Do Voters Represent Non-Voters? Policy-Representation Bias through Voter Abstention at the National and the EU Level.

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Keywords: Representation, turnout, european elections, second-order, comparative politics
Abstract:
Research regarding the determinants of abstention has shown that the group of voters systematically differs from the group of non-voters, i.e. non-voters are on average less educated, have lower incomes, and are not as interested in political topics, etc. Thus, if non-voters have different policy preferences than voters and political actors respond to their constituency then the group of non-voters is ‘underrepresented’ or a representation bias exists.

First, previous research has consistently shown that voting behaviour differs between national and EP elections because it is ‘less at stake’. Second, we assume that the two dimensions of the European political space consists of a high-salient left-right dimension and a low-salient European integration dimension. In this proposed paper we analyze differences in policy-representation occurring from voter abstention at the domestic level of the 27 EU member states and the supranational level and will show that distinguishing between different characteristics of non-voters helps us to better capture policy-representation bias at different electoral arenas. Using data from the EES 2009 we will show that there is a clear policy-representation bias at the national and the supranational level with different characteristics and different consequences.
1 Introduction

Representation is a key concept in political science. It is also a topic of dissent in day-to-day political life, whereas in this context the term representation often lacks an appropriate definition. This article exclusively focusses on policy representation or policy congruence since we depart from spatial voting theory. The key question we try to answer is: Is there a significant difference between representational congruence between voters and abstainers. Previous research showed that one important intervening variable in representational studies is the salience of a specific political dimension. Thus, we take into consideration that the national left-right dimension and the supranational European integration dimension pose a different salience for the European citizenry.

This article proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents our theoretical approach as well as our hypothesis and research gap. Then we outline the used dataset and estimation strategy. Section 4 presents our empirical findings and the last section concludes and sums up.
2 Spatial Voting and Policy Representation

In the following we present our theoretical approach, the assumed research gap, and the hypotheses which lead our further analysis.

2.1 Spatial Voting Models

The spatial model of voting, as pioneered by [Downs, 1957], is often considered the workhorse of electoral studies, and these approaches are ready for use in the toolbox of applied empirical researchers. While there are different camps, many traditions, and also some sects, any spatial voting model in principle claims two things: (i.) the ideal point of voters and the programmatic positions of voters may be meaningfully related in some political space, and (ii.) these relations matter for party evaluation and vote choice. Thus, the validity of empirical findings crucially depends on the ability of rational, self-interested voters to process political information and to meaningfully locate parties in a number of issue dimensions.

Thus, electoral behavior is determined by the voters’ assessments of ideological proximity or distance (Downs, 1957) or the extent of political change (Macdonald et al., 1991, 1998, 2001) within a political space. The scholarly discussion knows these models as ‘proximity voting’ (Downs, 1957), ‘directional voting’ (Macdonald et al., 1991, 1998, 2001) and ‘discounting’ (Adams et al., 2005; Grofman, 1985; Kedar, 2005). However, spatial voting theory not only provides explanations for the explanatory factors of how voters behave in the voting booth but also why voters may decide to abstain.

Concerning political information, European voters live in a relatively ‘information-unfriendly’ environment. The average voter gets her political information through domestic media, mostly television and newspaper. Thereby, the mass media fulfills several functions[1], whereas for my argument two functions are important: the legitimation function and the accountability function. The former poses that European issues and policies are made ‘visible’ by the mass media because of missing direct communicative links between the European citizenry and the supranational level. The latter refers to the necessity of citizens to receive information about the EU via the mass media, because of little direct experience with European institutions and multilevel policies. The average voter has to rely solely on the mass media to gather information about the European integration process. Thus, voters receive much of their available information about the EU via statements and interviews of domestic politicians (see e.g. Koopmans, 2007; Statham and Koopmans, 2009). Collecting in-

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1Koopmans [2007] speaks of four functions: legitimation function, responsiveness function, accountability function, and participation function.
formation is much easier for the average voter in the domestic context compared to EP elections.

2.2 Conceptualizing Representation

In modern political systems representation lies at the heart of indirect democracies, thus it is not surprising that there has been a massive increase in theoretical conceptions of representation (e.g. Mansbridge, 2003, 2009, 2011; Rehfeld, 2006, 2011) but also, unfortunately only partially related, in numerous strategies of operationalization and measurement of political representation (e.g. in the case of policy representation see Achen, 1978; Bingham Powell, 2009; Golder and Stramski, 2010).

The concept of representation does not necessarily need to imply democratic representation or electoral representation (see e.g. Saward, 2009 or Jane Mansfield’s conception of ‘surrogate representation’ Mansbridge, 2003). This difference becomes exceptionally clear by focussing on the concepts of delegation and trusteeship. In this article we focus on the possibility of representation of abstainers, we do not draw on non-electoral concepts of representation or non-elected representatives, i.e. representatives claiming to represent a group of individuals without any election at all.

First, we want to differentiate between so-called procedural representation and substantive representation or policy representation (see e.g. Bingham Powell, 2004; Ezrow, 2007; McDonald et al., 2004; Pitkin, 1967; Powell, 2000; Powell and Vanberg, 2000; Thomassen and Schmitt, 1997). The former concept refers to the influences on political representation of electoral systems, whereas the latter focusses only on issue-based representation. Since this article builds on spatial voting theory we will focus only on policy representation.

Second, for the purpose of this article we have to focus on two classical conceptions of political representation: the differentiation between delegates and trusteeship as promoted e.g. by Edmund Burke and James Madison (see also e.g. Pitkin, 1967, p.144ff., Eulau and Karps, 1977; Eulau et al., 1959; Miller and Stokes, 1963). The difference between these two concepts generally reflects the amount of discretion a representative enjoys. The representative as a ‘delegate’ closely follows the wishes and opinions of her constituency, whereas the representative as a ‘trustee’ may enjoy more freedom to act and make concessions or find a consent, although trusteeship does not imply that the representative may act as she wants (Eulau et al., 1959, p.748). These two concepts represent the ends of a continuum of how a representative may perceive her role or duty as a representative (Eulau and Karps, 1977). Scholars also often stressed the interpretation of representing the will or opinion of the respective constituency versus the interest of the broader public.
Surprisingly, there exists only a handful of studies investigating representational differences between voters and non-voters. Both studies compare roll-call votes in the US congress with policy preferences of voters and non-voters and find that elected officials really respond to shifts in voter preferences (Griffin and Newman, 2005; Marshall, 1978). This article contributes to the question under which circumstances voters may be better represented than non-voters or not.

2.3 Conceptualizing Different Arenas of Policy Representation

The difference in the interpretation of ‘delegation’ and ‘trusteeship’ helps identifying if and how non-voters may be represented. By comparing the possibilities of representing non-voters in the national and the European context we have also to take into account that policy representation may differ over various policy fields (c.f. Wlezien, 2004).

We assume a two-dimensional European policy space whereas one dimension comprises the traditional, high-salience domestic left-right dimension and the other one a supranational, low-salience pro- anti-European integration dimension. These two dimensions are clearly no simple policies but rather super-issues which represent rough political orientations. An important point is the differentiation between a low and high salience of these two different dimensions. Salience and representation are two interdependent concepts (see Franklin and Wlezien, 1997; Kuklinski and McCrone, 1980; Lax and Phillips, 2009; Miller and Stokes, 1963; Page and Shapiro, 1983; Pitkin, 1967) although their relationship is often neglected.

Salience increases the need for policy congruence on the support side as well as on the demand side, i.e. political parties as well as the citizenry. Political representatives carefully follow the public opinion regarding highly salient policies because of the need of re-election (Bartels, 1998; Canes-Wrone et al., 2002; Fiorina, 1974). In the case of low-salient issues representativeness may shirk the public will and follow their own policy goals (Lax and Phillips, 2009; Page and Shapiro, 1983). On the demand side, an individual does not take care about low-salient issues when deciding for whom to vote for and does not closely follow the positions of representatives on such issues. The main argument for the low salience of the European integration dimensions stems from Reif and Schmidt (1980) who argue that European elections are second-order elections because there is ‘less at stake’, because the European parliament (EP) still has relatively little power and - compared to parliamentary political systems - there is no directly linked formation process of a government according to election results of the EP. Further, scholars argue that EP elections are fought by national parties emphasizing domestically-salient issues and acting according to preferences of domestic voters (see e.g. Hix and Marsh, 2007, 2011; Marsh, 1998; van der
Brug et al., 2007; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996. Because there is ‘less at stake’ also the media coverage of EP elections is much lower than during comparable domestic elections (de Vreese et al., 2006).

Recapitulating and summarizing the above, we formulate the following hypotheses: In the national arena the representational relationship between voters and representative follows the logic of ‘delegation’ and thus policy congruence is relatively higher compared to low-salience dimensions. A voter gathers political information rather easily compared to the supranational level and is able to closely monitor her respective representative and to compare the own and the representative’s policy position. The political representative is also aware of this fact and tries to follow closely the median position of her constituency.

The informational environment is a totally different one when turning to the supranational political arena. Although, roughly the same parties compete for votes at EP elections the electoral logic is a different one. Voters perceive European integration as less salient, which also avoids the necessity of gathering enough information to form sophisticated preferences. The political representatives also know that they cannot gain electoral benefits by proposing specific and sophisticated policy positions, they rather assume that voters are seeking for ‘global’ representation or they follow their own policy goals. We expect that the representational relationship between voters and representatives follows the logic of ‘trusteeship’ and thus policy congruence is rather low compared to the highly salient left-right dimension.

In the next section we will present our data and estimation strategy to test the above hypotheses.

3 Data, measurement, and estimation

We present a secondary analysis of the European Election Studies data for 2009. With the PIREDEU project, the collaborators aimed at providing a unified infrastructure for the study of electoral politics both in the European Union and its 27 member states.

The voter survey, which comprises 27 parallel national survey modules, is not limited to providing a vast database which facilitates the study of electoral behavior and projection effects in EP elections. The scope of potential analyses is not constrained to the analysis of EP elections, but also allows for some more general insight into the context dependency of electoral behavior.

The PIREDEUS survey provides data about two so-called super-issues. The first one

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2 Further details about the aims, the components, and the methodological foundations of the PIREDEU project can be assessed in the internet: [http://www.piredeu.eu](http://www.piredeu.eu)
is the traditional socio-economic left-right dimension^{3} and the second one comprises a pro-anti European integration dimension^{4}. The EES 2009 asked citizens from the 27 member states to position themselves and the respective political parties on both dimensions. Further, also MEP candidates have been asked to locate themselves, their political parties, and the their political parties’ constituency, again, on both dimensions. Thus, the EES 2009 provides a great opportunity to measure and compare policy congruence between citizens and candidates as well as differentiating between a bottom-up focus, i.e. are individual positions congruent with individual party placements, and a top-down focus, i.e. do candidates think that they adequately represent their respective constituency?

Scholars used various possibilities to measure and operationalize ideological congruence (see Achen, 1978; Bingham Powell, 2009; Golder and Stramski, 2010). Golder and Stramski (2010) have systematically reviewed the different approaches to analyze policy congruence. The authors mainly differentiate between the type of relationship (one-to-one, many-to-one, and many-to-many) and if a measure incorporates not only the central tendency of a distribution of policy positions but also the dispersion (absolute vs relative congruence). A second strand of literature differentiates between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ measures of policy positions, whereas the former comprises policy positions as perceived by the respondents or candidates and the latter ‘subjectively unbiased’ ideological positions, e.g. mean average party positions of party supporters (Macdonald et al., 1991, 1998) or party positions on the left-right ‘super-issue’ extracted from manifesto data (e.g. Kim and Fording, 1998; Laver and Garry, 2000; McDonald et al., 2004).

In this article we follow a somewhat different logic. However, since we are especially interested in the possible differences of representational relationships between voters and political parties and abstainers, we have to define what to compare meaningfully. First, we use only survey data to assess individual and party positions. Generally, such data is seen as ‘subjective’ data. In order to compare differences between representational linkages on two dimensions and across 27 member states we have to aggregate these data, i.e. we will compare mean averages of individual and party positions.

Methodologically we will proceed in two steps: First, we employ a classical approach, i.e. comparing mean self-placements to mean party placement of voters and abstainers in various configurations. This approach has its drawbacks as many authors

^{3}The question wording is: In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. What is your position? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “left” and 10 means “right”. Which number best describes your position?

^{4}Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means unification ‘has already gone too far’ and 10 means it ‘should be pushed further’. What number on this scale best describes your position?
pointed out (e.g. Golder and Stramski, 2010) since we do not take into account the distribution of party voters, abstainers, and candidates. However, it will give us a first glance of the representational relationships of voters and abstainers. With this approach we can also investigate how voters and abstainers perceive policy representation and how party placements of abstainers differ compared to party placements of voters and candidates. Since we compare differences of these measures across two dimensions our approach also suffers from scale differences or the so-called ‘differential item functioning’ (DIF, see e.g. Golder and Stramski, 2010; King et al., 2004) and this problem leads to our second approach.

We use a standard methodological tool of multi-dimensional scaling called ‘procrustes analysis’. Generally, this method allows to assess the degree of congruence of two shapes in one or more dimensions. This method also allows specific transformations of the different dimensions such as dilation and compression (uniform scaling) as well as rotation, translation, and reflection, i.e. this method tries to maximize the congruence of two shapes using one or more of the aforementioned transformations (see e.g. Cox and Cox, 2001). This approach not only serves to overcome the ‘differential item Functioning’ problem but also offers the possibility to, first, compare the ideological congruence of whole party systems and, second, provides a measure of ‘misfit’, the procrustes statistic, which is the share of squared residuals to the overall sum of squares.

We will discuss further methodological advantages of our approach at the respective empirical sections but we will now turn to the first empirical investigations using simple mean average position comparison.

4 Voters, Abstainers, and Differences in Representation.

As mentioned above we will proceed in two steps. First, we present simple comparisons of average self-placements and party-placements of voters, abstainers, and candidates. Second, we use a more sophisticated tool, namely ‘procrustes analysis’ to analyze the representational linkages and maybe differences of voters and abstainers. Since we cannot differentiate between different average self-placements of abstainers across different parties because - by definition - abstainers expressed no vote choice, we can only compare the distribution of self-placements of voters and abstainers to get some notion if those two distributions are comparable.

Figure 1 and 2 show the kernel density estimates of the self-placement of voters and abstainers for the left-right and the European integration dimension. At face value
Figure 1: Comparing Distributions of Self-Placements Voter/Abstainer - LR

Notes: The figure shows the kernel density estimates of self-placement of voters and abstainers on the left-right dimension. Both figures give no reason to assume a significant difference between the distributions of self-placements on both dimensions. The distributions look like you would expect them, there is a higher density in the middle of the ideological spectrum and the density decreases towards the extremes. However, we also see a medium-high density at the extremes of the European integration dimension which may indicate that European integration is indeed a symbolic issue for a large part of the EU citizenry. We have also used a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to assess if the homogeneity of the distributions is also statistically significant, which could be corroborated for both ideological dimensions. The key message from this endeavour is that there is no systematic difference between voters and abstainers regarding their perceived ideological position on the left-right and the European integration dimension. Thus, we can now turn to the comparison of party placements stemming from different sources.

The results of the tests are available from the authors upon request.
Notes: The figure shows the kernel density estimates of self-placement of voters and abstainers on the European integration dimension.

4.1 Simple Ideological Congruence Comparison

We compare various measures of policy positions on the socio-economic left-right dimension and the supranational pro-anti European integration dimension. In this first step of our analysis the goal is to get a first impression of how the policy positions of voters and abstainers may differ across these two dimensions. It is not quite obvious what to compare if one wants to assess differences in representational linkages. There are many strategies like comparing the (weighted) position of the government and the respective constituency and in a further step the ideological positions of the opposition parties’ constituencies and the abstainers.

We refrain from this approach mainly because of two reasons: First, we want to compare a domestic and a supranational dimension, which poses the problem how to define a government at the supranational level and how to assess a specific spatial position and, not least, there is no government formation process tied to the outcome of European elections. Second, we focus on a more general level and ask how voters and abstainers are represented in their respective political and party system. Thus, we compare the positions of party voters of a respective political party with
Notes: The panels show on the left the self-placements (SPV) and party-placements (PPV) for the left-right and European integration dimension for voters and on the right the self-placements (SPAB) and party-placements of abstainers (PPAB).

the corresponding party positions and compare that to perceived party positions of abstainers.

Figure 3 shows the comparison of self-placements and party placements of voters and self-placements and party placements of abstainers across the domestic left-right and the supranational pro-anti European integration dimension. The comparison of self-placements and party-placements comes closest to a so-called ‘subjective’ measure of policy position because we compare ideological congruence of where voters and abstainers think they stand on a specific dimension and where they perceive the policy position of the respective political parties, thus we speak of ‘perceived representation’.

At first glance we see no marking differences between voters and abstainers on the left-right dimension. On the European integration dimension the self-placements of voters and abstainers seems the same across the different member-states but voters
perceive political parties to be on average more pro-European than the voters themselves. The lower-right panel shows the ideological congruence for abstainers on the European integration dimension with no perceived misrepresentation by political parties as in the case of the voters.

The next comparison is concerned with party placements as perceived by political candidates at the elections to the EP in 2009 and party-placements by voters and abstainers. Although, the used data is again a ‘subjective’ measure it is not a within-subject comparison as figure 3 shows, but a between-subject comparision, thus we speak of ‘relational representation’.

Further, contrary to the former comparison the differences in party-placements of candidates, voters, and abstainers may suffer from scaling bias (DIF), therefore we should handle and interpret these results carefully.

The left column of figure 4 shows again the ideological congruence for voters and the right column those for abstainers and the upper row the results for the left-right dimension and the lower row the results for the European integration dimension.

Concerning the left-right dimension we see small misrepresentation between party-placements of the candidates and voters, i.e. voters tend on average to be more conservative or on the socio-economic right than their respective candidates. Comparing the party-placements of candidates to those of abstainers offers no striking misrepresentation. Turning to the European integration dimension, we surprisingly see that across the 27 member-states voters and candidates place their parties on average on the pro-European side of the scale. Abstainers perceive political parties to be more moderate and thus candidates place their parties more to the pro-European end of the dimension.

A third and final comparison of ideological congruence refers to the perceived position of a constituency by the respective candidates and the party-placements of voters and abstainers. The implicit question behind this congruence comparison is: Do candidates rather represent voters or abstainers?

4.2 Procrustes Analysis and Ideological Congruence

Procrustes analysis allows to overcome the ‘differential item functioning’ problem by multi-dimensional scaling techniques. Since we assume that the European political

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6We have no educated guess that voters and abstainers may systematically differ in how they perceive either the left-right or the European integration dimension, if they do, also the former comparison suffers from ‘differential item functioning’.
Figure 4: Policy congruence - Party placements of candidates and voters/abstainers.

Policy Congruence – Relational Representation

Notes: The panels show on the left the party-placements of candidates (PPC) and voters (PPV) for the left-right and European integration dimension and on the right the party-placements of candidates (PPC) and party-placements of abstainers (PPAB).

space consists of a left-right and a European integration dimension which are orthogonal (the so-called Hix-Lord model, e.g. [Hix, 1999; Hix and Lord, 1997]) we allow no oblique rotation in the matching process of procrustes analysis.

Generally, our empirical approach is as follows: In a first step, we estimate the fit, i.e. the procrustes statistic, of, e.g., the self-placement of voters and the party-placements of voters on the left-right dimension. The smaller the procrustes statistic the higher the congruence on a specific dimension, thus the procrustes statistic is a measure of misfit. In a second step we replace the party-placements by those of abstainers and assess the congruence of the self-placements of voters and the party-placements of abstainers. In a final step we can now compare how these measures of misfit differ from each other, i.e. how the representational fit of voters and abstainers differ from each other.

We deviate to some extent from the first empirical approach because it is more intu-
Figure 5: Policy congruence - Constituency placements of candidates and voters/abstainers.

Policy Congruence – Candidates’ Perspective

Notes: The panels show on the left the constituency-placements of candidates (PPC) and party-placements by voters (PPV) for the left-right and European integration dimension and on the right the constituency-placements of candidates (PPC) and party-placements of abstainers (PPAB).

itive and more meaningful to assess differences in the misfit if only one matrix (the party-placements of the abstainers of the left-right and European integration dimension) changes and not both, i.e. the target and the source matrix.

Our first analysis focuses again on the so-called ‘perceived representation’, i.e. we compare the average individual self-positioning of voters and the respective average party positions on the left-right dimension and the European integration dimension. Figure 6 shows the data in a scatter plot. The abcissa shows the differences of the procrustes statistics for the left-right dimension between, on the one hand, voter self-placement and party positions assessed by voters, and, on the other hand, the voter self-placement and party positions identified by abstainers. We use again the self-placement of voters, because the self-placement of abstainers does not vary over the different parties in a political context. Another strategy for analysis might be to directly
Notes: The graph shows the value of the difference of procrustes statistics between the self-placement of voters and the party placements of voters and abstainers.

same data for the European integration dimension. This first analysis investigates how the perception of party positions differ between voters and abstainers and the ‘direction’ of the difference, i.e. if the difference is positive the fit of self-placement of voters to party placement of abstainers is better than the fit of self-placement of voters to party placement of voters, if the difference is negative the reverse is true.

Having a look at figure we immediately see that the variation of the difference of the procrustes statistics is much larger on the European integration dimension than on the left-right dimension. This first finding implicates that the self-placements of voters are much more congruent with the party-placements of voters and abstainers on the left-right dimension compared to the European integration dimension.

For ease of interpretation we added an additional 45 degree line. If a point lies exactly on this line we can infer that the bias between voter and abstainer congruence is the same for the left-right and the European integration dimension. The interpretation compare party placements of voters to those of abstainers, although this approach does not allow for assessing the ‘direction’ of bias.

Except this points lies exactly at (0,0) like Sweden, which means that there is no difference on either dimensions.
Notes: The graph shows the value of the difference of procrustes statistics on the European integration dimension.

of the results for Romania is straightforward and intuitive, the fit for voters is better than the fit for abstainers, whereas it is not at all plausible that the fit for abstainers is better than Bulgaria compared to the fit of voters, because that would imply that voters are systematically misrepresented compared to abstainers. Both cases lie close to the 45 degree line, which implies that the bias is (nearly) the same the left-right and European integration dimension.

Most of our cases show no or only a minor difference of congruence on the left-right dimension implying that voters and abstainers have on average the same perception about the position of political parties in the respective political context.

The next step analyses the ‘relational representation’-relationship. We compare the representational congruence of party placements of voters to those of political candidates to the EP and the congruence of abstainers party placements to those of the candidates. The data shown in figure 7 reveals again that the variance of congruence bias is much lower on the left-right dimension than the European integration dimension.

Bulgaria seems to be again an outlier. Showing a high degree of bias on both di-
Notes: The graph shows the value of the difference of procrustes statistics on the European integration dimension.

Dimensions the interpretation runs in opposite directions. Focussing on the left-right dimension party placements of voters compared to those of candidates show more representational congruence than the party placements of abstainers and candidates. Turning to the European integration dimension party placements of abstainers show a congruent with those of candidates. In Malta the perceived party placements of voters show the same representational congruence with party placements by the candidates both on the left-right as on the European integration dimension.

The last step of the analysis includes the perceptions of candidates of their respective constituency. This spatial locations will be compared with party placements by voters and abstainers. As figure 8 shows the variance is again lower on the left-right dimension than the European integration dimension although it is higher as in the previous two analyses. Again, Bulgaria and Romania are extreme cases with a huge congruence bias on both dimensions.

The key message from figure 8 is, that the congruence of how MEP candidates perceive the positions of their constituency and how voters and abstainers perceive the respective party placements do not differ considerably on the left-right dimension. On the European integration dimension the bias is much larger and thus voters and
abstainers significantly differ in ideological congruence compared to the perceived constituency position of MEP candidates.

5 Conclusions

Starting from our first analysis we can state that voters and abstainers do not differ substantively regarding the distribution of their positions on the left-right and European integration dimension. The simple mean average comparisons reveal only limited hints regarding representational differences between voters and abstainers. Instead our procrustes analysis offers two important findings.

First, the representational bias between voters and non-voters differs in all three comparisons between the national left-right and the supranational European integration dimension. The variance is always higher at the European integration dimension indicating that the representational linkage on the left-right dimension follows the logic of ‘delegates’ and on the European integration dimension the logic of ‘trusteeship’.

Second, we see marked differences between ideological congruence between the left-right and the European integration dimension indicating that salience may have an influence on the representational linkage between voters and MEP’s and the European citizenry and elected representatives.

However, we cannot say if following the representational logic of ‘trusteeship’ does automatically imply that elected representatives also feel responsible for abstainers. Regarding the influence of salience further research may analyze the representational bias using a longitudinal design, because we can plausibly assume that since the Maastricht treaty the EU gained in salience.

6 References


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