Increasing turnout inequality in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: economic disengagement or a progression to normalcy?

Ksenia Northmore-Ball
University of Oxford

Abstract

Post-Communist countries, with the exception of Belarus, Russia, and Hungary, have seen a decline in turnout since their first democratic elections. Studies that have so far examined this decline attribute it to a fading of the founding election euphoria (Kostadinova 2003, Kostadinova and Power 2007, and Pacek et al 2009). These studies, however, use only aggregate data and thus do not examine whether the decline has been even across all social groups. This paper instead uses pooled cross-sectional individual level data covering the period 1990 to 2007 across 12 post-Communist countries and asks if the lower turnout can be explained by frustration and disengagement among those people who benefited the least from the transition to a market economy. This new data confirms that the fall in turnout is mostly due to the wearing-off of founding election euphoria and a progression towards “normal” turnout patterns seen in established democracies where advantaged citizens are much more likely to vote than the disadvantaged. Other factors such as economic disengagement are found to be negligible in explaining the decline in voting.

Keywords: voter turnout; disengagement; founding elections; post-communist countries; political inequality

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Over the decade and a half since the collapse of communism, voter turnout in post-communist countries has declined dramatically and steadily (Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinova and Power 2009; Pacek et al 2009) as illustrated by Figure 1. Falling turnout has been widely noted as a phenomenon occurring across established democracies (Blais et al 2004; Franklin 2004; Gray and Caul 2000; Heath 2007; Wattenberg 2000, 2002), however the turnout decline experienced by post-Communist countries is quite different in size and speed. The turnout decline observed by Franklin (2004) across 22 established democracies was a decline of about 7 percent stretched over three decades; post-communist countries, on the other hand, experienced a decline double in size (14 percent) in just over a decade. These differences in speed and degree strongly suggest that the causes of the turnout decline in post-Communist countries are quite distinct from those identified for established democracies such as partisan de-alignment, the weakening of party identification (Wattenberg 2000, 2002; Dalton 2002), (decreased) mobilization by political parties (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), and generational replacement (Franklin 2004)\(^{1}\)

A handful of studies examine the turnout decline in post-Communist countries, arguing that participation declined as voters learned to distinguish between more and less important elections (Pacek et al 2009) and in particular as the initial euphoria of the founding elections waned.

\[^{1}\text{The partisan de-alignment and weakening of party mobilization explanations are unlikely to hold in post-Communist countries with nascent party systems. The generational replacement explanation would appear more plausible. I have tested this explanation in the post-Communist context, and I find that it does not work. Firstly, unlike in established democracies considered by studies such as Franklin (2004), the oldest pre-Cold War generation is less likely to participate in elections than the Cold War generation, so generational replacement would actually have a positive effect on turnout. Generation effects are included in this analysis and displayed in the results table for interested readers. Secondly, the period since the collapse of communism is not long enough for generational replacement to significantly alter the make up of the electorate.}\]
(Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinova and Power 2007). Kostadinova’s (2003) main conclusion is that post-Communist countries experienced a dramatic drop in voting participation after the unusually high levels of voter mobilization during the founding elections. Kostadinova and Power (2007) build on the latter study and compare electoral patterns in new democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America, arriving at the same conclusion as Kostadinova (2003), namely that the main dynamic explanation for turnout decline is the founding elections explanation. Their conclusion is substantiated by the strong negative correlation between election sequence and turnout, even when numerous institutional, political and economic factors are controlled for. These studies, however, all use aggregate data, and thus cannot examine micro-level patterns. To conclude, as Kostadinova notes at the end of her paper ‘Voter turnout dynamics in post-Communist Europe,’ we still do not know which social groups have withdrawn from voting, so we do not know if the micro-level longitudinal dynamics in voting patterns support the founding elections explanation favored by the existing studies. Secondly, we do not know if any of the other explanations considered by existing studies, such as economic disillusionment\(^2\), contributed to the decline.

This study seeks to further explore the founding elections explanation from the micro-level perspective. Using repeated cross-sectional individual-level data from 12 post-Communist countries covering 47 elections in the period between 1991 and 2008, this paper reconsiders the main explanations for the turnout decline in post-Communist countries and focuses on the extent to which the micro-level longitudinal patterns in the behavior of different social groups, identified by education and class, support the founding elections and other explanations.

\(^{2}\) I use the term economic disillusionment to distinguish a form of political disengagement that has its origins in negative economic experiences including unemployment and real wage decline from political disengagement originating from political causes such as the perception of politicians and the general political system as being fundamentally corrupt.
Explaining the Turnout decline in post-Communist countries.

The waning of the founding elections euphoria

The two main studies, which examine the decline in turnout in post-Communist countries, attribute the decline to the natural waning of the initial excitement during the founding elections which immediately followed the transition from communism to democracy (Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinova and Power 2007). The idea of the unique nature of the founding elections was most notably put forward by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) who noted, based on several case studies of regime change in Latin America, that the first post-authoritarian elections are a time of euphoria and unusually high levels of interest in politics during which people believe they can shape political outcomes; however, once the new political rules are in place, the excitement wears off. The core theoretical principle underlying the founding elections explanation is the idea that voting behavior progresses towards more “normal” patterns. For most post-Communist new democracies, with little or no democratic past, the patterns of voting behavior in established democracies would serve as a reference point to determine what is normal.

“Normal” voting participation patterns in established democracies are characterized by a strong socioeconomic bias or gap in voting participation between high and low socioeconomic groups. That individuals with a higher social status, measured by education, class, and income, participate more in politics than the disadvantaged is one of the most consistent research findings (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Brady et al 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone
Socioeconomic bias in political participation has been found to be especially strong in the United States; for a long time several have argued that in established democracies in Western Europe socioeconomic bias in voting participation is far weaker or even non-existent (Verba and Nie 1972: 340; Norris 2002; Topf 1995; See Gallego 2007 and 2010 for reviews of this literature), although recently studies have found that socioeconomic bias in voting participation is no longer unique to the United States (Gallego 2007).

The elements of socioeconomic status (income, education, and social class) are not necessarily direct resources for political participation, especially not for voting. Verba et al (1995: 358) find that income and education do not directly contribute to voting, except for when education helps expand the knowledge of vocabulary. Rather than representing direct political resources, Verba and his colleagues find that socioeconomic status shapes the ‘civic orientations or ‘psychological engagement in politics’ such as interest, political efficacy, and civic skills (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al 1995). Higher socioeconomic status individuals vote more because they are more likely to be active in several organizations and to be socialized among individuals who are interested in politics. Verba et al (1995: 358) find that accounting for ‘psychological engagement’ in politics in a regression model with the determinants of voting effectively eliminates any effects of socioeconomic status. As the elements of socioeconomic status are not direct resources for voting, changes in the socio-demographic compositions of societies such as increasing levels of educational attainment as well as an expansion of the salaried class do not necessarily result in higher levels of overall turnout (Heath 2007; Blais et al 2004). As socioeconomic status is primarily linked to voting participation via political engagement, the strength of the associations between these factors is relatively subjective and likely to vary in strength across societies irregardless of the socio-demographic compositions.
To understand how the political context and other factors influence the degree of socioeconomic bias on voting it is best to compare changes over time within one country. Indeed several longitudinal studies on established democracies have found that a decline in mechanisms that foster an interest in politics such as party identification (Wattenberg 2002; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000) and efforts by parties to mobilize voters (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) have been paired with increasing socioeconomic bias in voting participation (Lyons and Alexander 2000; Wattenberg 2000, 2002; Blais et al 2004). These observations suggest that a weakening of mobilization mechanisms matters most for people with low socioeconomic status who are less likely to become interested in politics on their own. One would expect that the waning of the founding elections euphoria in post-Communist new democracies would cause a similar increase in socioeconomic bias in turnout.

During the extraordinary times of the founding elections when populations are unusually mobilized, “normal” variation in voting participation along the lines of socioeconomic status should be suppressed. Individuals who normally would not be interested in politics such as the poor and the uneducated will be mobilized to a similar degree as those voters who normally maintain an interest in politics. As the initial euphoria of the founding elections wanes, levels of interest in politics should return to more normal levels: so high status individuals who under normal political conditions are relatively engaged will maintain their interest in politics and will continue to vote at high levels, but interest in politics and voting participation among the disadvantaged should drop with time to more “normal” levels.

Therefore if the founding elections explanation holds in post-Communist countries, the following micro-level patterns should be apparent:
**H1a:** The voting participation gap between education groups should increase with every passing election as the uneducated become disengaged at a faster rate than those with university degrees. The lower the level of education, the faster the rate of turnout decline.

**H1b:** The voting participation gap between social classes should increase with every passing election as turnout among the manual workers and farmers declines at a faster rate than among the professionals and non-manual workers.

*Economic disillusionment*

One of the difficulties in establishing whether the founding elections explanation holds is that the increasing socioeconomic bias in voting participation may not only be the result of the waning of the founding elections euphoria. The decline in voter turnout could in part be the result of disillusionment among the ‘losers’ in the economic transition. The same low socioeconomic status people who are most likely to lose interest in voting as the euphoria of the founding elections wanes, such as those with little education, farmers, and manual workers from heavy industries, were also the least prepared to compete in the new market economy and therefore most likely to experience disillusionment with the new political and economic system. Milanovic (1996, 1998) finds that in the first few years of the economic transition in Eastern Europe real per capita income for farmers declined, whereas those people possessing skills in demand in a service economy (accountancy, finance, foreign languages, computing) as well as entrepreneurs were successful. Bantelj and Mahutga (2010) find that sector dualism - the contraction of the agricultural sector relative to other parts of the economy - is the best predictor of income inequality in post-Communist countries, reflecting growth in inequality between farmers and other workers across the region. Although by
far, education rather than occupation is the strongest predictor of poverty in most post-Communist countries: Milanovic (1996) finds that there are almost no poor among university graduates. Several studies find that since the collapse of communism the returns to education have significantly increased thus expanding the wage gap between university educated and those with only a secondary or primary education (Orazem and Vodopivec 1994; Rutkowski 1996; Heyns 2005).

Based on the findings of the economic studies, we would expect that the characteristics of the economic ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ as identified above will be reflected by these groups’ economic assessments:

**H2a:** People with university educations and in service or non-manual occupations should hold more positive assessments of the national and their own financial situations than the uneducated, manual workers and farmers.

When it comes to determining the impact of economic factors on voting turnout, the general turnout literature is contradictory and fails to arrive at firm conclusions. Some studies find evidence that economic hardship encourages people to become politically involved to rectify the situation (Aguilar and Pacek 2000; Radcliff 1992; Schlozman and Verba 1979). Others suggest that poor economic conditions cause people to become disengaged (Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko 1985; Jesuit 2003; Radcliff 1992; Rosenstone 1982). Others yet, argue that economic conditions have no effect on turnout (Arcelus and Meltzer 1975; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Fiorina 1978). Radcliff 1992 finds that the effect of economic conditions depends on the level of economic development and the extent of the welfare system: in developing countries where people are not protected from economic downturns, economic hardship has a mobilizing effect, whereas in developed countries
with strong welfare systems, people can afford to withdraw from politics during difficult economic times. Predicting the direction of the effects of economic hardship in post-Communist countries is further complicated given that these countries are middle-income countries so they cannot be clearly classified as either developed or developing: Pacek et al (2009) predict that poor economic conditions should depress turnout as in developed countries, whereas Kostadinova (2003) predicted the opposite.

The question of whether poor economic conditions during the transition have contributed to the decline in voting turnout in post-Communist countries is still a largely unanswered question, and the existing literature on the topic is rather scant (Pacek et al 2009: 475). White and McAllister (2004) show that, in Russia, labor force participation is the strongest predictor of civic engagement and voting participation: the unemployed are less likely to vote. Pacek (1994), also, concludes that the effect of economic adversity on turnout is withdrawal based on an analysis of aggregate interregional data for four countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland). However, Kostadinova (2003) and Pacek et al (2009) both use aggregate data and are unable to find any clear relationship between economic indicators and turnout.

While the voting literature is inconsistent on determining the effect of economic conditions on turnout, the literature on attitudes towards democracy in post-Communist countries suggests that negative economic experiences could potentially depress turnout. Kleugel and Mason (2004) find that economic evaluations and perceptions of distributional fairness shape trust in the government and satisfaction with the political system. Neundorf (2010) finds that economic evaluations are positively linked to satisfaction with democracy especially among the Cold War generation. Finally Evans and Whitefield (1995) find a strong connection between support for the market economy and democracy implying that those who have done well in the market economy will also be more
supportive of democratic elections. In so far as attitudes towards democracy can influence the decision whether to vote or not, it is likely that economic experiences do have an influence on turnout.

If economic disillusionment explains, even if only partially, the decline in voting participation in post-Communist countries, we would expect to see that some of the decline in turnout among people with low socioeconomic status is due to their experiences of economic hardship. In a more technical sense, negative economic experiences should explain some of the growing socioeconomic bias in turnout. Therefore:

**H2b**: Negative economic experiences among low socioeconomic status groups, which are least able to compete in the new market economy, should explain some of the increasing socioeconomic bias. In other words controlling for economic assessments should reduce the turnout gap between the least and most educated as well as the highest and lowest social classes.

**Data and Variable Measurement**

The dataset used in this empirical analysis was created by pooling four different data sources: a collection of cross-sectional national stratified random sample surveys covering the period from 1991 to 2008 conducted as part of UK ESRC and EU Science Foundation funded projects awarded to Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield 1992-2009 (hereafter referred to as the EurEqual survey), the European Social Survey Rounds 1 through 4 (ESS), the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 (CSES), and Waves 1 and 2 of the study “Consolidation of Democracy in Central and
Eastern Europe” (CDCEE). The dataset covers 47 elections across 12 post-Communist countries with at least 2 elections covered in each. For each election in each of the 12 countries at least 1,000 individuals were surveyed, so in total the entire dataset includes a sample size of 105,812 individuals (for table with further information on data see Appendix A.1).

By merging several datasets, this study is able to cover micro-level trends in voting participation over several elections in each country. The analysis includes elections that occurred once the democratization process was underway. Turnout is measured through reported participation in last parliamentary election prior to any given survey. As the surveys are not actual election surveys, the gap between the actual election and survey can extend up to 3 years, so a control variable for the time lag is included in the analysis to account for variation in levels of vote reporting. Finally to allow for cross-national comparability all the data is clustered according to election sequence. For example, all the first founding elections would be coded 1 irregardless of the actual year of occurrence (i.e. Poland 1989 and Russia 1990). The dataset covers most of the elections between the second and sixth elections since the collapse of communism for all the countries in the study. Also all the surveys for each country that occur in the same electoral cycle (i.e. all surveys done between the 1995 and 2001 elections for the Russian Duma used to cover the 1995 election) are clustered together as covering the previous election.

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4 I use past studies on turnout in post-Communist countries as the standard in choosing which elections to classify as the first founding elections (Kostadinova and Power 2009; Pacek et al 2009).
5 Unfortunately owing to the lack of a sufficient number of countries being covered, I have been unable to include the first founding elections in the analysis.
The key independent variables for the analysis are education level and social class. These measures capture two aspects of socioeconomic status that are crucial in this analysis: the effects of political socialization within socioeconomic groups and the ability to compete in the market economy based on education level and occupational skills. While income and education are key components of socioeconomic status they are not direct resources for voting participation (Verba et al 1995); the power of socioeconomic status as a correlate of voting participation should really be attributed to psychological orientations\(^6\) associated with class and social status (Verba and Nie 1972: 133-135; Verba et al 1995). As the drastic structural economic changes in post-Communist countries altered income distributions and the status of various professions as well as the returns on education (Milanovic 1998; Heyns 2005), the psychological orientations associated with class and education levels that shape voting participation should remain stable as they are the result of past socialization. Ideally in the analysis we would include all three measures of socioeconomic status, income, social class, and education level, however given the poor quality of the income data, only the latter two measures are included.\(^7\) Education is measured as a three category variable: 1 – Primary 2 –Secondary and 3 –Tertiary, and social class is measured as a binary variable 1-Non-Manual/Service and 0 -Manual workers and farmers.\(^8\) Other determinants of turnout such as marital status, gender, party identification and so forth are not included in the analysis so as to not disaggregate the full extent of the socioeconomic bias in voting participation.

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\(^6\) The psychological orientations that Verba identifies are: interest in politics, political efficacy, information about politics and a sense of contribution to the community (Verba and Nie 1972)

\(^7\) In several of the surveys used to create the dataset, the income measure has a high number missing cases.

\(^8\) The social class variable only contains two categories since it was not possible to create a more detailed measure of social class that would be consistent across all the different surveys included in the dataset.
The education and class measures also designate the particular social groups that won or lost in the economic transitions. The winners may include professionals (lawyers, accountants and entrepreneurs), while the losers may include manual workers, farmers and individuals with low education levels (Milanovic 1998). As Tucker et al (2002) note, identifying the winners and losers simply by their social characteristics is unlikely to be accurate therefore economic assessments are a sounder measure of winner/loser status. The regression analysis includes both social characteristics and economic assessments in order to differentiate between general psychological orientations towards voting participation associated with socio-economic status and disengagement fuelled specifically by winner/loser status in the economic transition.

In addition to the socioeconomic status, measures for cohorts and age are included to account for generation and life-cycle effects in voting participation. Following Neundorf (2010),

9 Economic assessments are measured as a three point scale: 1- economic conditions are worse, 2 the same, and 3 –better, though for easier interpretation of results, the three point scale has been recoded to a binary variable for negative economic experiences (1 –the economic situation is worse and 0 –the same or better). The three point scale combines both retrospective and prospective sociotropic assessments and both retrospective and prospective pocketbook assessments. The four surveys combined in the dataset do not all include all of the four combinations of economic assessments (see Table A.1 in Appendix). However factor analysis conducted within each survey suggests that sociotropic and pocketbook assessments in both prospective and retrospective variants can be combined. The EurEqual survey contains all four variants, all of which load on to one factor suggesting that the four types of economic assessments indeed capture one latent variable. The alpha for the combined measure in the EurEqual surveys is .73 which is perfectly acceptable. The CDCEE survey also contains all four variants and again all four items load onto one factor with an alpha of .78. The ESS survey only contains sociotropic and pocketbook assessments in the present, and the two items likewise load onto one factor with an alpha of .40. The CSES only includes sociotropic assessments which load onto one factor with an alpha of .68. Finally factor analysis for the three surveys that include sociotropic and pocketbook assessments shows that both load onto one factor and have a high alpha of .71. Neundorf (2010) also uses a measure of economic assessments that combines all four variants of economic assessments and finds the combined measure to be robust.

10 To estimate separate generation and life cycle effects the three essential elements are included in the models: age, cohort and period effects (represented by the election sequence variable). To avoid the problem of collinearity (Glenn 2005; Neundorf 2010), cohorts are treated as dummy variables whereas age is treated as linear. Including all three elements allows for separation of life-cycle and
in Eastern Europe respondents are classified into three generations: the pre-Cold War (born in 1930 or earlier), Cold War (born in 1931 to 1974) and the post-Cold War (born 1975 or later). For the three founding republics of the Former Soviet Union, I use Mishler and Rose’s (2007) coding: the pre-Cold War generation (born before 1945), the Cold War generation (born between 1945 and 1965), and the post-Cold War generation (born 1965 onwards). Age is measured through reported age. Generally as people age they participate more in politics.

In order to estimate the longitudinal patterns in voting participation among various socioeconomic groups, I use a logit model with election sequence effects and interactions between the measures of socioeconomic status and election sequence. The basic model with the interactions is shown below:

\[ Y_{\text{Turnout}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{\text{Election}} + \beta_2 X_{\text{SES}} + \beta_3 X_{\text{Election}} \times X_{\text{SES}} + \beta_4 X_{\text{Age}} + \beta_5 X_{\text{PreColdWar}} + \beta_6 X_{\text{PostColdWar}} + \beta_7 X_{\text{SurveyDummies}} + \beta_8 X_{\text{CountryDummies}} \]

If indeed the low socioeconomic status groups are dropping out of the electorate at faster rate than the advantaged voters as the founding elections hypothesis predicts, the socioeconomic bias in voting participation should increase with time. Therefore, I would expect the coefficient for the interaction term between socioeconomic status and election sequence to be positive and statistically significant. When testing for the increase in socioeconomic bias, I test separately for increasing class and education bias and I do not include the both socioeconomic status measures in the same model as they are treated as interchangeable measures of socioeconomic status.\(^{11}\) Verba and Nie

\(^{11}\) Model testing for increasing education bias:

\[ Y_{\text{Turnout}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{\text{Election}} + \beta_2 X_{\text{Education}} + \beta_3 X_{\text{Election}} \times X_{\text{Education}} + \beta_4 X_{\text{Age}} + \beta_5 X_{\text{PreColdWar}} + \beta_6 X_{\text{PostColdWar}} + \beta_7 X_{\text{SurveyDummies}} + \beta_8 X_{\text{CountryDummies}} \]

Model testing for increasing class bias:

\[ Y_{\text{Turnout}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{\text{Election}} + \beta_2 X_{\text{Class}} + \beta_3 X_{\text{Election}} \times X_{\text{Class}} + \beta_4 X_{\text{Age}} + \beta_5 X_{\text{PreColdWar}} + \beta_6 X_{\text{PostColdWar}} + \beta_7 X_{\text{SurveyDummies}} + \beta_8 X_{\text{CountryDummies}} \]
(1972: 125) also consider the different measures of socioeconomic status as interchangeable in so far as they all serve as indicators of overall social status. Differentiating between the two measures is more important when examining the specific resources for various political acts, but not so much for identifying the effects of socialization across socioeconomic groups (see Verba et al 1995 and Brady et al 1995 for further explanations).

To test for the presence of economic disillusionment, a three-way interaction between election sequence, socioeconomic status and economic assessments is introduced. The three-way interaction is also accompanied by interactions between all the constitutive terms in order to avoid omitted variable bias through the under-specification of the model.\(^\text{12}\) The following illustrates the model structure with the three-way interaction:

\[
Y_{\text{Turnout}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{\text{Election}} + \beta_2 X_{\text{SES}} + \beta_3 X_{\text{EconomicAssess}} + \beta_4 X_{\text{Election}}^* X_{\text{SES}}^* X_{\text{EconomicAssess}} + \beta_5 X_{\text{Election}}^* X_{\text{SES}} + \beta_6 X_{\text{Election}}^* X_{\text{EconomicAssess}} + \beta_7 X_{\text{SES}}^* X_{\text{EconomicAssess}} + \beta_8 X_{\text{Age}} + \beta_9 X_{\text{PreColdWar}} + \beta_{10} X_{\text{PostColdWar}} + \beta_{11} X_{\text{SurveyDummies}} + \beta_{12} X_{\text{CountryDummies}}
\]

The ability of economic assessments to explain the growing gap in voting participation between advantaged and disadvantaged citizens, will be assessed by comparing marginal effects of socioeconomic status over time as explained in the next section.

Finally, it is important to note that the individual level data is clustered within countries and surveys. While the focus on this paper is on micro-level dynamics, turnout varies across countries and also, different surveys may vary in their estimation of turnout. To account for the cross-national variation in turnout, I include country fixed effects in the form of country dummies. I include fixed rather than random effects since for the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to distinguish between the different macro-level determinants of turnout, so all the non-dynamic factors which

\(^{12}\) For full discussion of the need to include interactions between all constitutive terms see Brambor et al (2006).
account for the cross-national variation are captured by the country fixed effects. The survey effects are treated in the same way.

**Results**

Before looking at the findings of the multivariate analysis, it is useful to look at the data descriptively. A glance at Figures 2 and 3 with the raw percentages of respondents who have reported that they voted in the last parliamentary election clearly shows that voting participation declined across all social groups though most so among the uneducated, manual workers, and farmers. The figures show that even university educated, service and non-manual workers, who are the most active politically, lost interest in voting after the initial excitement of the first democratic elections. In the second election, 84 percent of the university educated voted, but by the sixth election only 74 percent did. While voting participation of 74 percent is still high, the size of the drop in voting participation since the second election would indicate that one in eight of the active and educated voters dropped out of the electorate. Figure 4 shows that professionals and non-manual workers lost interest in voting to a similar degree.

The loss of interest in voting among the uneducated, manual workers, and farmers was far more dramatic. In the second election, uneducated people participated in the elections with almost as much eagerness as the university educated at 81 percent turnout, however by the sixth election, only 58 percent of the uneducated voted, which means that almost a third of uneducated dropped out of the electorate by the sixth election. The decline in turnout among the manual workers and farmers was greater than among the professionals, a 16 percent decline among the former compared to a 13 percent decline among the latter, however the difference between the classes is not as marked probably owing to the crudeness of the measure for social class. The uneven rate of decline
in voting participation across socioeconomic groups means that by the sixth election the different socioeconomic groups were quite unequally represented in the electorate. In the second election, the least educated even exceeded people with secondary educations in their voting participation; the difference in turnout between the uneducated and the university educated was an almost negligible 3 percent, however by the sixth election this gap has grown to 16 percent. Again, probably because of measurement error, the growth in turnout inequality between social classes is smaller: in the second election the difference in turnout between the classes was 4 percent and in the sixth election is increased to 6 percent. The greater decline in turnout among the uneducated, manual workers and farmers relative to the more advantaged resulting in turnout inequality across these social groups fits well with the founding elections hypothesis. As the euphoria of the first democratic elections waned, the initial interest in the opportunity to vote ebbed across all citizens, but particularly among the uneducated and lower social classes which in established democracies generally show a lower level of interest in politics. The reported turnout across education groups and classes quite clearly shows a progression towards the more “normal” patterns of voting participation seen in established democracies, which are characterized by turnout inequality whereby the advantaged citizens are far more likely to vote than the disadvantaged (Gallego 2008, 2010).

[Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here]

Though the patterns of increasing turnout inequality predicted by the founding elections hypothesis are quite clearly shown in the raw percentages of reported turnout, we still need confirm that the pattern seen in the descriptive statistics will hold even if variation across countries and several different surveys is accounted for. As I will show in the following discussion of the multiple regression analysis, turnout has declined to a greater degree among the disadvantaged than advantaged citizens, and as a result, turnout inequality between the two has significantly increased.
In order to test the hypotheses I estimate a logit model which predicts the probability of having voted in the last parliamentary election while accounting for country and survey effects as well as the ages and generations of the respondents. To simplify the models, the relationship between turnout and election sequence is assumed to be linear, so the election sequence is represented by a single variable rather than dummies for each election. The base model, shown first in Table 1, confirms that the overall decline in turnout following the founding elections is sufficiently strong to hold even when country and survey effects are controlled for: the coefficient for election sequence is negative and strongly statistically significant. Models 2 and 5 provide an initial test of the founding elections hypothesis (H1a and H1b) by examining whether a pattern of growing turnout inequality seen in the descriptive statistics holds even when country and survey effects are accounted for. As explained in the previous section of the paper, an interaction term between election sequence and each of the measures for socioeconomic status is included in the model in order to test whether the gap in voting participation between advantaged and disadvantaged citizens has increased. The multivariate results shown in the table clearly support the founding elections hypothesis: the interaction terms between elections sequence and education and social class are positive and statistically significant indicating that with each passing election the participation gap has grown as the disadvantaged lost interest voting at a faster rate than their more advantaged peers. To illustrate, Figures 4 and 5 show the predicted probabilities of voting for each education group and social class over the election sequence. The divergence in voting participation between the socioeconomic groups is clearly visible. In the second election, the university educated were only 5 percent more likely to vote than those with a primary school education, but in the sixth election, this gap grew to 26 percent. When using social class as a measure of socioeconomic status, the gap between professionals and manual workers and farmers grew from 2 percent to 8 percent.
Furthermore a comparison of the Bayesian Information Criteria shows that the strength of the models is greatly improved with the addition of the interaction term that accounts for the growing turnout inequality between socioeconomic groups. The strong model fit further confirms the substantive significance of the faster rate of political disengagement among the disadvantaged relative to the advantaged groups in the electorate in post-Communist new democracies.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

[Insert Figure 4 and 5 about here]

Though the results of the initial multivariate analysis show support for the founding elections hypothesis, the possibility exists that the uneducated, non-manual workers, and farmers dropped out of the electorate at a faster rate not because they were less inclined to be interested in politics in the absence of some mobilizing factor such as the founding elections euphoria, but because their economic vulnerability caused them to be disillusioned not only with the new market economy, but also with democratic elections. As explained in the earlier discussion of the economic disillusionment hypothesis, economic studies have shown that people lacking a university or professional education as well as farmers or low level industrial workers were at a significant disadvantage in the new market economy both in terms of earning power and the ability to find employment (Milanovic 1995, 1998; Bandelj and Mahutga 2010; Orazem and Vopopivec 1994; Rutkowski 1996; Heyns 2005). We would therefore expect these groups to be more pessimistic about their own and the national economic situation (see Hypothesis H2a). Figure 6 and 7 shows the proportions of respondents across education groups and social class over time who expressed

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13 The addition of the interaction term between the measures of socioeconomic status and election sequence reduces Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) by 157 for Model 3 with education and by 38 for Model 6 with class. The guidelines for assessing model fit using the BIC given in Long (1997: 112) indicate that a reduction of 10 points or more in the BIC indicates very strong improvement in model fit.
negative economic assessments. As expected, a greater proportion of uneducated people expressed negative assessments than of people with secondary or university educations. Though the proportion of economic pessimists across all education levels rose since the fourth election, people without university education have been consistently more pessimistic across the entire time period considered in the analysis reflecting their difficulty in competing for well paid jobs in the new economy. A similar pattern is visible in economic assessments across social classes: manual workers and farmers have been consistently more pessimistic than professionals and other highly skilled workers. Therefore, the descriptive analysis shows that economic assessments across social groups are consistent with the findings of economic studies on the relative success of these groups in the new market economy.

[Insert Figures 6 and 7 about here]

If the economic disillusionment model is correct, then we would expect that economic pessimism can explain at least partially the faster rate of political disengagement among the uneducated and lower social classes (see Hypothesis H2b). In order to test this hypothesis, one first needs to see how economic assessments affect the probability of voting. As discussed earlier, the existing literature has not come to a firm conclusion on whether the perception of economic malaise should have a mobilizing or disengaging effect on voters (Radcliff 1992). Therefore we first want to determine the direction of the main effect for negative economic assessments by adding them in Models 3 and 6, and indeed economic pessimism discourages voting as the negative sign on the coefficient indicates. Overall, people who believed that the economic situation had gotten worse
were 4 percent less likely to vote than people who believed that the economic situation remained the same or improved.\footnote{\textsuperscript{14}}

Next, in order to determine whether negative economic assessments explain the faster rate of disengagement among the uneducated, manual workers, and farmers, we create a triple interaction between election sequence, each of the measures of socioeconomic status, and negative economic assessments in Models 4 and 7. If economic pessimism can explain some of the increasing disengagement among low socioeconomic status groups, we would expect the growth in turnout inequality to be reduced once negative economic evaluations are accounted for. To put it another way, if the greater proportion of economic losers among uneducated, manual workers and farmers, is accounted for, we would expect the growth in the participation gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged to be much smaller. To facilitate the interpretation of the triple interaction, the simplest approach is to examine marginal effects of education and class across time while accounting for economic assessments. We can treat the marginal effects of education or class as a measure of turnout inequality between education groups and social classes respectively. Marginal effects are the derivative of education or class, which means they show how much the dependent variable, the probability of voting, changes if the independent variables, in this case education or class, change by one unit. Therefore, looking at Figure 8, a one unit change in education, in other words a person with a secondary education compared to someone with just a primary school education, would be about 2 percent more likely to vote in the second election. In the sixth election, on the other hand, a person with a secondary school education would be 14\% more likely to vote than the least educated person. So we can see how marginal effects are a way of measuring turnout inequality.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{14} Estimate based on predicted probabilities calculated from Models 3 and 6. All the covariates were held at the mean, with only economic assessments varying.}
If the economic disengagement model is correct, then we would expect marginal effects of education and class, in other words turnout inequality, to be smaller among the economic winners than among the economic losers. Figures 8 and 9 compare extent of the growth in marginal effects of education and class across economic losers and winners. Contrary to the predictions of the economic disengagement model, the figures show that marginal effects are actually minimally smaller among respondents with pessimistic economic evaluations than those with positive or neutral economic evaluations. If economic disillusionment did explain part of the gap in voting participation between the advantaged, then we would have expected the voting participation gap to be much smaller for those who believed the economic situation remained the same or improved. The key point though is that the rate of political disengagement among the uneducated, manual workers, and farmers does not depend on economic assessments. The rate of turnout decline is 24 percent for the uneducated and at about 18 percent for manual workers and farmers and these rates are the same for economic winners and losers within these groups.\(^{15}\) Not only are the marginal effects for economic winners very slightly greater than for the losers, contradicting the economic disillusionment model, but also the confidence intervals of the marginal effects overlap indicating that the difference in marginal effects between economic winners and losers is negligible. To further emphasize the inability of economic assessments to account for the patterns in voting participation, the model fit does not improve significantly by the addition of the measure for economic

\(^{15}\) Estimates of decline based on predicted probabilities calculated using Models 4 and 7. For those with a primary education who expressed negative economic assessments the probability of voting was: .75 in the second election and .52 in the sixth. For people with a primary school education, and positive or neutral economic assessments, the probability of voting in the second election was .78 and .54 in the sixth. For manual workers and farmers with negative economic assessments the probability of voting in the second election was .77 and .58 in the sixth. For the same group but with positive or neutral economic assessments, the probability of voting in the second election was .81 and .63 in the sixth election. All other covariates were held at the mean.
assessments and the triple interaction as a comparison of the Bayesian Information Criteria shows. To summarize, the findings show that the relative economic success of socioeconomic groups does not explain the inequality in turnout, disconfirming the economic disillusionment model. These findings serve to emphasize the importance of the interaction between different socializations of socioeconomic groups and political processes such as the euphoria of the founding elections that can counteract the natural tendency of the disadvantaged to lack interest voting.

Conclusions

Since the first democratic elections following the collapse of communism, turnout in Eastern Europe has steadily declined inspiring several studies on the subject. Most of these studies have concluded that the main dynamic factor underlying this pattern has been the passing of the euphoria of the founding elections. As these studies, however, have relied on aggregate turnout data, they have been unable to confirm whether the founding elections explanation is reflected in the micro-level patterns. My aim has been to further probe and determine the strength of the founding elections explanation by examining micro-level voting patterns over time using cross-sectional data which would cover several elections in each post-Communist country.

My examination of the micro-level causes of the decline in turnout in post-Communist countries confirms the founding elections explanation that has been put forward by the several studies on post-Communist turnout dynamics (Kostadinova 2003; Kostadinova and Power 2007). During the founding elections, following the collapse of communism, the entire electorate, regardless of social status, was in an unusual state of euphoria and mobilization. As the new democratic political system fell into place, the excitement wore off, and the electorate moved
towards more normal patterns of turnout. With each passing election, turnout declined most markedly among the social groups that are usually apathetic voters in established democracies: namely low socioeconomic status groups such as the uneducated, manual workers and farmers. This trend is reflected by the increasing socioeconomic bias in the post-Communist electorate.

This paper finds that economic explanations for the declining turnout frequently considered in the literature on post-Communist countries do not explain the comparatively rapid decline in voting participation in post-Communist new democracies. Although economic evaluations clearly have an effect on turnout – people with more positive economic evaluations are more likely to vote – there appears to be no evidence for disengagement caused by disillusionment with the new market economy. Even though the low socioeconomic status individuals who dropped out of the electorate most rapidly are also the ones who had the most negative economic evaluations, reflecting their weaker abilities to compete in the new market economies, economic experiences do not explain the decline in their propensity to vote.

The findings of this paper have implications for our understanding of voting participation and its links to economic conditions not just in Eastern Europe. The findings of this paper suggest that negative economic experiences like unemployment, declines in real wages, and declines in a person’s relative economic position, do not affect voting behaviour quickly. Rather the findings of this paper reinforce the conclusions of Sidney Verba and his colleagues who argue that the association between socioeconomic status and political participation is the product of a lengthy process of political socialization within different socioeconomic groups (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al 1995b). Verba explains that higher status individuals are more likely to be members of organizations and to be surrounded by other people who participate in politics (Verba and Nie 1972: 133). The environment determined by socioeconomic status in turn fosters “civic orientations,” such
as an interest in politics, a sense of political efficacy, and civic skills, which characterize a politically active citizen (Verba and Nie 1972). Although these “civic orientations” may not be immutable, a sudden change in economic circumstances, such as unemployment experienced by so many in post-communist countries, is unlikely to immediately change the effects of prior politicization and discourage voting. To summarize, this paper suggests that the “social” aspect of socioeconomic status matters more for voting participation than the purely “economic” aspect.

The findings of this paper indicate that a political phenomenon such as the occurrence of founding elections has a stronger ability to modify the standard relationship between socioeconomic status and voting participation than a sudden change in the relative economic success of socioeconomic groups. At first this finding may be surprising and it would appear to contradict the fundamental importance of socioeconomic status itself in fostering political participation. One would think that a change in the relative economic position, income and employability, of socioeconomic groups would have a corresponding effect on their relative voting participation levels. That this paper finds support to the contrary is actually not so surprising, if one notes the parallels between the effect of founding elections and partisan affiliation in mobilizing low socioeconomic status groups and thereby decreasing the disparity in participation between upper and lower-status groups. Verba and Nie (1972) find that the Democratic Party in the United States, which draws support more heavily from among low socioeconomic status groups, has a strong mobilizing effect on these normally apathetic citizens. Indeed several studies which examine the turnout decline in several established democracies attribute the decline in turnout to a weakening of party identification (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Wattenberg 2002; Heath 2007). Also several studies looking at turnout decline noted that contrary to expectations increasing educational attainment has not countered the overall downward trend in turnout (Blais et al 2004; Lyons and
Alexander 2000; Heath 2007;). Although these studies have not explicitly addressed the connection between partisan affiliation and socioeconomic status that Sidney Verba and his colleagues have made, their observations give support to the idea that as partisanship declines the participation gap between education groups widens as the citizens with little education drop out of the electorate even if overall levels of educational attainment increase. The link between socioeconomic bias and the decline in partisanship in established democracies is a subject that warrants further research.

In conclusion, the progression towards a ‘normal’ voting pattern that is more similar to that seen in established democracies, which is characterized by a strong socioeconomic bias, suggests that voters in post-Communist countries are not inherently different from those established democracies. The same differentiation in politicization across social levels that Verba and his colleagues have noted in established democracies appears to have occurred in post-communist societies. Given that a large part of the electoral was born and came of age before the collapse of communism suggests that the communist societies had similar patterns of socialization based along socioeconomic lines. The legacies of communism may in fact not be quite as unique as one could suppose in shaping voting behaviour in post-Communist Eastern Europe.
*Comparative Political Studies* 33 (8): 995-1017.


APPENDIX

A.1 The dataset

Table A.1: Distribution of Observations in Dataset by Country and Election Sequence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Czech Rep</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,932*</td>
<td>1,520*</td>
<td>2,029*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,000*</td>
<td>2,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,229*</td>
<td>1,503*</td>
<td>2,611*cd</td>
<td>3,099*ad</td>
<td>2,000*</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,021*d</td>
<td>1,004*d</td>
<td>1,000*d</td>
<td>3,183*b</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,005*d</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,314*b</td>
<td>3,506*b</td>
<td>4,092*ab</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,042*a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,230*b</td>
<td>3,084*ab</td>
<td>2,718*ab</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,980*b</td>
<td>1,968*b</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,183</td>
<td>11,151</td>
<td>10,756</td>
<td>9,886</td>
<td>5,079</td>
<td>6,973</td>
<td>3,042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.1 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Total for Each Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,621*a</td>
<td>3,512*ad</td>
<td>1,511*a</td>
<td>2,500*a</td>
<td>18,625</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,729*a</td>
<td>2,383*cd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,848*cd</td>
<td>19,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,368*cd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,000*a</td>
<td>1,033*d</td>
<td>2,031*b</td>
<td>15,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,826*b</td>
<td>3,631*ab</td>
<td>4,413*b</td>
<td>1,512*b</td>
<td>1,858*b</td>
<td>28,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,719*b</td>
<td>2,146*b</td>
<td>2,536*b</td>
<td>3,576*b</td>
<td>1,989*b</td>
<td>23,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,642</td>
<td>9,781</td>
<td>12,461</td>
<td>7,632</td>
<td>13,226</td>
<td>105,812</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### A.2 Economic Assessment Measure

**Sociotropic/National Economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Retrospective (SR)</th>
<th>Prospective (SP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EurEqual</td>
<td>V274: Thinking now of the country as a whole, do you think that compared with five years ago, standards of living have fallen a great deal, fallen a little, stayed about the same, risen a little, or risen a lot?</td>
<td>V275: And looking ahead over the next five years, do you think that standards of living will fall a great deal from their current level, fall a little, stay about the same as now, rise a little, or rise a lot from their current level?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**European Social Survey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>STFECO: How satisfied with the present state of the economy in the [country] (S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSES Module 1</td>
<td>Module 1 A3023 Economy Change (Q10 would you say that the state of the economy over the past 12 months?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSES Module 1</td>
<td>Module 1 A3022: Economy improved in last 12 months (Q9: What do you think about the state of the economy these days in [country]?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCEE</td>
<td>V186 Country’s economic situation during the present government (Wave 1 and 2) (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCEE</td>
<td>V188 Country’s economic situation next year (Waves 1 and 2) (SP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Egocentric/Personal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Retrospective (ER)</th>
<th>Prospective (EP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EurEqual</td>
<td>V272: Compared with five years ago, has your household’s standard of living fallen a great deal, fallen a little, stayed about the same, risen a little, or has it risen a lot?</td>
<td>V273: And looking ahead over the next five years, do you think that your household’s standard of living will fall a great deal from its current level, fall a little, stay about the same as it is now, rise a little, or rise a lot from its current level?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**European Social Survey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>HINCFEL: Feeling about household’s income nowadays (ESS1, ESS2 variation across countries) (E)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDCEE</td>
<td>V183 Personal economic situation during the present government (Wave 2) (E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDCEE</td>
<td>V183 Personal economic situation next year (Wave 2) (EP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Turnout Decline across Post-Communist Countries

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Database available at http://www.idea.int
### Table 1: Turnout Inequality Across Socioeconomic (Education and Class) Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Education as Measure of Socioeconomic Status</th>
<th>Class as Measure of Socioeconomic Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election</td>
<td>-0.184***</td>
<td>-0.378***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic status</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESXElection</td>
<td>0.104***</td>
<td>0.104***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
<td>0.026***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>-0.594***</td>
<td>-0.545***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Cold War</td>
<td>-0.572***</td>
<td>-0.489***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years from last election</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
<td>0.018*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Economic Assessments</td>
<td>-0.223***</td>
<td>-0.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NegEconAssesXElection</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NegEconEvalXSES</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SESXElectionXNegEconAssess</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.029***</td>
<td>0.965***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>101936</td>
<td>101683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>114302.8</td>
<td>112269.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 The models are estimated using logit regressions. The coefficients displayed are log odds and the standard errors are in parentheses. For Country Dummies: the reference category is Bulgaria. For Survey Dummies: the reference category is the EurEqual Survey.
Figure 2: Reported Turnout by Education Level from 2nd to 6th Election (Percentage of All Respondents)
Figure 3: Reported Turnout by Social Class from 2nd to 6th Election (Percentage of All Respondents)

Voting Turnout By Social Class From the 2nd Free Election to 6th

- Manual/Farmers
- Service
Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Voting by Education Level from 2nd to 6th Election

Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs

Figure 5: Predicted Probability of Voting by Social Class

Predictive Margins of class2categ with 95% CIs
Figure 6: Percentage of Economic Losers Across Education Groups
Figure 7: Economic Losers Across Social Classes

- Working/Peasant
- Service/Non-manual
Figure 8: Marginal Effects of Education on the Probability of Voting for Economic Winners and Losers (with 95% confidence intervals)
Figure 9: Marginal Effect of Social Class on the Probability of Voting for Economic Winners and Losers (with 95% confidence intervals)