

Has multiculturalism utterly failed? Not really

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Abstract

This paper subjects the criticisms advanced against multiculturalism to empirical test. It asks whether ethno-religious groups lead ‘parallel lives’ and, in consequence, fail to integrate with the wider society. It looks in particular at the alleged corrosive effects of multiculturalism, specifically at the maintenance of an ethnic rather than a British identity, social distance from white people and willingness to contemplate violent protest, but finds that all groups alike have displayed major change across the generations in the direction of a British identity and reduced social distance. It finds no evidence that rates of intergenerational change have been slower among ethno-religious groups that have made successful claims for cultural recognition. The paper concludes that Britain has implemented a ‘thin’ version of multiculturalism which has had little or no effect on the trajectories of any ethno-religious groups towards integration.

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A widespread belief in western countries is that multiculturalism, defined as a programme for giving recognition to ethno-religious groups and their cultures, has failed and is instead leading to the entrenchment of separate communities with corrosive consequences for trust and solidarity. This argument has been forcibly expressed by politicians, with Prime Minister David Cameron (echoing remarks of German Chancellor Angela Merkel) claiming that:

Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values This hands-off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared. And this all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for something to belong to and something to believe in can lead them to this extremist ideology what we see – and what we see in so many European countries – is a process of radicalisation. (Cameron 2011)

Similar arguments have been put forward by academics. For example Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) have argued that 'Britain and the Netherlands have promoted multiculturalism to expand opportunities for minorities to enjoy a better life and to win a respected place of their own in their new society. It is all the more unfortunate, as our findings will show, that the outcome has been the opposite – to encourage exclusion rather than inclusion.' (2007, p.5) Similarly Barry argued that some forms of multicultural policy (such as separate curricula and schooling) foster institutional separation and that 'a situation where groups live in parallel universes is not one well calculated to advance mutual understanding or encourage the cultivation of habits of co-operation or sentiments of trust' (Barry 2001, p.88), while Wolfe and Klausen have claimed that 'if groups within the nation state receive greater recognition, it must follow that conceptions of overarching national solidarity must receive less' (2000, p.29). Banting and Kymlicka (2004), who are themselves highly skeptical of these claims, summarize the argument as follows: 'MCPs [multicultural policies] tell citizens that what divides them into separate ethnocultural groups is more important than what they have in common, and that co-citizens from other groups are therefore not really "one of us".' (2004, p.231)

As Banting and Kymlicka indicate, there are additional criticisms, namely the 'crowding out' criticism (MCPs divert time and effort from redistribution to recognition) and the 'misdiagnosis'

criticism (MCPs misinterpret the causes of minority disadvantage as being due to lack of cultural recognition rather than to other factors such as racial discrimination). However, in this article we focus on the corrosion argument since this is the central issue for most critics. Our aim is not to debate the philosophical arguments about the justification of multiculturalism but to assess empirically whether or not the corrosion anticipated by the critics has actually occurred in Britain. We focus on the effects on the minorities rather than on the corrosive effects on the majority group (which would need a different research design).

While there are many different versions of the critique of multiculturalism, there is a central core of arguments on which we focus in this paper. The first step in most critiques is the claim that MCPs will tend to foster separate communities where ethnic groups lead parallel social lives. More sociologically, the hypothesis is that MCPs promote ‘bonding’ rather than ‘bridging’ social capital. The second step in the argument is that these parallel communities will preserve ethnic norms and values including some (especially on the treatment of women which is a particular focus of many critics) that run counter to the norms of the broader society, will inhibit identification with the broader society, and will hence lead to hostility and distrust between majority and minority. The third step is that these separate communities and lack of identification with the wider society will provide fertile soil for radicalization.

A central assumption of many critics is that the problematic consequences of MCPs will apply particularly to Muslims. Superficially there are some grounds for this assumption: in Britain some of the Muslim communities do indeed have high rates of in-group marriage and of course the 7/7 bombings were carried out by young British-born Muslims. However, this is not the end of the story. Firstly, many of the arguments would seem to apply equally to the case of Sikhs, who won some notable battles, for example over the right to wear the turban, for cultural recognition.

A second key but implicit assumption is that MCPs will entrench these patterns of parallel lives across generations. It is well-known that new migrants tend to rely on ethnic communities for social, emotional and practical support, and we might expect this tendency to be greater for groups whose members do not speak the English language and who thus experience barriers to social integration. Critics of multiculturalism however are making a stronger claim than simply that new migrants from

certain origins will tend to form ethnic communities. They imply that multicultural policies will entrench this tendency and maintain the strong inward-looking communities across generations and preserve 'bright' boundaries between minorities and the wider society. Another key assumption is that bonding social capital, and an emphasis on preserving communities' traditional practices, is incompatible with bridging social capital or a commitment to British values. They are seen to be mutually exclusive 'either/or' phenomena.

There is also an assumption that multiculturalism and assimilationism are the only possibilities, but surely this is unwarranted. Barry, for example, distinguished between two programmes of multicultural education. One, which he found acceptable on liberal grounds and which we term a 'thin' version of multiculturalism, advocates a common curriculum for all groups but is inclusive and pays 'due attention to the past and present situation of all these [ethnic, religious, gender, sexual orientation] groups'. The other, to which Barry objects on liberal principles, and which we term the 'thick' version, endorses separate curricula for different groups. The latter he sees as likely to lead to educational segregation with attendant corrosive effects on social cohesion (Barry 2001, p.238). We should distinguish both the thick and thin versions from assimilationism (to which Barry also objects on liberal grounds), which we take to be a programme that downplays 'difference', discourages ethno-religious groups from maintaining their own cultural practices, and encourages adoption of the destination-country identity, norms and values.

Broadly speaking, Britain has implemented thin versions of multiculturalism (for example with the educational recommendations of the Swann report, the exemptions for Sikhs who wish to wear turbans at work or on motor cycles, the exemptions to allow halal and kosher meat, and the extension to other faiths of the same rights to have religious schools as already existed for Christians). This contrasts with the 'thick' versions involving segregated schooling and curricula for different ethno-religious communities in Bosnia and the separate civil code for Muslims in India. It also contrasts with the assimilationist rhetoric (and policies such as the ban on headscarves) in France. Other than Barry, however, most critics do not make these distinctions between thick and thin versions and it is unclear whether corrosive effects will follow from thin versions of multiculturalism in the same way that they are expected to arise from thick versions.

A helpful framework for analysing this is provided by Berry (1992), who argues that there are two important issues that individuals and groups confront in culturally-diverse societies. The first relates to the maintenance of one's own cultural identity and the second relates to the nature of relationships with the wider society and value of developing relationships with other groups. This leads Berry to present a four-fold typology of 'acculturation options', namely assimilation, integration, separation and marginalization, which we reproduce in figure 1.

FIGURE 1 HERE

So the critics are essentially concerned that some groups, notably ones that have been given the benefit of MCPs, may be entrenched in the bottom-left cell of Berry's figure, and that radicals and extremists will emerge from groups located in this cell. A counter expectation is that in a liberal society such as Britain which has implemented a 'thin' version of multiculturalism, the normal pattern would be for groups to occupy the top-left cell with positive orientations both to their ethnic culture and to the wider society, and with dual identities rather than exclusively ethnic or British ones.

But even if we were to find that some groups were entrenched in the bottom-left cell, this would not necessarily indicate that MCPs were responsible. An alternative hypothesis is that the wider society's treatment of minorities might drive some groups into this category. Theories of discrimination and reactive ethnicity thus become an alternative explanation for entrenchment and corrosion.

The central questions that we address in this paper, therefore, are whether

1. Ethno-religious groups who have been granted claims for cultural recognition are more likely to lead parallel lives;
2. Groups who lead parallel lives show greater maintenance of distinctive ethnic values, particularly ones that run counter to 'mainstream' western values;
3. And show greater entrenchment across generations in their maintenance of an ethnic rather than British identity, distrust of the white out-group, and greater radicalism;

4. Or whether greater in-group solidarity, distrust of the out-group and propensity for protest is associated with experiences of rejection and hostility.

We focus on a comparison between Muslim and Sikh groups on the one hand and Black African and Black Caribbean groups on the other hand. Statham (1999, table 7) shows that, broadly speaking, Muslim groups have tended to make political claims for cultural equality and group rights whereas Black groups have tended to make claims for anti-discrimination measures (which following Barry we do not treat as multicultural demandsⁱ). Statham notes that Hindus are notably absent from either sort of claims-making, which he attributes in part to their relative economic success. This further suggests that we should see important differences between Muslims and Hindus in their social integration trajectories.

The plan of the article is as follows. After describing our data and the key variables of ethno-religious group and generation, we begin with descriptive results, charting differences across generations in the extent to which different ethno-religious minorities lead parallel lives. Here we look at patterns of co-ethnic partnership, friendship, civic engagement, worship, residential segregation and work. We then investigate the alleged corrosive effects of parallel lives, looking at changes across generations in value orientations, identification with Britain, social distance from the majority group, and willingness to support violent protest. From these analyses we can ascertain whether and which ethno-religious groups exhibit in the second generation the corrosive patterns of distrust, separatism and radicalism anticipated by the critics. We then model the data and test whether patterns of generational change differ between ethno-religious groups and whether levels or rates of change are related to experiences or perceptions of exclusion and prejudice.

Data and measures

Our data come from the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Survey (EMBES). The aim of EMBES was to provide a representative probability sample of the major established ethnic minorities in Britain – namely people of Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Black African background. The design was based on a clustered, stratified sample with areas of high ethnic minority density being over-sampled and areas with the lowest density (< 2% ethnic minorities) being

excluded for cost reasons. (In order to adjust for this oversampling, descriptive statistics are weighted while in the statistical modelling we control for ethnic density.) Addresses were screened for the presence of ethnic minority individuals. The achieved sample size was 2,787 respondents with a response rate between 58% and 62%, depending on the method of treating ‘unknowns’ in the screening process. The study was funded by the ESRC, and the Electoral Commission is a collaborating partner in this research. For further technical details and for the full questionnaire see Howat et al (2011).

Two key variables in this paper are ethno-religious group and generation. We next describe how we constructed these variables. Details of the further variables used in the analysis are given in the appendix.

Ethno-religious group

We constructed a combined ethno-religious variable in place of the usual ‘official’ classification. We did so because the Indian and Black African groups are highly heterogeneous in ways that are relevant to multicultural policies. We therefore distinguish within the Indian group between those who are Hindu, Sikh, Muslim or belong to other or no religion. This is partly because Sikhs can legitimately claim to be an ethnic group in their own right and because a great deal of the multiculturalism debate has focussed on Muslims.

We also distinguish within the Black African group between the Muslims and those who belong to other religions – largely Christian. Ideally, if sample size permitted, we would make further distinctions, particularly between Pentecostal, Anglican and Catholic Christians, and between different language groups. There are further ethnic or linguistic differences within our other ethno-religious groups too. For example, within the group of Pakistani background one could distinguish Urdu, Sindhi and Pashto speakers. We should note that the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups do contain small numbers (around 5%) who are not Muslim, but there are too few to permit a sensible distinction in our dataset. While our sample size is not sufficient for us to make these additional distinctions, it is nevertheless very important to remember the heterogeneity within all the groups that we distinguish and to avoid ‘essentializing’ the official categories.

Generation

We have found it helpful to distinguish between a ‘first’ generation, who were born abroad and arrived as adults, that is at age sixteen or older, a ‘one-point-five’ generation who were also born abroad but migrated before age sixteen, and a ‘second generation plus’ who were born in Britain and which also includes the small number of third-generation individuals whose parents were also born in Britain. For simplicity we shall throughout this paper refer to this latter group simply as the second generation.

The broad rationale for making these distinctions is that the first generation, thus defined, will have received most or all of their education in the country of origin and will have been socialized into origin-country values and identities. In contrast the one-point-five generation will have received some or all of their education in Britain and will have had more exposure to British values in their formative years. Finally, the second generation will have received all their education in Britain and will in almost all cases (99 per cent in our sample) be British citizens. We should note that the Black Caribbean group has the highest percentage in the second generation, whereas the Black African groups, being the most recent arrivals in Britain, are predominantly first-generation. This further means that for some analyses it will not be sensible to report percentages for the second-generation Black African groups. In general, if the base frequency is less than twenty respondents, we do not report percentages.

Descriptive findings

We begin with the claim that minorities live parallel lives and that this will be entrenched across generations. In table 1 we show the percentages of our nine ethno-religious groups who have a co-ethnic partner, who belong to a voluntary association whose members are mainly co-ethnic, whose friends are mainly co-ethnic, who attend a place of worship comprised mainly of co-ethnic worshippers, whose neighbours are mainly co-ethnic, and who work at a firm where workmates are mainly co-ethnic. Before the slash we show the percentage for the first generation and after the slash

we show the percentage for the second generation (excluding for simplicity the one-point-five generation, although they will be included in our modelling later in the paper).

TABLE 1 HERE

We have arranged table 1 according to the strength of the ‘bonding’ tendency in the first generation. Thus we see the highest levels of in-group choice occurring with respect to partnership, where around 90 per cent of the married/cohabiting members of the first generation partner co-ethnics. (Many of these marriages may of course have been formed in the country of origin before migration.) Associational membership also tends to be predominantly with co-ethnics in the first generation and there are also high levels of in-group friendship and of attendance at predominantly co-ethnic places of worship. The figures then fall off very considerably for residential neighbourhoods and workplaces. We have checked the self-reported figures for residential segregation against official (2001) census figures of the ethnic composition of the areas where our first-generation respondents lived. The figures tally remarkably well.ⁱⁱ

It is also striking that the south Asian groups generally show greater co-ethnic choice with respect to partners, friends, church and associational involvement than do the black groups. This applies equally to Sikh, Hindu and Muslim Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis: the patterns of in-group choice are certainly not unique to Muslims.

As to entrenchment across the generations, the pattern is not straightforward. We see little change with respect to participation in ethnic associations or residential concentration, although there is a modest increase in the extent of attendance at predominantly co-ethnic places of worship. In contrast there are clear signs of greater mixing across the generations in friendship patterns and in work patterns, and there are also significant increases in inter-marriage. The notion that even the most inward-looking minority is entrenched in a parallel universe is therefore a gross overstatement. However, the cases where parallel lives are least evident, such as neighbourhood and workplace, are ones where ties are likely to be weaker rather than stronger (and strictly speaking residence in a mixed

neighbourhood or workplace merely gives the opportunity for inter-ethnic ties; it does not guarantee that such ties, even of a weak sort, will be formed).

In table 2 we then turn to minorities' value orientations and attitudes. We asked two questions, designed to tap the two dimensions of Berry's typology of acculturation strategies, on the desirability of maintaining ethnic values and beliefs, and of mixing and integrating. We also included a question, asked only of Muslims, on the desirability of having Shari'a courts for all cases (which could be interpreted as support for a 'thick' version of multiculturalism) and another on support for traditional gender roles.

TABLE 2 HERE

The most striking aspect of table 2 is that minorities overwhelmingly support maintenance of their own ethnic customs and traditions alongside equally striking support for mixing and integrating. That is, minorities have positive orientations to the cultures of both origin and destination countries (that is, occupy to the integrationist cell of Berry's typology). This is equally true of all groups, south Asian and black, Muslim and Christian alike. Furthermore there is no generational change here to speak of. Most members of all ethnic groups, both in the first and in the second generations, have positive orientations towards both minority and majority cultures. Only around 5 per cent occupy the bottom-left separationist cell of Berry's typology and these are outnumbered by 10 per cent in the top-right assimilationist cell.

Similarly, support for a thick version of multiculturalism, at least as indexed by a question on Shari'a courts, amounts to just one fifth of Muslims. To be sure, critics of multiculturalism might be worried that the figure is as high as one fifth, and it would be wrong to deny that some support for separatism does exist – just as we could not deny that there is some white British support for ethnic exclusionism.

We also find some support for traditional gender roles, although even in the first generation only a minority of respondents favour the patriarchal model. Moreover, for the two groups where we have

large enough second-generation samples – Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans – there is clear evidence of convergence with the white British figure (14 per cent agreement with the patriarchal statement).

So this is a very different picture from table 1 on social relationships. Whereas in table 1 we saw high levels of bonding social capital and social involvement with co-ethnics, in table 2 we see positive orientations towards mixing and integrating, and rather low levels of support for a ‘thick’ version of multiculturalism. One of the key assumptions of the critics of multiculturalism, namely that high levels of bonding social capital would lead to unwillingness to integrate, does not therefore appear to be well-founded.

We next turn to feelings of British or ethnic identity, hostility towards integration with whites (as indexed by a classic ‘social distance’ question on attitudes towards intermarriage) and finally, a measure of willingness to engage in a violent protest ‘if the British government was about to start a war that you didn’t agree with’. These are three key outcomes and represent our best indicators of whether corrosion has in fact been occurring.

TABLE 3 HERE

In the case of British identity and social distance from white people we see major changes across generations in the direction of greater integration, rather than of increasing corrosion. Thus we see high levels of British identity even in the first generation, and these levels are higher still in the second generation, with significant increases among Pakistanis and the three Indian groups. We also see much reduced hostility to marriage with a white person in the second generation although there is no decline, and indeed some increase overall, in willingness to support violent protest. As Sanders and his colleagues show in their paper in this special issue, however, the overall level of support for violent protest in the second generation is no different from that of white respondents.

These are complex results, and should not be reduced to ‘stylized facts’ in the way that critics of MCPs tend to. In summary:

- High levels of bonding social capital coexist with positive orientations towards integration, high levels of British identity and low levels of hostility to white people.

- Intergenerational change is faster for some measures than for others – it is fastest for British identity, slowest for bonding capital.
- The overwhelming majority show positive orientations both towards their own ethnic culture and towards integration into British society. Only a small minority take a separatist position, rejecting a British identity, supporting Shari'a law or supporting violence.

Our provisional conclusions, then, are that, while minorities do indeed show high levels of bonding social capital even in the second generation, the characterization of minorities as living separate lives, rejecting British values and integration into British society is to put it mildly a slur on these British citizens. To check these provisional conclusions, and to test whether multicultural policies are in any way responsible for the less comfortable of our findings, such as those on support for violent protest, we now turn to formal modelling of the data.

Modelling the data

One possibility is that some of the apparent intergenerational differences observed in tables 1, 2 and 3 are due to confounding factors such as the differing age or gender distributions of the generations. For example, young men may be more inclined to support violent protests, and so the apparent increase in the second generation may simply be a consequence of the younger profile of this generation. Secondly, we need to check whether the rates of intergenerational change in our key outcome measures are consistent across the different ethnic groups: do groups such as Sikhs and Muslims who have asked for greater cultural recognition show a slower rate of generational change than groups who have not asked for or received MCPs? This is the key test of whether MCPs have served to entrench separatism across generations. And thirdly, is the potential support for violent protest observed in table 3 related to experiences of discrimination and a sense of social injustice rather than to multiculturalism?

We focus on three outcomes - preferring a black or Asian identity to a British one, social distance from white people, and support for violent protest. For each outcome we fit three models. The first includes demographics (age, educational level, gender, generation and marital status) as well as our ethno-religious group measure. (We also experimented with numerous other potential confounding

variables such as citizenship, language, income source and social class but none of these proved to be consistent predictors for these outcomes.) We control throughout for percentage co-ethnics in the LSOA in order to take account of the oversampling in high density areas.

In the second model we test formally whether rates of intergenerational change differ across the nine ethno-religious groups. In the third model we then include various mediating variables, focussing on the key variables identified in table 1, together with measures of personal (egocentric) experience of discrimination and feelings that their ethnic group is held back by discrimination (sociotropic). We show the average marginal effects, which can be interpreted straightforwardly as the change in the probability of the outcome occurring.

TABLE 4 HERE

Considering identity first, we can see from model 1 that a black or Asian identity is negatively associated with age (that is, younger people are more likely to adopt a black or Asian identity) and that, controlling for age, the second generation is markedly more likely to feel British than the first generation (up by 27 percentage points), with the one-point-five generation in between. It is also notable that it is not the Muslim groups but the black groups, especially those of black Caribbean heritage, who are least likely to feel British and most likely to adopt a black identity. In model 2 we then test whether rates of generational change vary across ethno-religious groups (that is, we tested for interaction effects). It transpires that none of the interactions approached standard levels of significance, and we therefore reject the hypothesis that rates of inter-generational change vary.ⁱⁱⁱ

In model 3 we then introduce mediating variables to see how far ethno-religious or generational differences can be explained by differences in bonding social capital or experiences of discrimination. Our measures of bonding social capital are co-ethnic friendship, neighbours, places of worship and ethnic associations. Of these variables, membership of a co-ethnic association has the strongest association with a black or Asian identity. We must be careful to remember however that we cannot be sure about the direction of causation.

We also include measures of reported individual (egocentric) and group (sociotropic) discrimination. As we can see both forms of discrimination increase one's likelihood of feeling black or Asian rather than British, with perceptions that the group is held back by discrimination proving to be more important than any of our other predictors except age and generation (a difference of 25 percentage points between those who are most aware and those least aware of group discrimination).

Turning next to social distance, we again see considerable generational progress towards reducing social distance. However, the ethno-religious differences are almost the exact opposite of those found for identity. In the case of social distance we find that the black groups are much less bothered about intermarriage with a white person than are the south Asian groups, with people of Pakistani background showing the highest level of concern. In other words, despite their lesser acceptance of a British identity, black groups show a greater acceptance of white people. This is an important contrast, which is confirmed by other scholars using different datasets (e.g. Muttarak and Heath 2010, Maxwell 2010).

As with identity, none of the interaction terms between ethno-religious group and generation proves to be statistically significant, and we can therefore reject the hypothesis that rates of inter-generational change differ. Our mediating variables, too, operate in much the same way as with identity, membership of a co-ethnic association and perceptions of individual and group discrimination being associated with greater social distance.

Finally we turn to support for violent protest. Here we get a different pattern. The generational trend, albeit modest in size (a change of only five percentage points between the first and second generations), is towards greater willingness to protest. Furthermore, unlike identity and social distance, there are no significant ethno-religious differences in support for violent protest: in particular Muslims show no greater support for violence than do other south Asians or blacks.

As with ethnic identity, perceptions of group discrimination are associated with support for violent protest (a ten percentage point difference), as is membership of ethnic associations (five percentage points). This small minority of protesters cannot therefore be characterized as 'rootless'. However, it is also clear that all these 'effects' are substantively rather small. In other words, we should be very careful not to exaggerate the importance ethnic organisations or generational change as a source of

radicalisation. The other distinguishing characteristics of people who might be prepared to engage in violent protest are that they are young and male. This profile almost certainly fits white British protesters too and probably has nothing to do with Muslim or ethnic radicalization.

Conclusions

The first lesson to be drawn from our evidence is that patterns of inter-group relations do not fall into a neat set of ‘stylized facts’ of the sort favoured by critics of multiculturalism. On the one hand it is true, according to our evidence, that some south Asian groups, particularly those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi background, do exhibit high levels of bonding social capital, but they do not lead parallel lives since residential and workplace segregation is actually rather low. Consistently with this, we also find that people of Pakistani and Bangladeshi background are the most likely to feel bothered about intermarriage. On the other hand, it is not true that they are more inclined to preserve their own values, to reject integration into British society, to reject a British identity, or to contemplate violent protest than are other ethno-religious groups. Indeed, it is the black groups who are the most likely to reject a British identity, while there are scarcely any differences in the propensity to contemplate violent protest. In short, levels of bonding social capital are not especially correlated with willingness to integrate, British identity or support for protest. As table 4 showed, the only one of the ‘bonding’ measures that consistently predicts our three outcomes is membership of a co-ethnic organization.

The second lesson to be drawn is that patterns of intergenerational change do not fall into a neat set of stylized facts either. While there was rather little change in the extent of ethnic intermarriage, desire to maintain ethnic customs or support for Shari’a law, there were large movements towards inter-ethnic friendships, British identity and norms of gender roles, and reduced feelings of social distance from whites.

And a third lesson is that the mechanisms involved in negative outcomes cannot be reduced to a neat model of parallel lives. Experience of discrimination and feelings of collective relative deprivation have some of the strongest effects on negative outcomes.

The key point, however, is that these patterns of intergenerational stability or change are uniform across all the ethno-religious groups that we were able to distinguish. In other words, there was no sign in our data that the groups that had made successful claims for recognition of cultural practices, particularly Sikhs and Muslims, made slower intergenerational progress towards integration than did other groups such as Hindus or non-Muslim blacks. So, while our evidence does not support a stylized version of either parallel lives with corrosive implications or of 'straight line' intergenerational progress towards assimilation, it strongly suggests that multicultural policies have played little part in the story. This makes perfect sense since the kinds of MCP enacted in Britain have been modest ones that comfortably fit within our concept of 'thin' multiculturalism. Had Britain instituted the 'thick' versions that obtain in pillarized societies such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, then entrenchment of parallel lives and mutual suspicion might well obtain. But as a simple rule of thumb, modest interventions are likely to have at best modest effects (and ones that are difficult to detect). MCPs are an easy headline-grabbing target for politicians and critics, but as social scientists we need to look for more subtle explanations of the processes of change.

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Figure 1. *Four acculturation strategies*

		<i>Is it considered to be of value to maintain cultural identity and characteristics?</i>	
		Yes	No
<i>Is it considered to be of value to maintain relationships with other groups?</i>	Yes	Integration	Assimilation
	No	Separation/Segregation	Marginalization

Source: Berry 1992

Table 1. *Parallel lives?* (Cell percentages, 1st generation before the slash and 2nd + after the slash, 1.5 excluded)

	Co-ethnic partner	association members mainly co-ethnic	Friends mainly co-ethnic	Fellow worshippers mainly co-ethnic	Neighbours mainly co-ethnic	Workmates mainly co-ethnic
Bangladeshi	100/88	88/77	63/49	46/55	26/38	40/17
Pakistani	96/98	75/74	61/55	66/79	36/39	37/21
Indian Sikh	96/94	96/82	65/42	85/91	14/16	36/10
Indian Hindu	97/100	82/88	59/42	71/83	16/9	15/10
Indian Muslim	90/73	-/-	76/49	52/60	16/36	-/25
BA Muslim	90/-	64/-	53/56	24/-	13/-	17/7
Other BA	88/-	68/70	57/28	42/50	8/7	18/3
Black Caribbean	90/52	79/67	53/39	34/30	10/7	7/7
All minorities	89/76	76/71	57/39	52/58	20/19	21/10

Notes: Weighted; significant inter-generational changes (at 0.05 level) emboldened. Percentages not reported where N < 20. The base excludes non-partnered (column 1), non-members of associations or religions (columns 2 and 4) and non-workers (column 6).

Table 2. *Generational change in attitudes and orientations (cell percentages)*

	minorities should maintain own values	minorities should mix and integrate	Shari'a law should apply to all cases	husband should work and wife stay at home
Bangladeshi	85/82	93/86	19/22	17/-
Pakistani	82/81	92/93	19/22	38/18
Indian Sikh	92/91	99/95	-	15/-
Indian Hindu	87/93	93/98	-	19/-
Indian Muslim	72/77	92/92	21/6	-
BA Muslim	80/-	91/-	16/-	33/-
Other BA	74/85	91/89	-	20/-
Black Caribbean	82/83	97/93	-	25/13
All minorities	81/83	92/92	20/19	26/14

Notes: Weighted; significant inter-generational changes (at 0.05 level) emboldened. Percentages not reported where N < 20. Gender role question asked in mailback supplement; Shari'a question asked only of Muslims.

Table 3. *Generational change in identity, social distance and support for violent protest (cell percentages)*

	Feel equally or more British than black/Asian	Bothered about marriage with white person	Might support violent protest against war
Pakistani	67/85	29/14	6/19
Bangladeshi	63/75	19/12	8/17
Indian Sikh	56/86	24/ 8	14/12
Indian Hindu	53/73	18/ 4	6/ 4
Indian Muslim	60/95	16/ 0	12/ 5
BA Muslim	55/-	10/-	3/-
Other BA	48/60	14/11	7/19
Black	51/69	10/ 7	6/ 7
Caribbean			
All minorities	57/75	20/ 9	6/13

Notes: Weighted; significant inter-generational changes (at 0.05 level) emboldened. Percentages not reported where N < 20.

Table 4. *Logistic regression of identity, social distance and support for violent protest (average marginal effects)*

	Feels more black/Asian than British		Bothered about marriage to white person		Might support violent protest against war	
	Model 1	Model 3	Model 1	Model 3	Model 1	Model 3
<i>Ethno-religious group</i>						
Pakistani	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bangladeshi	0.07*	0.06	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Indian Sikh	0.08*	0.05	-0.07**	-0.08*	0.04	0.02
Indian Hindu	0.11**	0.10**	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.01	-0.02
Indian Muslim	-0.02	-0.01	-0.09*	-0.08	-0.02	-0.02
Other Indian	0.05	0.03	-0.12**	-0.13**	0.00	0.00
BA Muslim	0.13***	0.14**	-0.10*	-0.11**	-0.02	-0.03
Other BA	0.25***	0.20***	-0.03	-0.05	0.04**	0.02
Black Caribbean	0.24***	0.21***	-0.07**	-0.09***	-0.03*	-0.04
<i>Generation</i>						
1 st	0	0	0	0	0	0
1.5	-0.13***	-0.14***	-0.06**	-0.07**	0.06***	0.05***
2 nd +	-0.25***	-0.27***	-0.11***	-0.12***	0.06***	0.05***
Age (ln)	-0.31***	-0.33***	-0.04	-0.04	-0.08**	-0.09**
Gender	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.03**	-0.03**
Married	0.00	0.00	0.03*	0.03*	0.00	0.00
Education	0.00	0.00	-0.01*	-0.01**	0.00	0.00
<i>Interactions between generation and ethno-religious group</i>						
	NS		NS		NS	
Co-ethnic friends		0.03**		-0.02		0.00
Co-ethnic neighbours		0.01		0.01		-0.01
Co-ethnic worship		-0.02		0.01		0.02
Co-ethnic association		0.08***		0.06***		0.05**
Sociotropic discrimination		0.25***		0.06		0.10***
Egocentric discrimination		0.09***		0.07***		0.00
Percentage co-ethnic (ln)	0.06	0.04	0.11**	0.09*	-0.01	0.00
Index of multiple deprivation (ln)		0.08		-0.03		-0.04
<i>N</i>	2552	2552	2537	2537	2520	2520

Notes: Unweighted; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. Models run in STATA with robust standard errors. The Average Marginal Effects (AME) report the change in the dependent variable computed at different values of the *X* variables and then *averaged* across the different values. For dummy variables, the marginal effect shows by how much the probability of the outcome is predicted to change as *x* changes from 0 to 1 holding all other explanatory variables equal. For ordinal variables, the AME report the predicted change for an increase in *x* of one unit. For the continuous variables, we report the difference between the probability of the outcome occurring for the lowest and highest value that the variable can take.

Appendix: Definitions of variables used in Table 4

Independent Variable	
Age	Natural logarithm of Age
Gender	0=Male; 1=Female
Married	0=Not Married; 1=married/cohabiting
Education	0=None; 1=Low; 2=GCSE; 3=A level; 4=Degree
Generation	0=1 st generation; 1=1.5; 2=2 nd +
Ethno-religious group	0=Pakistani; 1=Bangladeshi; 2=Indian Sikh; 3=Indian Hindu; 4=Indian Muslim; 5=Other Indian; 6=Black African Muslim; 7=Other Black African; 8=Black Caribbean
Co-ethnic Friends	‘As far as you know, how many of your friends have the same ethnic background as you?’ 5 = All of them, 4= Most of them; 3=About half of them, don’t know; 2=A few of them; 1= None of them
Co-ethnic Neighbours	‘As far as you know, how many of the people in your neighbourhood have the same ethnic background as you?’ 5 = All of them, 4= Most of them; 3=About half of them, don’t know; 2=A few of them; 1= None of them
Co-ethnic Association	0= Does not participate in any association or participates in non-ethnic association; 1=participates in ethnic association
Co-ethnic worship	0=Not a church member or non-ethnic church member; 1= Member of co-ethnic church
Egocentric Discrimination	0=Not experienced race discrimination; 1=Experienced race discrimination
Sociotropic Deprivation	‘There is a big gap between what people from my ethnic group expect to get out of life and what they receive’. ‘Non-White people don’t have the same opportunities and chances in life as White people, as they are held back by prejudice and discrimination.’ Both items recoded so that 1 = strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3 = don’t know, neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree; 5=strongly agree. Scores summed.
Percentage Co-ethnic	Natural Logarithm of Percentage Co-ethnics in the LSOA
IMD	Natural Logarithm of the Index of Multiple Deprivation
Dependent Variable	
Social Distance	How far respondent would be bothered if a close family member married a white person : 0 = not at all, not very much, a little, no opinion; 1 = rather a lot, a great deal
Feel more black/Asian than British	0= Equally (Black/Asian) and British, More British than (Black/Asian), British not (Black/Asian), other answers; 1 =(Black/Asian) not British, More (Black/Asian) than British
Might Support Violent Protest against War	0=No, don’t know; 1=Yes

ⁱ While Banting and Kymlicka (2004) include affirmative action policies as one of the components of their index of multicultural policies, we do not regard anti-discrimination policies as falling within the definition of MCPs since they do not focus on cultural rights but aim to ensure simply that minorities achieve the same opportunities as does the majority population.

ⁱⁱ According to Census the co-ethnic proportion in the LSOAs where our first-generation Caribbeans lived was 9%, and the corresponding figures were 14% for Bangladeshis, 22% for Sikhs and 23% for Pakistanis.

ⁱⁱⁱ Change in chi² for identity was 12 (8df), for social distance 10 (8df) and for protest was 8 (8df).