the adjusted coefficients used in the plots can be calculated. Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix

display the probit models fit to right and left vote respectively. A glance at the tables does indeed show that there are significant group differences in attitudes and voting. We now turn to the graphs for a detailed discussion of the effects of age, race, religiosity and social class on attitudes and vote in the different regions that we have distinguished.

4.1. Effects of Age

It is well known that people generally become more resistant to change and more socially conservative as they age (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Glenn 1980; Markus 1979). In none of the regions we examine is there a party that uniquely represents the old, but the party structures are similar in that they have distinct right-wing parties with conservative platforms. All else being equal, we should expect that the old (those 65 and over) will be more conservative than the young (those under 35), and that this conservatism will be reflected in a higher propensity for the old to vote for right-wing parties.

Figure 1 displays the adjusted coefficients for the old/young contrast from the models of liberal-conservative attitudes (plotted along the horizontal axes) compared with left and right vote (on the vertical axes). As expected, age has a similar influence on attitudes in all regions—the coefficients measured on the horizontal axis are all positive, and statistically significant, indicating that the old are more conservative than the young. On the other hand, controlling for the other major social identities, age does not generally affect voting patterns. Only in Scotland and the north of England is there a statistically significant relationship between age and right vote. Moreover, there is no apparent cross-societal pattern. The findings are similar for left vote. Once again, aside from Scotland and the north of England, none of the coefficients for left

voting are statistically significant. The general lack of age effects on vote despite strong influences on attitudes cries out for a political context interpretation—the obvious supposition is that it at least partly reflects the absence of specifically age-based political parties.

[Figure 1 about here]

The deviation of Scotland is easily explained using the political context argument. In this respect, the higher propensity for the old to vote right in this region is better suited to a generational rather than a life-cycle explanation. Older Scots are typically more favorable to a united Britain largely because their formative years took place during a time of common British projects such as the British Empire and the World Wars (Heath and Kellas, 1998). Because of this identification with the British State, older Scots are more likely to favour the Conservative Party, the most unionist of the British parties. On the other hand, young Scots have less affinity with the British State and thus are more likely to avoid the Conservative Party, perhaps giving support to the Scottish National Party instead.

4.2. Effects of Race

Research suggests that visible racial minorities are more likely than others to be discriminated against in the job market and elsewhere (Modood *et al,* 1997; Keith and Herring, 1991; Telles and Murguia, 1990; Massey and Denton, 1993; Elliot and Fleras, 1992). It follows that left-leaning policies, such as laws ensuring equal opportunity and income redistribution, are in the interest of racial minorities and one would therefore

expect ethnic minorities to be generally more left-leaning, both in terms of attitudes and vote, than the majority population.

Figure 2 displays the relationships between racial minorities and whites in terms of left-right attitudes and vote. Recall that in all other regions outside the U.S., race is coded as non-white versus white, while in the U.S. regions the nonwhites are further divided into blacks and other visible minorities. (The coefficients representing blacks in Figure 2 are denoted by "b" at the end of the region code). The effect of race on attitudes is most apparent for the black/white contrast in the U.S.—in all regions blacks are significantly more left in attitudes (shown by the negative coefficients on the horizontal axis). Other visible minorities in the U.S. are also typically more left than whites, though to a lesser degree (the coefficients are statistically significant for the South and West only). Excluding Wales, for which the relationship between race and attitudes is not statistically significant, visible minorities in Britain also have significantly more left attitudes than are whites. The Canadian regions are markedly different in that in none of them is there a significant race effect on left-right attitudes.

[Figure 2 about here]

It is evident from Figure 2 that racial differences in voting generally reflect attitudinal differences between the races. Reflecting its impact on attitudes, racial minorities are less likely to vote right and more likely to vote left than are whites in most regions of the U.S. and Britain (witness the negative coefficients on the vertical axis). As with the left-right attitudes model, the effects on vote in the U.S. are much larger for the black/white contrast than for the other minority/white contrast. That U.S. blacks standout again is not surprising if we consider party platforms. The Democratic

Party is both more left and has campaigned for the rights of blacks to a far greater degree than the Republican Party. Once again, as with attitudes, the relationship between race and vote are almost nonexistent in Canada and do not reach statistical significance. The Canadian exceptions perhaps indicate the success of Canada's official multicultural policy.

4.3. Effects of Religiosity

Considering that religions usually uphold conservative values (see, Schwartz and Huismans, 1995), we should expect that those who are religious would generally hold socially conservative views. Although none of the regions we examine have religious-specific parties, the right parties in each region cater more to religious concerns than any other parties. According to the sociological model, we would expect the conservative views of the religious to be reflected in a higher propensity to vote for right parties than those who are not religious. If we consider political context, we might also expect the voting patterns of practicing Catholics and practicing Protestants to differ across regions, especially given the dominance of Protestantism in most of the regions. The following analysis recognizes this be distinguishing between practicing Catholics and practicing Protestants, comparing each of them with the less religious.

We can see in Figure 3 that, as expected, Protestantism is positively associated with conservative attitudes in all regions (the coefficient is positive and statistically significantly in all regions). Protestants are also generally more likely to vote for right-wing parties, and less likely to vote for left parties. Nonetheless, the U.S. regions and Quebec are significant outliers. First, Protestantism has a much stronger impact on right vote in the U.S. regions than elsewhere, probably reflecting that the Republican Party has closer ties to the religious right than do the right-wing parties in Canada and

Britain. Secondly, contrary to all other regions, there is a significant negative effect on both left and right vote in Quebec. This anomaly is also easily explained by political context. The nature of party competition and the emphasis on nationalism in Quebec politics limit party choices for Protestants. Both right parties and the NDP are generally considered to represent the interests of the western provinces rather than the interests of Quebec. This leaves the centralist Liberal Party as by far the most viable party for Quebec Protestants to support.

[Figure 3 about here]

Figure 4 shows the Catholic/less religious contrasts to be very similar with respect to attitudes but vastly different with respect to vote across regions. Except in Scotland, Catholics hold more Conservative attitudes on average than the less religious. On the other hand, aside from a few significant deviations, Catholicism generally has little impact on vote. The most notable exception is Scotland, where Catholicism can be seen as a marker for Irish ethnicity, a historically disadvantaged minority that has opposed the dominant institutions of the British State (see Clark, 1998). It is not surprising, then, that we find Catholics to be significantly less likely to vote for the right-wing but unionist Conservative Party, and far more likely to vote for the left Labour Party. Considering the large Irish minority in the south of England, particularly in London, the effects of Catholicism in this region represent a paler version of the same phenomenon.

[Figure 4 about here]

Two Canadian regions—Ontario and Quebec—also stand out because Catholics are significantly less likely than the less religious to vote for right parties. In both cases it is the centre Liberal Party that benefits, but for different reasons. The relatively low propensity for Quebec Catholics to vote right reflects the strong historical ties between Quebec and the Liberal Party, partly reflected in the large number of Liberal Prime Ministers from Quebec. Ontario's deviation can be explained by the large number of southern European immigrants, largely Catholic, who show allegiance to the Liberal Party because they were in power when most of them arrived in Canada.

4.4. Effects of Social Class

Cross-national research suggests that social class generally affects attitudes, with working class individuals typically more left than those in other classes (see for example, Kelley and Evans, 1995; Vanneman, 1980). While the relationship may be weakening, class is also significantly related to voting in most Western societies (see the edited volume by Evans, 1999). Given their adversarial relationship in the workplace, the largest differences in class attitudes and vote might be expected between the working class and the managerial class, so we focus primarily on the contrast between these two classes.

Figure 5 plots the contrasts between managers and the working class for left-right attitudes and vote. Although the relationships are generally in the expected direction, there are vast differences between regions. Like previous research on class voting (see Weakliem and Heath, 1999; Andersen and Heath 2002), we find strong class effects in all British regions, with managers being more right both in terms of attitudes and vote (correspondingly they are also less likely to vote for the left).

Similar to previous research on the U.S. (Clark and Lipset, 1991) and Canada (Lambert and Curtis, 1993) the effects on attitudes and vote are generally positive, but small and not statistically significant. (The coefficient for Quebec is negative but not significantly different from zero).

[Figure 5 about here]

Once again, political context explains these cross-societal differences. The labour movement and local working class communities have traditionally been much stronger in Britain than in Canada and the U.S. (Parkin, 1967). This greater class awareness has led to higher levels of class voting, both from the working class who vote left, and from managers who may have a greater propensity to vote right as a reaction against the working class (Przeworski and Soares, 1971). Despite these differences, the general pattern in Figure 5 suggests that the relationships of class with attitudes and vote tend to go in tandem.

4.5. Effects of National Identity

The small number of regions—Quebec, Wales and Scotland—for which minority national identities are relevant makes graphing the coefficients unnecessary. Nonetheless, there are some interesting findings that deserve reporting. Most importantly, minority identities did not have identical effects in each of the regions. For example, national differences in terms left-right attitudes were much more polarized in the British regions than in Quebec, with those holding Welsh or Scottish attitudes being typically more left-wing. In none of these regions, however, were these attitudinal differences reflected in left-vote. Of course, this is because we chose to

exclude nationalist parties from the left-bloc—other analyses including the nationalist parties in the Left Bloc did in fact show the expected relationship. Nonetheless, context also plays a role in Quebec in that those with Quebec national identity were more likely to vote for the Conservative Party than others.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

This article explored the social bases of attitudes and of vote in a comparative perspective. Our analysis was unusual in that it modelled attitudes and vote separately rather than including attitudes as predictors of vote. We developed a novel methodology that allows easy comparison of regression coefficients from different types of models, specifically from linear regression and probit models. In this way we were able to compare the effects of explanatory variables on categorical dependent variables with the effects on continuous dependent variables.

Our method clearly demonstrates when the effects of social identities on voting are not congruent with their effects on attitudes. We found significant regional differences in the effects of social identities on vote and attitudes, indicating that countries should not always be treated as homogeneous regions; even in apparently similar regions there can be differences in group attitudes and voting. Most importantly, this method highlights the importance of considering the role of party competition when assessing social cleavages.

We found remarkable uniformity in the social basis of attitudes, especially with respect to age and religiosity. In every region, older respondents were more likely than younger ones to have socially conservative attitudes and this association tended to be quite powerful and invariably significant. There was little variation either within or between countries. In every region too we found that religiosity was associated with

socially conservative attitudes (even after controlling for age and the other variables in the model).

Still, there were large differences in voting patterns according to age and religion, especially with respect to right voting. For example, there was no general pattern for the contrast between Catholics and the less religious across countries, perhaps reflecting that none of the regions has a party that caters specifically to Catholic concerns. On the other hand, there was a general tendency for Protestants to be more likely than the less religious to vote for right wing parties. For both the Protestant and Catholic contrasts, Quebec stood out suggesting that the structure of party competition and the political dominance of nationalist issues played a role. The strongest party in Quebec, the Bloc Quebecois, is a separatist party that represents the interests of secular Quebecers, thus encouraging markedly different religiosity/vote patterns in Quebec than elsewhere (see Blais, Martin and Nadeau 1995 and Nadeau and Fleury 1995 for a description of the national vote in Quebec).

We also found evidence of political context affecting the impact of age-related identities. In no country is there a party representing specific age groups, so despite that there were significant age effects on attitudes, these did not generally induce differences in vote. Scotland was a noteworthy exception, however, but age differences here are better interpreted as generational effects rather than life-course effects. Older Scotish voters are typically more likely to vote for the Conservative Party on the grounds that it represents a united Britain. In other words, disparity in age effects on voting most likely reflects differences in party platforms rather than differences in the nature of the social cleavage.

Age and religiosity, then, show a fair degree of uniformity in their association with attitudes but high variability in their association with vote. In contrast, for race

and social class there is considerable variability in the association with left-right attitudes and in the association with voting, but the two tend to move in tandem. In Britain working class respondents were substantially more left in their attitudes than managers, and substantially more likely to vote for the Labour party. In Canada and the U.S., on the other hand, there were only weak class differences in left-right attitudes and no significant effects on left voting. We also found that race had a significant impact on attitudes and vote in all British and U.S. regions. There was no notable impact on attitudes or vote in Canada.

Since the race and class effects on attitudes and vote varied in tandem across regions, these findings could in principle be explained by the sociological approach. Still, this does not explain why the effects of race are so much stronger in the U.S., especially with respect to the voting patterns of blacks. Similarly, it could be argued that class voting is weak in the U.S. and Canada precisely because class divisions in left-right attitudes are weak. This still leaves the lack of attitudinal polarization unexplained, although there are a number of potential sociological explanations such as Sombart's (1976/1906) classic explanation for the absence of socialism in the U.S., which could apply.

In any event, the significant cross-regional differences in social identity effects suggest that political explanations are necessary. Considering class, Przeworski and Sprague (1986) emphasize the way in which political parties act to promote class awareness. The British Labour party, for example, went to great efforts to promote class awareness before its reincarnation as New Labour. No parties behaved similarly in any of the other regions. Similarly, we can see the strength of the race cleavage in the U.S. as reflecting that the Democrats take a clear stand on racial issues, especially for blacks, whereas Canada and Britain do not have any major parties that stand out on

similar issues. The evidence cannot be conclusive, but the fact that the associations of both attitudes and vote with social class and race tend to run in tandem, is suggestive that parties can influence social divisions.

This raises the further question as to why we have such different patterns for class and religiosity. The answer to this may lie in the fact that none of the parties in our selection of regions is primarily a religious party. We might expect to see stronger associations of both attitudes and vote with religiosity in political contexts where there are primarily religious parties (as in the Netherlands, see DeGraaf, Heath and Need 2001). Following from this, we could predict that in Britain, where New Labour has moved to become a catchall party of the centre, the association of class with left-right attitudes, as well as the association with vote, might decline in time. We leave it to other researchers to address these issues in greater detail.

Appendix A: Description of the datasets

A.1. American Data: The 1996 and 2000 ANES

The 1996 and 2000 ANES employed nationally representative samples of the American electorate during and following the 1996 and 2000 U.S. Presidential elections. We restrict our analysis to the post-election samples from both studies. In both studies respondents were randomly allocated to face-to-face and telephone interviews. Preliminary analyses showed no substantive differences between the two samples, so the analyses reported here use all respondents regardless of whether they were administered a personal or telephone interview.

The 1996 ANES has a total sample size of 1714 respondents who were interviewed before the 1996 U.S. Presidential Election; 1534 of these were re-interviewed in a post-election survey during November and December 1996. Of these 1534 respondents 1197 were initially interviewed in the 1994 election study; 337 were freshly sampled. The response rates to the 1996 ANES were 71% for the pre-election survey and 90% for the post-election re-interview. The 2000 ANES interviewed 1803 respondents before the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election. The post-election re-interview, which took place from immediately following the election in November and December of 2000, achieved a sample size of 1556. The overall response rate for the 2000 ANES was 61.2%; the post-election re-interview had a response rate of 86%

Both the 1996 and 2000 ANES are available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research Data Archive. The ICPSR Archive number for the 1996 ANES is 6896 (see Rosenstone *et al,* 1997, for more details); for the 2000 ANES the ICPSR data archive number is 3131 (see Burns *et al,* 2001).

A.2. Canadian Data: The 1993 and 1997 CES

The 1993 and 1997 CES contain data from pre- and post-campaign interviews surrounding the 1993 and 1997 Canadian Federal Elections respectively. Both studies conducted telephone interviews to a sample selected using random-digit-dialling and were designed to be representative of the Canadian population over the age of 18. Since many of the questions of interest to this study were asked only in the post-election surveys, our results were based on this portion of the samples.

The total sample size of the 1993 CES was 3775, of which 3340 were re-interviewed in the post election survey. The total sample size of the 1997 CES was 3949, of which 3170 were re-interviewed after the election. Response rates were 63.4% and 59% for the 1993 and 1997 CES campaign interviews respectively. The response rates for the CES post-election re-interviews were 88% in 1993 and 80% in 1997 (see Northrup 1998 for more details of the 1997 CES, and Northrup and Oram 1994 for more details of the 1993 CES).

Data from the 1993 and 1997 Canadian Election Studies were provided by the Institute for Social Research, York University. The 1993 survey was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), grant numbers 411-92-0019 and 421-92-0026, and was completed for the 1992/93 Canadian Election Team of Richard Johnston (University of British Columbia), André Blais (Université de Montréal), Henry Brady (University of California at Berkeley), Elisabeth Gidengil (McGill University), and Neil Nevitte (University of Calgary). The 1997 survey was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), grant number 412-96-0007 and was completed for the 1997 Canadian Election Team of Andre Blais (Université de Montreal), Elisabeth Gidengil (McGill University), Richard Nadeau (Université de Montreal) and Neil Nevitte (University of Toronto).

Neither the Institute for Social Research, the SSHRC, nor the Canadian Election Teams are responsible for the analyses and interpretations presented here.

A.3. British Data: The 1992 and 1997 BES and the 1999 WAES

Both the 1992 and 1997 BES were representative samples of all British adults aged 18 or over living in private households. Respondents were selected using the Postcode Address File and interviewed face-to-face in their homes shortly after the 1992 and 1997 General Elections. Both studies also included a self-completion supplement that respondents were to retune later. Since the items necessary to construct attitude scales were included only in the self-completion questionnaire, our analysis is based on this portion of the samples.

The 1992 BES has a complete sample size of 3,534, of which 3,304 returned the self-completion supplement. The response rate for the face-to-face interviews was 73%; the response rate for the self-completion portion was 68%. The total sample size of the 1997 BES was 3615, of which 3093 completed and returned a self-completion survey. The response rate for the in-home personal interviews of the 1997 BES was 62%; the response rate for the self-completion portion of the study was 53% (see Thomson et al., 2001 for more details of the BES).

Since the BES interviewed relatively few respondents from Wales, we further supplement the British data with the 1999 Welsh Assembly Election Study. The WAES was designed to yield a random sample of the population of Wales aged 18 years and over. A combination of telephone and face-to-face interviews were carried out between May and June of 1999. The achieved sample was 1255 respondents; 729 were interviewed over the telephone and 522 were given face-to-face interviews. The response rate for the face-to-face survey was approximately 67 percent. The response

rate for the telephone survey was approximately 50 percent. Although specifically about the 1999 Welsh Assembly Elections, the study contained relevant questions about voting during the 1997 British election. The WAES is similar in structure to the BES and all items used in this study were measured identically in both studies. For more details about the WAES study see Thomson (forthcoming).

The 1992 and 1997 BES was conducted under the auspices of the Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends (CREST). The Directors of Crest are Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John Curtice. The WAES was conducted jointly by the Institute for Welsh Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth and CREST.

Appendix B: Attitude scales

The British attitude scales were constructed using questions designed specifically for the creation of additive scales measuring liberal-conservative attitudes and left-right attitudes (see Evans *et al*, 1996). Although the CES and ANES data were not designed with the specific purpose of creating scales identical to those from the BES, there were a number of items in both studies that could be put together to create functionally equivalent scales. Since we combined data from two ANES and two CES studies, the scale was necessarily created using items that were used in the both years for each country. We initially explored dimensionality and limited the number of items using exploratory factor analysis. After reducing the number of items to measure the two attitudes, we constructed scales similar to those from the BES. Details of the scales are provided below.

B.1. British scales

All of the items used in both BES scales are Likert items with the following response format: "agree strongly", "agree", "neither agree nor disagree", "disagree" or "disagree strongly". Each item was coded from 1 to 5. The specific items used for the left-right scale are as follows:

1. Ordinary people get their fair share of the nation's wealth
2. There is one law for the rich and one for the poor
3. There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employee's working conditions and wages
4. Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems
5. Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership

6. It is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one

The items used for the British liberal-conservative scale are as follows:

1. Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British attitudes
2. Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards
3. People should be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against government
4. Homosexual relations are always wrong
5. People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives
6. Political parties which wish to overthrow democracy should be allowed to stand in general elections

The British liberal-conservative scale had a reliability of alpha=.56; for the British left-right scale the reliability was alpha=.67.

B.2. US scales

Five items were used for the American left-right scale. The first three questions used five point Likert scales with the following responses: "agree strongly", "agree", neither agree nor disagree", "disagree" or "disagree strongly" (again coded from 1 to 5). Items 4 and 6 presented respondents with two response categories but accepted no opinions and don't know responses if they were declared.

1. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems.
2. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.

3. One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance.
4. Next, I am going to ask you to choose which of two statements I read comes closer to your own opinion. You might agree to some extent with both, but we want to know which one is closer to your own views. ONE, the less government, the better; or TWO, there are more things that government should be doing?
5. ONE, the main reason government has become bigger over the years is because it has gotten involved in things that people should do for themselves; OR TWO, government has become bigger because the problems we face have become bigger.

Each of the items used for the American liberal-conservative scale are 5-point Likert items with responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree (again coded from 1 to 5). The items are as follows:

1. The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.
2. This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties
3. The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behaviour to those changes.

The reliability of the American left-right scale was quite good, achieving a Cronbach's alpha= .72. The liberal-conservative scale's reliability was reasonable given that only three indicators were used in its construction (alpha=.56).

B.3. Canadian scales

As can be seen from the wording of the questions, the response format for each of the questions used to construct the Canadian left-right scale was the following: “a lot” (coded 3), “some” (coded 2), or “not at all” (coded 1). The specific items of the scale are as follows:

1. Would you cut WELFARE spending A LOT, SOME, or NOT AT ALL?
2. Would you cut PENSIONS A LOT, SOME, or NOT AT ALL?
3. Would you cut HEALTH CARE A LOT, SOME, or NOT AT ALL?
4. Would you cut UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE A LOT, SOME, or NOT AT ALL?
5. Would you cut EDUCATION A LOT, SOME, or NOT AT ALL?

The questions used to construct the Canadian liberal-conservative scale had varying response formats. The first two questions used five point Likert scales with the following responses: “agree strongly”, “agree”, neither agree nor disagree”, “disagree” or “disagree strongly” (coded from 1-5). For questions 3 thru 5 respondents were asked to give a score on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 means they “really dislike” the group and 100 means they “really like” the group. To make these comparable to the Likert questions, responses to these questions were collapsed into 5 categories and assigned scores from 1 to 5. This had only a minimal effect on the response distributions since the data were essentially in five clusters. The last item, which has three categories, was scored one for the most liberal response, 5 for the most conservative response, and 3 for the middle response. The items used for the scale are as follows:

1. Only people who are legally married should be having children
2. Society would be better off if more women stayed home with their children.
3. How do you feel about Aboriginal peoples?

4. How do you feel about homosexuals?
5. How do you feel about racial minorities
6. Of the following three positions, which is closest to your own opinion: One: abortion should NEVER be permitted, Two: should be permitted only after NEED has been established by a doctor, OR Three: should be a matter of the woman's PERSONAL CHOICE?

The Cronbach's alpha for the left-right scale was .59, indicating that the scale was reasonably reliable especially considering that there were only three response categories for all of the items. The liberal-conservative scale had good reliability (alpha=.66).

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Table A1. *Coefficients from the Regression of Left-Right Attitudes on Social Group Variables* (*continued on next page*)

	United Sates				Canada			
Independent Variable	West	North Central	Northeast	South	West	Ontario	Quebec	East
Age								
35 to 64	-.34	-.43	.07	.36	-.10	-.07	-.40	-.51
	(.41)	(.38)	(.47)	(.38)	(.22)	(.26)	(.29)	(.35)
65 and over	-.87	-.39	.29	.56	-.46	-.35	0.10	-.27
	(.54)	(.45)	(.56)	(.29)	(.35)	(.41)	(.51)	(.56)
Men	2.82***	1.85***	1.96***	2.39***	.34	.49	1.04	.46
	(.40)	(.37)	(.44)	(.30)	(.20)	(.24)	(.27)	(.32)
Race								
Black	-4.21***	-3.95***	-3.65***	-4.03***	—	—	—	—
	(.88)	(.76)	(.64)	(.33)				
Other minority	-1.06*	-.65	-.41	-1.72***	.27	-.13	.21	.17
	(.51)	(.71)	(.77)	(.47)	(.39)	(.43)	(.57)	(1.03)
Religion								
Protestant	2.31***	1.76***	.92	.81**	.36	1.02***	-1.01	-.11
	(.47)	(.36)	(.54)	(.28)	(.25)	(.31)	(.88)	(.38)
Catholic	-.54	1.06**	.43	.33	.07	-.86**	.80*	.24
	(.55)	(.39)	(.45)	(.28)	(.32)	(.32)	(.32)	(.38)
Other	-1.06	-.65	-.41	.09	-.45	-.42	-1.59	2.24
	(.51)	(.71)	(.77)	(.42)	(.51)	(.24)	(1.00)	(1.40)
National Identity	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.13	—
							(.38)	
University Degree	.58	.33	.93*	.99**	.40	.54	.28	1.53***
	(.41)	(.41)	(.46)	(.32)	(.26)	(.30)	(.35)	(.43)
Social Class								
Professionals	.51	.20	-.14	.52	.56	.30	.83	-.11
	(.59)	(.54)	(.65)	(.43)	(.34)	(.38)	(.46)	(.53)
Managers	1.80**	.59	.84	.85	.49	.84	-.57	.09
	(.65)	(.56)	(.67)	(.47)	(.40)	(.46)	(.54)	(.66)
Self-employed	1.46*	1.76**	.62	1.95***	.84**	1.04**	1.26**	1.55**
	(.65)	(.61)	(.73)	(.47)	(.29)	(.38)	(.46)	(.51)
Non-manual	.64	.11	-.32	.77	.07	.56	1.19*	.13
	(.50)	(.41)	(.53)	(.35)	(.36)	(.43)	(.47)	(.53)
Missing	-.15	.24	-.63	.64	-.96**	-.03	-.15	-.84
	(.67)	(.54)	(.72)	(.43)	(.31)	(.35)	(.38)	(.46)
Constant	10.69***	10.96***	10.46***	10.22***	10.75***	10.64***	9.87***	9.15***
	(.52)	(.44)	(.56)	(.36)	(.27)	(.31)	(.50)	(.41)
Residual standard error	18.29	17.43	16.29	16.48	17.66	16.72	20.17	13.23
R^2	.15	.11	.16	.23	.03	.04	.04	.07
Number of cases	643	803	643	1127	1922	1294	1202	590

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

(Table A1 continued from previous page)

Coefficients from the Regression of Left-Right Attitudes on Social Group Variables

	Great Britain				
Independent Variable	South England	Midlands England	North England	Scotland	Wales
Age					
35 to 64	-.63*	.11	-.03	.08	-.42
	(.27)	(.33)	(.36)	(.31)	(.24)
65 and over	-.06	.67	.81	.70	.49
	(.34)	(.40)	(.45)	(.39)	(.30)
Men	.34	.21	-.25	.03	.37
	(.18)	(.22)	(.23)	(.20)	(.23)
Race					
Black	—	—	—	—	—
Other minority	-.82**	-1.28***	-.89**	-.74*	-.52
	(.25)	(.29)	(.33)	(.30)	(.32)
Religion					
Protestant	.72**	1.21**	.64	1.09***	.23
	(.26)	(.31)	(.34)	(.26)	(.31)
Catholic	-.99*	-.12	-.53	-1.38***	.54
	(.43)	(.61)	(.46)	(.34)	(.60)
Other	.161	1.36	1.81	.38	-.52
	(.80)	(1.11)	(.99)	(1.34)	(.32)
National Identity	—	—	—	-.69*	-3.333***
				(.32)	(.90)
University Degree	-.01	-.68	-.35	1.45***	.24
	(.29)	(.39)	(.42)	(.38)	(.37)
Social Class					
Professionals	1.58***	1.18**	1.75***	1.72***	1.08*
	(.31)	(.35)	(.42)	(.36)	(.49)
Managers	2.89***	2.58***	2.49***	2.55***	2.02***
	(.27)	(.35)	(.34)	(.33)	(.34)
Self-employed	1.99***	2.23***	1.90**	2.73***	1.09*
	(.35)	(.44)	(.55)	(.41)	(.45)
Non-manual	1.35***	1.41***	1.07***	.94***	.46
	(.24)	(.27)	(.28)	(.23)	(.28)
Missing	1.85**	1.61**	1.79**	2.32***	1.04**
	(.54)	(.52)	(.65)	(.46)	(.40)
Constant	15.56	15.65***	14.91***	13.94***	15.01***
	(.22)	(.23)	(.22)	(.20)	(.26)
Residual standard error	14.86	12.19	14.16	13.32	12.44
R^2	.09	.10	.07	.13	.07
Number of cases	2002	1166	1302	1637	1168

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

Table A2. Coefficients from the Regression of Liberal-Conservative Attitudes on Social Group Variables (*continued on next page*)

	United Sates				Canada			
Independent Variable	West	North Central	Northeast	South	West	Ontario	Quebec	East
Age								
35 to 64	.94***	.53*	.54	1.06***	1.05***	1.73***	1.19***	2.29***
	(.23)	(.21)	(.28)	(.18)	(.24)	(.29)	(.26)	(.40)
65 and over	1.57***	.65**	.97**	1.38***	3.07***	3.73***	3.88***	4.46***
	(.30)	(.25)	(.33)	(.23)	(.39)	(.47)	(.45)	(.65)
Men	-.12	-.51*	.28	-.14	.79***	.88**	1.10***	.06
	(.22)	(.21)	(.26)	(.18)	(.22)	(.27)	(.24)	(.37)
Race								
Black	-.66	-1.23**	-.18	-1.09***	—	—	—	—
	(.49)	(.42)	(.38)	(.20)				
Other minority	-.12	-.55	-.38	-.37	-.02	.53	.07	-2.20
	(.28)	(.39)	(.46)	(.28)	(.44)	(.49)	(.51)	(1.22)
Religion								
Protestant	2.71***	1.84***	1.30***	1.72***	3.39***	2.81***	2.62***	2.85***
	(.26)	(.20)	(.32)	(.17)	(.28)	(.36)	(.80)	(.45)
Catholic	1.57***	1.24***	1.11***	.93***	2.67***	2.39***	1.67***	2.07***
	(.31)	(.22)	(.26)	(.27)	(.35)	(.37)	(.28)	(.44)
Other	2.38***	1.76***	1.54***	1.78***	3.08***	3.42***	1.49	4.47***
	(.31)	(.35)	(.44)	(.26)	(.57)	(.76)	(.90)	(1.72)
National Identity	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.05**	—
							(.34)	
University Degree	-1.09***	-.34	-.69*	-.73***	-1.85***	-1.64***	-1.82***	-2.54***
	(.23)	(.23)	(.27)	(.20)	(.28)	(.35)	(.31)	(.51)
Social Class								
Professionals	.55	-.22	.21	.09	-.94*	-1.35***	-.51	-.69
	(.33)	(.30)	(.39)	(.26)	(.37)	(.44)	(.41)	(.63)
Managers	.76*	-.51	.15	-.12	-.93*	-.49	-1.62**	-1.49
	(.36)	(.31)	(.40)	(.29)	(.44)	(.53)	(.48)	(.77)
Self-employed	.54	.83*	.15	.09	.26	-.99*	-.13	-.24
	(.36)	(.34)	(.43)	(.28)	(.32)	(.44)	(.40)	(.59)
Non-manual	.38	-.13	.28	-.11	-.95*	-1.66**	-1.12**	-2.45***
	(.28)	(.23)	(.32)	(.21)	(.40)	(.49)	(.41)	(.61)
Missing	.46	.15	-.42	.21	-.39	-.71	-.03	-.36
	(.37)	(.30)	(.43)	(.26)	(.34)	(.40)	(.33)	(.54)
Constant	9.22***	10.49***	10.10***	9.96***	14.40***	13.87***	13.06***	14.10***
	(.29)	(.25)	(.33)	(.22)	(.29)	(.35)	(.44)	(.48)
Residual standard error	5.65	5.36	5.74	6.12	20.59	20.95	15.39	17.30
R^2	.26	.16	.11	.16	.19	.19	.21	.29
Number of cases	643	803	643	1127	1922	1294	1202	590

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

(Table A2 continued from previous page)

Coefficients from the Regression of Liberal-Conservative Attitudes on Social Group Variables

	Great Britain				
Independent Variable	South England	Midlands England	North England	Scotland	Wales
Age					
35 to 64	1.19***	1.24***	1.31***	1.39**	.94***
	(.23)	(.30)	(.29)	(.27)	(.20)
65 and over	2.59***	2.50***	3.02***	2.68***	2.33***
	(.28)	(.37)	(.37)	(.34)	(.24)
Men	.07	-.03	.24	-.13	.69***
	(.15)	(.20)	(.19)	(.17)	(.19)

Race					
Black	—	—	—	—	—
Other minority	-.86***	-.64*	-1.24***	-1.42***	.75**
	(.21)	(.27)	(.28)	(.26)	(.27)
Religion					
Protestant	1.92***	1.80***	1.46***	1.92***	1.19***
	(.22)	(.28)	(.29)	(.22)	(.26)
Catholic	.97**	.63	1.22***	.14	1.64**
	(.35)	(.35)	(.38)	(.29)	(.49)
Other	1.08	1.96	1.91*	.30	-2.73**
	(.66)	(1.02)	(.82)	(1.20)	(.85)
National Identity	—	—	—	.13	-1.42
				(.28)	(.74)
University Degree	-2.57***	-2.38***	-2.79***	-1.28***	-1.13***
	(.24)	(.36)	(.35)	(.33)	(.31)
Social Class					
Professionals	-.92***	-.98**	-.72*	-.61	-.95*
	(.25)	(.34)	(.35)	(.31)	(.40)
Managers	-.50	-.25	-.14	-.04	-.78**
	(.22)	(.32)	(.29)	(1.28)	(.28)
Self-employed	.20	.49	-.48	.61	.004
	(.29)	(.40)	(.45)	(.36)	(.37)
Non-manual	-.60**	-.16	-.34	-.04	-.63**
	(.20)	(.25)	(.23)	(.20)	(.23)
Missing	-1.37**	-1.44**	-.21	-1.16**	-.52
	(.45)	(.48)	(.54)	(.40)	(.33)
Constant	18.93***	18.86***	19.14***	18.80***	17.70***
	(.18)	(.21)	(.19)	(.18)	(.22)
Residual standard error	10.18	10.16	9.78	9.98	8.40
R^2	.16	.15	.14	.11	.16
Number of cases	2002	1166	1302	1637	1168

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

Table A3. *Coefficients from the Probit Models of Right Vote regressed on Social Group Variables* (*continued on next page*)

	United Sates				Canada			
Independent Variable	West	North Central	Northeast	South	West	Ontario	Quebec	East
Age								
35 to 64	.06	-.004	-.13	.07	.06	.002	.09	-.16
	(.16)	(.14)	(.19)	(.13)	(.08)	(.09)	(.11)	(.15)
65 and over	.008	-.17	.27	-.14	.14	-.17	.26	-.04
	(.20)	(.17)	(.22)	(.16)	(.12)	(.15)	(.19)	(.16)
Men	.31*	.35**	.46**	.55***	.17*	.32**	.08	.16
	(.14)	(.13)	(.17)	(.12)	(.07)	(.09)	(.10)	(.15)
Race								
Black	-1.75***	-1.75***	-1.17***	-2.05***	—	—	—	—
	(.55)	(.47)	(.33)	(.23)				
Other minority	-.45*	-.24	-.42	-.24	-.38*	-.54**	.05	-.19
	(.20)	(.27)	(.33)	(.18)	(.15)	(.18)	(.22)	(.45)
Religion								
Protestant	.90***	.79***	.71***	.41***	.12	.34**	-.17	.35*
	(.16)	(.13)	(.20)	(.11)	(.09)	(.11)	(.41)	(.16)
Catholic	.14	.88**	.41*	.22	-.12	-.44***	-.28*	-.16
	(.20)	(.14)	(.16)	(.16)	(.11)	(.12)	(.12)	(.16)
Other	.14	.01	-.04	.09	.01	.24	.06	.21
	(.20)	(.25)	(.33)	(.19)	(.18)	(.28)	(.38)	(.58)
National Identity	—	—	—	—	—	—	.33*	—
							(.15)	
University Degree	-.08	.23	.06	.003	-.17	-.09	-.17	-.02
	(.14)	(.14)	(.17)	(.12)	(.09)	(.11)	(.13)	(.17)
Social Class								
Professionals	.13	-.14	.28	.22	-.16	.05	-.10	-.02
	(.20)	(.19)	(.25)	(.17)	(.11)	(.14)	(.18)	(.22)
Managers	.23	.24	.43	.04	-.23	.14	.23	.008
	(.23)	(.20)	(.26)	(.17)	(.14)	(.16)	(.19)	(.29)
Self-employed	-.07	.75***	.61*	.41*	.18	.23	.10	.06
	(.23)	(.22)	(.29)	(.18)	(.10)	(.14)	(.17)	(.21)
Non-manual	.05	.27	.11	.18	-.14	.38*	-.03	-.11
	(.19)	(.15)	(.22)	(.15)	(.13)	(.16)	(.18)	(.22)
Missing	.11	.31	.24	.48*	-.06	.25	-.12	.15
	(.26)	(.20)	(.29)	(.20)	(.11)	(.13)	(.15)	(.20)
Constant	-.61**	-.67***	-.86***	-.40*	.04	-.63***	-1.21***	-.41*
	(.21)	(.18)	(.24)	(.16)	(.10)	(.12)	(.19)	(.17)
Chi-Square	54.9***	100.4***	60.6***	192.5***	45.8***	61.6***	18.19	14.14
Degrees of freedom	14	14	14	14	13	13	14	13
Number of cases	643	803	643	1127	1922	1294	1202	590

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

(Table A3 continued from previous page)
Coefficients from the Probit Models of Right Vote regressed on Social Group Variables

	Great Britain				
Independent Variable	South England	Midlands England	North England	Scotland	Wales
Age					
35 to 64	-.14	-.15	.12	.53**	-.06
	(.11)	(.15)	(.17)	(.20)	(.11)
65 and over	-.009	.04	.64***	.92***	.006
	(.13)	(.17)	(.19)	(.22)	(.13)
Men	-.09	-.03	-.11	-.12	.04
	(.07)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.11)

Race					
Black	—	—	—	—	—
Other minority	-.32**	-.45***	-.66***	-1.05***	-.35*
	(.10)	(.14)	(.16)	(.19)	(.16)
Religion					
Protestant	.22*	.38**	.13	.31**	.31*
	(.09)	(.12)	(.13)	(.10)	(.13)
Catholic	-.49**	-.20	-.19	-.77***	.33
	(.16)	(.23)	(.18)	(.20)	(.23)
Other	-.32***	-6.50***	.75*	—	—
	(.10)	(.00)	(.37)		
National Identity	—	—	—	-.48*	-5.82***
				(.21)	(.00)
University Degree	-.41**	-.61***	-.37*	.14	-.04
	(.11)	(.16)	(.16)	(.15)	(.16)
Social Class					
Professionals	.39***	.38*	.75***	.83***	.35
	(.11)	(.15)	(.16)	(.16)	(.22)
Managers	.65***	.73***	.81***	.79***	.49***
	(.10)	(.14)	(.13)	(.15)	(.14)
Self-employed	.57***	.35*	1.17***	.99***	.33
	(.13)	(.18)	(.23)	(.17)	(.20)
Non-manual	.39***	.34**	.44***	.49***	.37**
	(.09)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.12)
Missing	.55**	.24	.36	.94***	-.10
	(.21)	(.22)	(.28)	(.22)	(.20)
Constant	-.20*	-.18	-.63***	-.99***	-.97***
	(.08)	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)	(.12)
Chi-Square	103.2***	94.8***	123.9***	185.4***	48.3***
Degrees of freedom	13	13	13	13	13
Number of cases	2002	1166	1302	1637	1168

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

Table A4. *Coefficients from the Probit Models of Left Vote regressed on Social Group Variables* (*continued on next page*)

	United Sates				Canada			
Independent Variable	West	North Central	Northeast	South	West	Ontario	Quebec	East
Age								
35 to 64	.11	.05	.19	.03	.02	-.08	.41	.35*
	(.16)	(.14)	(.19)	(.12)	(.10)	(.13)	(.24)	(.17)
65 and over	.29	.26	-.17	.29	.02	-.0009	-.22	-.47
	(.20)	(.17)	(.24)	(.16)	(.15)	(.20)	(.50)	(.32)
Men	-.13	-.17	-.25	-.41***	-.31***	-.31**	.07	-.23
	(.42)	(.13)	(.17)	(.12)	(.09)	(.12)	(.20)	(.16)
Race								
Black	1.39***	1.62***	1.34***	2.02***	—	—	—	—
	(.42)	(.38)	(.33)	(.21)				
Other minority	.56**	.26	.56	.31	-.08	-.07	.14	.82
	(.20)	(.27)	(.33)	(.18)	(.19)	(.23)	(.39)	(.44)
Religion								
Protestant	-.78***	-.78***	-.65***	-.37***	-.04	-.39*	-5.19***	-.43*
	(.16)	(.13)	(.19)	(.11)	(.11)	(.17)	(.00)	(.20)
Catholic	-.21	-.29*	-.38*	-.17	-.34*	-.04	-.23	-.52**
	(.19)	(.14)	(.16)	(.16)	(.15)	(.15)	(.28)	(.19)
Other	-.36	-.11	.18	.01	-.19	-.07	1.05*	-.24
	(.20)	(.24)	(.33)	(.19)	(.25)	(.23)	(.49)	(.66)
National Identity	—	—	—	—	—	—	-.14	—
							(.26)	
University Degree	-.002	-.06	-.16	.07	.12	.28*	.61**	.02
	(.14)	(.14)	(.17)	(.12)	(.11)	(.14)	(.23)	(.20)
Social Class								
Professionals	.04	.28	.04	-.12	-.03	.19	.10	.08
	(.20)	(.19)	(.25)	(.16)	(.14)	(.19)	(.32)	(.25)
Managers	.0004	-.20	-.25	.06	-.07	-.20	-.04	.23
	(.22)	(.20)	(.26)	(.17)	(.17)	(.25)	(.41)	(.32)
Self-employed	.14	-.55*	-.64*	-.33	-.38**	.08	—	.03
	(.22)	(.22)	(.28)	(.18)	(.14)	(.20)		(.24)
Non-manual	.11	-.05	.09	.006	-.42*	.06	.11	-.004
	(.19)	(.15)	(.22)	(.12)	(.18)	(.23)	(.38)	(.26)
Missing	.04	-.14	-.07	-.29	.05	.30	.27	.17
	(.25)	(.20)	(.28)	(.20)	(.14)	(.18)	(.30)	(.24)
Constant	.14	.27	.47*	.006	-.88***	-1.27***	-2.45***	-.85***
	(.20)	(.17)	(.24)	(.15)	(.12)	(.16)	(.39)	(.20)
Chi-Square	45.6***	84.9***	63.7***	193.7***	35.1**	24.7*	27.5*	27.2*
Degrees of freedom	14	14	14	14	13	13	13	13
Number of cases	643	803	643	1127	1922	1294	1202	590

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)

(Table A4 continued from previous page)
Coefficients from the Probit Models of Left Vote regressed on Social Group Variables

	Great Britain				
Independent Variable	South England	Midlands England	North England	Scotland	Wales
Age					
35 to 64	.21	.15	-.01	-.32	.11
	(.11)	(.14)	(.15)	(.13)	(.10)
65 and over	-.07	-.09	-.32	-.38*	.11
	(.13)	(.17)	(.18)	(.16)	(.12)
Men	.02	.03	.08	-.13	.08
	(.07)	(.09)	(.09)	(.08)	(.09)

Race					
Black	—	—	—	—	—
Other minority	.30**	.44**	.55***	.76***	.14
	(.10)	(.13)	(.14)	(.13)	(.14)
Religion					
Protestant	-.30**	-.55***	-.49***	-.47***	-.42***
	(.10)	(.14)	(.13)	(.10)	(.12)
Catholic	.31*	.33	.22	.68***	.12
	(.15)	(.23)	(.17)	(.13)	(.23)
Other	.79**	7.27***	-.37	.88	.96
	(.29)	(.00)	(.37)	(.69)	(.56)
National Identity	—	—	—	.02	.13
				(.13)	(.40)
University Degree	.10	.37*	-.01	-.34*	.06
	(.11)	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)	(.15)
Social Class					
Professionals	-.47***	-.41**	-.76***	-.77***	-.65**
	(.12)	(.15)	(.16)	(.14)	(.20)
Managers	-.78***	-.85***	-.80***	-.60***	-.70***
	(.11)	(.15)	(.13)	(.14)	(.13)
Self-employed	-.48***	-.75***	-1.24***	-.52**	-.42*
	(.13)	(.19)	(.25)	(.17)	(.18)
Non-manual	-.37***	-.47***	-.61***	-.40***	-.38**
	(.09)	(.19)	(.10)	(.09)	(.11)
Missing	-.81**	-.52*	-.05	-.34	-.07
	(.25)	(.24)	(.28)	(.20)	(.17)
Constant	-.40***	-.23*	.22**	-.03	.51***
	(.08)	(.10)	(.08)	(.08)	(.11)
Chi-Square	125.1***	123.8***	142.4***	188.1***	60.5***
Degrees of freedom	13	13	13	14	14
Number of cases	2002	1166	1302	1637	1168

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests)



Figure 1. Effects of Age (65 and over/under 35 contrast) on Liberal-Conservative Attitudes and Vote



Figure 2. Effects of Race (visible minority/white contrast) on Left-Right Attitudes and Vote. (For the US regions blacks are separated and denoted by the letter b at the end of the region code.)



Figure 3. Effects of Protestantism (practising Protestant/less religious) on Liberal-Conservative Attitudes and Vote.



Figure 4. Effects of Catholicism (practising Catholics/less religious) on Liberal-Conservative Attitudes and Vote.



Figure 5. Effects of Social Class (manager/working class contrast) on Left-Right Attitudes and Vote.